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FIRST, DO NO HARM: THE USE OF COVERT VIDEO
SURVEILLANCE TO DETECT MUNCHAUSEN SYNDROME
BY PROXY-AN UNETHICAL MEANS OF "PREVENTING"
CHILD ABUSE
Michael T. Flannery*
Since it was first identified in 1977, Munchausen Syndrome by Proxy has uniquely
affected the way in which the medical and legal communities deal with the issue of
child abuse. Inherent in the medical response to the disease are issues of suspicion,
investigation, identification, confrontation, and, of course, the health of an inno-
cent child. Given the deceptive dynamics of the disease, however, denial and disbelief
naturally overshadow every action taken by medical professionals in pursuing these
issues. Fortunately, as medical knowledge about the dynamics of the disease contin-
ues to develop, medical professionals become more willing and better able to identify
the disease and focus their responses on the safety of the child. The greatest problem
in prosecuting Munchausen Syndrome by Proxy is that judges and juries remain
unwilling to accept the reality of the disease. Consequently, in an effort to confirm
medical suspicions and quell legal doubts, the medical community has resorted to
covert video surveillance of the abuse while it is being perpetrated in the hospital. In
this Article, Flannery argues that this response is an unnecessary and unethical,
means of preventing Munchausen Syndrome by Proxy and protecting the child.
Flannery supports the approach taken by the Family Court of New York in ad-
dressing Munchausen Syndrome by Proxy cases. The Family Court of New York
recognizes the unique dynamics of this bizarre disorder, and, therefore, considers
all cumulative circumstantial evidence in a Munchausen Syndrome by Proxy
case, comparing the facts of the subject case to the commonly accepted features of
confirmed cases. Part of the circumstantial evidence that should be considered,
Flannery argues, is the dissipation of the child's condition upon temporary sepa-
ration from the alleged perpetrating parent. As is done by the Family Court of
New York, a res ipsa loquitur standard should then be applied, and an appro-
priate disposition for the child should be determined. By employing this standard,
the court may confirm suspicions of Munchausen Syndrome by Proxy while
avoiding the unnecessary harm to the child inherent in the covert video surveil-
lance of Munchausen Syndrome by Proxy.
"A good End cannot Sanctifie evil Means; nor must we ever do
Evil, that Good may come of it."'
* Attorney at Law. Visiting Legal Writing Instructor, Villanova University School of
Law. B.A. 1987, University of Delaware; J.D. 1991, The Catholic University of America, Co-
lumbus School of Law.
1. William Penn, Some Fruits of Solitude, in REFLECTIONS & MAXIMS RELATING TO THE
CONDUCT OF HUMAN LIFE 129 (2d ed., London, printed for Thomas Northcott, 1693).
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You may burn my body to ashes, and scatter them to the winds
of heaven; you may drag my soul down to the regions of dark-
ness and despair to be tormented forever; but you will never
get me to support a measure which I believe to be wrong, al-
though by doing so I may accomplish that which I believe to
be right.
2
INTRODUCTION
As you read the Introduction to this Article, try this test: take a
deep breath and hold it. Hold your breath as you continue reading
these initial paragraphs. Now, imagine that someone has covered
your face with his or her hands, or, perhaps, with a plastic bag. For
how long can you hold your breath? How long before you need air?
Is it now? It has only been ten seconds. How much longer before
you are forced to take a breath?
By now, you may be breathing freely again. But what if you could
not get air? How long before you would begin to panic, flail your
arms or kick your feet? Imagine that there is still a plastic bag over
your head and you still cannot breathe. Now, imagine that you are
only six weeks old, and that the hands holding the plastic bag over
your head are the hands of your mother. Consider how long it has
been since you took a gasp of air, yet imagine that you still cannot
breathe, and will not breathe for another thirty seconds.
Now, imagine something even more surreal. Imagine that, as you
continue to be unable to breathe, an entire hospital staff is sitting
in the next room, watching you struggle for air as the life is choked
out of you. It has been sixty seconds since your last breath, yet the
only action taken by the hospital staff is to record your struggle on
video. Finally now, after more than a minute, a nurse enters the
room as the bag around your head is released.
Shockingly, the surreal scenario you have just imagined actually
occurs in dozens of hospitals throughout the United States.3 These
2. IDA M. TARBELL, THE LIFE OF ABRAHAM LINCOLN 139 (McClure, Phillips & Co.
1900) (quoting T.H. Henderson's version of a Lincoln legislative address).
3. See PrimeTime Live (ABC television broadcast, Nov. 19, 1997), transcript available in
1997 WL 15362147 *1, *9 [hereinafter PrimeTime Live]. Video surveillance was used at Mary
Bridge Children's Hospital, in Tacoma, Washington, to convict 24-year-old Andrea Guzman
for attempting to suffocate her 2-month-old daughter Angel. SeeJohn Gillie, Mother Draws 10-
Year Term for Assaulting Baby in Hospital: Woman May Be Suffering from Rare Mental Disease, Attor-
neys Say, TACOMA NEWS TRIB., Nov. 19, 1997, at B1. A charge of attempted murder was
reduced to first-degree assault in exchange for a plea of guilty. See id. Reports indicate that
Guzman had another 5-month-old child, whose death reportedly was caused by Sudden In-
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scenarios are occurring with the knowledge of medical profession-
als. In fact, doctors and hospital staffs arrange for such incidents of
abuse to occur,5 and as they occur, the abuse is permitted to con-
tinue-sometimes for up to a minute. "  Unbelievably, the
justification for this seemingly unimaginable scenario is that it is in
the best interest of the very children who are being suffocated and
abused. In fact, some doctors adamantly contend that videotaping
these occurrences is necessary to save the lives of these children,
who are the victims of Munchausen Syndrome by Proxy. Others,
opposed to the use of covert video surveillance, cling to the most
basic tenet of medical ethics: "First, do no harm."'
fant Death Syndrome (SIDS) in 1993. See id. Part of the plea agreement was that officials
would not further pursue that child's death. See id.
At another hospital in Atlanta that conducts video surveillance, Munchausen Syndrome
expert Beatrice Crofts Yorker observed a mother smothering a child and one injecting the
child with fecal matter. See Rob Schneider, Motives Behind the Nurses: Expert Says Caregivers Kill
for Attention: Professor Links Murders by Convicted Nurses with Disorder in which Parents Injure Kid,%
INDIANAPOLIS STAR, Feb. 15, 1998, at Al.
It is estimated that since Munchausen Syndrome by Proxy was first identified in 1977,
more than 1000 cases have been reported nationally, of which approximately 120 have re-
sulted in death. See Sally Kestin, Experts Study the Abusive World of Munchausen Syndrome by Proxy,
TAMPA TRIB., June 6, 1997, at 2; Janet Leiser, Judge Denies Mother Custody, TAMPA TRIB., Sept.
9, 1997, at 1; James Tobin, Woman Escapes Years of Silence, Secrets and Pain, DET. NEWS, Feb. 9,
1998, at Al (estimating that there have been some 700 cases of Munchausen Syndrome by
Proxy documented in medical journals since 1977); see also In re Dylan C., No. L-96-152, 1997
Ohio App. LEXIS 2731, at *5 (Ohio Ct. App., June 27, 1997) (relating physician testimony
that Munchausen Syndrome by Proxy has a "mortality rate between eight and thirty-one per-
cent and a morbidity rate higher than fifty percent" and that the perpetrator becomes more
inventive and perpetrates more devastating harm as the syndrome progresses without inter-
vention).
It turns out that Munchausen Syndrome by Proxy... is not nearly so rare as we
would like to assume.
The notion of a mother deliberately making her children sick to meet needs of her
own so assaults our understanding of the natural order that we have a strong desire for
it to be very rare. Yet hundreds of cases have been documented.
Rick Casey, Prosecutor Hitting Road for Baby Case, SAN ANTONIO ExPIEss-NEWs, Apr. 24, 1997,
at 2A [hereinafter Casey, Prosecutor Hitting Road for Baby Case].
4. See infra Part II.A.
5. See id.
6. See infra text accompanying notes 226-27.
7. For a discussion of the question of who is the victim of Munchausen Syndrome by
Proxy, see infra notes 74-75 and accompanying text.
8. The tenet, "First, do no harm," is generally attributed to Hippocrates, who wrote:
"As to diseases, make a habit of two things--to help, or at least to do no harm." HIPPO-
CRATES, EPIDEMICS, bk. I, § XI, at 625 (W.H.S.Jones trans., Harvard Univ. Press 1948). But
see William D. Weitzel, A Later Addition to Hippocratic Oath, WALL ST. J., Nov. 25, 1996, at
A19 (attributing the phrase "Primum Non Nocere" or "First, do no harm," to the physician
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Galen). The phrase is probably most commonly derived from the Hippocratic Oath, which
provides:
I swear by Apollo the physician, by Aesculapius, Hygeia, and Panacea, and I take to
witness all the gods, and all the goddesses, to keep according to my ability and my
judgment the following Oath: To consider dear to me as my parents him who taught
me this art; to live in common with him and if necessary to share my goods with him;
to look upon his children as my own brothers, to teach them this art if they so desire
without fee or written promise; to impart to my sons and the sons of the master who
taught me and disciples who have enrolled themselves and have agreed to the rules of
the profession, but to these alone, the precepts and the instruction. I will prescribe
regimen for the good of my patients according to my ability and my judgment and
never do harm to anyone. To please no one will I prescribe a deadly drug, nor give ad-
vice which may cause his death. Nor will I give a woman a pessary to procure abortion.
But I will preserve the purity of my life and my art. I will not cut for stone, even for pa-
tients in whom the disease is manifest; I will leave this operation to be performed by
practitioners (specialists in this art). In every house where I come I will enter only for
the good of my patients, keeping myself far from all intentional ill-doing and all seduc-
tion, and especially from the pleasures of love with women or with men, be they free
or slaves. All that may come to my knowledge in the exercise of my profession or out-
side of my profession or in daily commerce with men, which ought not to be spread
abroad, I will keep secret and will never reveal. If I keep this oath faithfully, may I en-
joy my life and practice my art, respected by all men and in all times; but if I swerve
from it or violate it, may the reverse be my lot.
MARGARET R. O'LEARY ET AL., JOINT COMM'N ON ACCREDITATION OF HEALTHCARE ORGS.
(JCAHO), LEXIKON DICTIONARY OF HEALTH CARE TERMS, ORGANIZATIONS, AND ACRO-
NYMS FOR THE ERA OF REFORM 361 (1994).
The British Medical Association (BMA) published a proposed revision of the Hippocratic
Oath, equally applicable to the issue of the propriety of using covert video surveillance to
detect Munchausen Syndrome by Proxy. The proposed revision provides:
The practice of medicine is a privilege which carries important responsibilities. All
doctors should observe the core values of the profession which centre on the duty to
help sick people and to avoid harm. I promise that my medical knowledge will be used
to benefit people's health. They are my first concern. I will listen to them and provide
the best care I can. I will be honest, respectful and compassionate towards patients. In
emergencies, I will do my best to help anyone in medical need.
I will make every effort to ensure that the rights of all patients are respected, includ-
ing vulnerable groups who lack means of making their needs known, be it through
immaturity, mental incapacity, imprisonment or detention or other circumstance.
My professional judgment will be exercised as independently as possible and not be
influenced by political pressures nor by factors such as the social standing of the pa-
tient. I will not put personal profit or advancement above my duty to patients.
I recognise the special value of human life but I also know that the prolongation of
human life is not the only aim of healthcare. Where abortion is permitted, I agree that
it should take place only within an ethical and legal framework. I will not provide
treatments which are pointless or harmful or which an informed and competent pa-
tient refuses.
I will ensure patients receive the information and support they want to make deci-
sions about disease prevention and improvement of their health. I will answer as
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In the past twenty years, Munchausen Syndrome by Proxy as a
form of child abuse has slowly worked its way into the standard vo-
cabulary of the medical and legal professions. 9 Most people outside
of those professions have never heard of it, and very few of those
who have heard of it understand it.l0 Munchausen Syndrome by
Proxy is a form of child abuse wherein the perpetrating parent
(almost always a mother)"1 "factitiously induces illnesses or symp-
toms in a child by fabricating evidence. The fabricated evidence
usually results in numerous and extensive diagnostic procedures
that in themselves can often harm the child."12 Unfortunately, even
when the Syndrome is explained to judges and juries, it is rarely
truthfully as I can and respect patients' decisions unless that puts others at risk of
harm. If I cannot agree with their requests, I will explain why.
If my patients have limited mental awareness, I will still encourage them to partici-
pate in decisions as much as they feel able and willing to do so.
I will do my best to maintain confidentiality about all patients. If there are overriding
reasons which prevent my keeping a patient's confidentiality I will explain them.
I will recognise the limits of my knowledge and seek advice from colleagues when
necessary. I will acknowledge my mistakes. I will do my best to keep myself and col-
leagues informed of new developments and ensure that poor standards or bad
practices are exposed to those who can improve them.
I will show respect for all those with whom I work and be ready to share my knowl-
edge by teaching others what I know.
I will use my training and professional standing to improve the community in which
I work. I will treat patients equitably and support a fair and humane distribution of
health resources. I will try to influence positively authorities whose policies harm pub-
lic health. I will oppose policies which breach internationally accepted standards of
human rights. I will strive to change laws which are contrary to patients' interests or to
my professional ethics.
British Med. Ass'n, BMA Updates Hippocratic Oath (visited Jan. 25, 1999) <http://
www.bma.org.uk/pressrel/archive/970327b.htm>.
9. In one study involving 86 professionals from various hospitals, community service
programs, the Ohio children's service agency, and law enforcement agencies, professionals
employed in hospitals or medical settings were three times more likely to have heard of Mun-
chausen Syndrome by Proxy than those employed by community service agencies. See Keith L.
Kaufman & Daniel Coury, Munchausen Syndrome by Proxy: A Survey of Professionals'Knowledge, 13
CHILD ABUSE & NEGLECT 141, 141 (1989). For a discussion of the nature of Munchausen
Syndrome by Proxy, see Michael T. Flannery, Munchausen Syndrome by Proxy: Broadening the
Scope of Child Abuse, 28 U. RICH. L. REV. 1175, 1224-32 (1994) (arguing that, in order for it to
be appropriately addressed, conceptually it must be integrated into the common understand-
ings of both the medical and legal communities).
10. See generally Flannery, supra note 9.
11. SeeFlannery, supra note 9, at 1182.
12. Id. (citation omitted).
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understood, and sometimes, not even believed.1 3 In many
cases, expert testimony regarding the disorder is disallowed.
14
Thus, the very deceptive nature of the Syndrome perpetuates
itself within the medical and legal systems 5-the two
13. See In reAaron S., 625 N.Y.S.2d 786, 787 (N.Y. Fam. Ct. 1993) (describing the accu-
sations of Munchausen Syndrome by Proxy as "so counter-intuitive to our concept of being a
parent that it seems unbelievable").
14. See State v. Lumbrera, 845 P.2d 609, 620 (Kan. 1992) (instructing the jury to disre-
gard all evidence concerning Munchausen Syndrome by Proxy); Commonwealth v.
Robinson, 565 N.E.2d 1229, 1237-38 (Mass. App. Ct. 1991) (barring all evidence regarding
Munchausen Syndrome by Proxy); cf People v. Phillips, 175 Cal. Rptr. 703, 715 (Cal. Ct. App.
1981) (allowing evidence of Munchausen Syndrome by Proxy for purpose of showing mo-
tive); Reid v. State, 964 S.W.2d 723, 730 (Tex. App. 1998) (allowing evidence of Munchausen
Syndrome by Proxy for purposes of explaining mother's conduct and motive).
In July 1996, Yvonne Eldridge was convicted of "abusing two sickly babies," whose condi-
tions she worsened by tampering with their intravenous lines and misinforming doctors
about their symptoms. See Foster Mom Convicted of Abuse Granted New Trial, SAN DIEGO UNION-
TRIR., Jan. 18, 1998, at A7 [hereinafter Foster Mom Convicted]. She was "sentenced to more
than three years in prison." Id. However, a California Superior Court judge subsequently
granted her a new trial, ruling that her trial attorney failed to call relevant witnesses and did
not present evidence that would have supported her defense. See id.; Charlie Goodyear, Retrial
Set For Foster Mother- S.F. Lawyer Serra May Represent Her in Abuse Case, S.F. CHRON., Jan. 21,
1998, at A14 [hereinafter Goodyear, Retial]. The judge did not allow the jury to hear evi-
dence about the syndrome, finding that the testimony would be too prejudicial against
Eldridge. See Goodyear, Retrial, supra. Ironically, in 1988, Eldridge was honored by First Lady
Nancy Reagan as part of the Great American Families program for her dedication in caring
for dozens of needy foster children. See Foster Mom Convicted, supra. In 1992, however, when
investigations revealed that three children had died in Eldridge's care and eight other chil-
dren were allegedly mistreated, her foster care license was revoked. See Charlie Goodyear, New
Trial for Foster Mother Convicted of Abuse: Supporting Witnesses Weren't Called, S.F. CHRON., Jan. 17,
1998, at Al3.
In Florida, 20-year-old Kelly Dunsford injected her healthy 11-month-old son with insulin
to make others believe that the child had diabetes. See Mother Accused of Injecting Healthy Infant
with Insulin, ST. PETERSBURG TIMES, Mar. 12, 1997, at 5B. In a Washington, D.C. hospital,
Tracey McPherson held a plastic bag over her two-year-old son Tre's head in an effort to
suffocate him. See Nancy Lewis, Medical Expert Questions Deaths of Woman's Other Children, WASH.
POST, Mar. 13, 1997, at D3. The child was in the hospital because McPherson had pushed
him out of a third-floor window. See id. McPherson's ten-month-old daughter, Ebony, died in
1984 under mysterious conditions. See id. Her four-month-old son, Antwain, died similarly in
1988. See id. Prior to the incident with Tre, McPherson had made fifteen trips to the emer-
gency room with the boy. See id. The case includes the telltale signs of Munchausen Syndrome
by Proxy; however, when the prosecuting attorney attempted to question McPherson at trial
about the Syndrome, the judge disallowed the questioning, concluding that it was too late in
the proceeding to introduce evidence of the disease. See id.
15. The perpetuation of Munchausen Syndrome is ironically demonstrated in one case
where a letter to the New EnglandJournal of Medicine claimed that the disease that the patient
feigned having was Munchausen Syndrome itself. See Marc Gurwith & Clare Langston, Facti-
tious Munchausen's Syndrome, 302 NEw ENG.J. MED. 1483, 1483-84 (1980). As Chris Amirault
notes: "Paradoxically, by choosing to fake Munchausen Syndrome the patient proves that he
or she suffers from it. As a result, the term factitious, which initially signifies that the patient
does not really suffer from Munchausen Syndrome, now signifies that the patient really does."
Chris Amirault, Pseudologica Fantastica and Other Tall Tales: The Contagious Literature of Mun-
chausen Syndrome, 14 LITERATURE & MED. 169, 184-85 (1995). The case took on an added
twist of irony when it was revealed that the case itself was fictitiously contrived as a humorous
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systems that must attempt to prevent the disease, or at
least deal with its consequences.
Although Munchausen Syndrome by Proxy is still
far from a household term, medical 16  and
con, "prompted by the frustration of frequent encounters with the self-destructive behavior of
patients with factitious disease." Id. at 186. In still a third twist of irony, Amirault suggests that
the original fictitious letter serves as "an exemplary piece of medical literature... 'an explo-
ration of the paradoxes' of this disorder." Id. Amirault further points out that the fact that the
original piece contained the identity of the patient-Norman U. Senchbau-which ran con-
trary to the cardinal rule of contemporary medical ethics, indicates that the letter was meant
as fiction. See id. at 186-87. Indeed, the level of irony runs deeper: "Norman U. Senchbau" is,
in fact, an anagram of "Baron Munchausen." Id. at 187.
16. See, e.g., U.O. Aideyan & W.L. Smith, Radiological Features in a Case of Munchausen
Syndrome by Proxy, 25 PEDIATRIC RADIOLOGY 70 (1995); Randell Alexander et al., Serial Mun-
chausen Syndrome by Proxy, 86 PEDIATRICS 581 (1990); All in a Day's Work.... NURSING TIMES,
Oct. 15, "1997, at 16; Laweh Amegavie et al., Munchausen's Syndrome by Proxy: A Warning for
Health Professionals, 293 BRIT. MED. J. 855 (1986); Tanash H. Atoynatan et al., Munchausen
Syndrome by Proxy, 19 CHILD PSYCHIATRY & HUM. DEv. 3 (1988); Mouhab Ayass et al., Mun-
chausen Syndrome Presenting as Hemophilia: A Convenient and Economical "Steal" of Disease and
Treatment, 10 PEDIATRIC HEMATOLOGY & ONCOLOGY 241 (1993); Janiine Babcock et al., Ro-
denticide-Induced Coagulopathy in a Young Child: A Case of Munchausen Syndrome by Proxy, 15 AM.
J. PEDIATRIC HEMATOLOGY/ONCOLOGY 126 (1993); Marjorie A. Baldwin, Munchausen Syn-
drome by Proxy: Neurological Manifestations, 26J. NEUROSCIENCE NURSING 18 (1994); Lisa Hains
Barker & Robert J. Howell, Munchausen Syndrome by Proxy in False Allegations of Child Sexual
Abuse: Legal Implications, 22 BULL. AM. ACAD. PSYCHIATRY L. 499 (1994); A.P. Bath et al.,
Munchausen Syndrome by Proxy: Otolaryngologists Beware!, 107J. LARYNGOLOGY & OTOLOGY 151
(1993); Susanne Blix & Gregory Brack, The Effects of a Suspected Case of Munchausens Syndrome
by Proxy on a Pediatric Nursing Staff, 10 GEN. Hose. PSYCHIATRY 402 (1988); C.N. Bools et al.,
Co-Morbidity Associated with Fabricated Illness (Munchausen Syndrome by Proxy), 67 ARCHIVES OF
DISEASE IN CHILDHOOD 77 (1992); C.N. Bools et al., Follow Up of Victims of Fabricated Illness
(Munchausen Syndrome by Proxy), 69 ARCHIVES OF DISEASE IN CHILDHOOD 625 (1993); Christo-
pher Bools et al., Munchausen Syndrome by Proxy: A Study of Psychopathology, 18 CHILD ABUSE &
NEGLECT 773 (1994); Joni Jacobsen Bosch, Munchausen Syndrome by Proxy, I IJ. PEDIATRIC
HEALTH CARE 242 (1997); Mary L. Brown, Dilemmas Facing Nurses Who Care for Munchausen
Syndrome by Proxy Patients, 23 PEDIATRIC NURSING 416 (1997); Mary Bryk & Patricia T. Siegel,
My Mother Caused My Illness: The Story of a Survivor of Munchausen by Proxy Syndrome, 100 PEDI-
ATRICS 1 (1997); Brenda Bursch et al., Nurses' Knowledge of and Experience with Munchausen
Syndrome by Proxy, 19 ISSUES IN COMPREHENSIVE PEDIATRIC NURSING 93 (1996); Donald J.
Carek, The Munchausen by Proxy Controversy, 34 J. AM. ACAD. CHILD & ADOLESCENT PSYCHIA-
TRY 261 (1995) (letter to the editor); Patricia T. Castiglia, Munchausen Syndrome by Proxy, 9J.
PEDIATRIC HEALTH CARE 79 (1995); Darrow A. Chan et al., Munchausen Syndrome by Proxy: A
Review and Case Study, 11 J. PEDIATRIC PSYCHOL. 71 (1986); Karen A. Crouse, Munchausen
Syndrome by Proxy: Recognizing the Victim, 18 PEDIATRIC NURSING 249 (1992); P. DiBiase et al.,
Munchausen Syndrome by Proxy Complicating Ear Surgery, 122 ARCHIVES OTOLARYNGOLOGY-
HEAD & NECK SURGERY 1377 (1996); Terence Donald & Jon Jureidini, Munchausen Syndrome
by Proxy; Child Abuse in the Medical System, 150 ARCHIVES PEDIATRICS & ADOLESCENT MED. 753
(1996); Andrea J. Eberle, Munchausen by Proxy, 36 J. AM. ACAD. CHILD & ADOLESCENT PSY-
CHIATRY 1491 (1997); Edmond C.O. Edi-Osagie et al., Munchausen's Syndrome in Obstetrics and
Gynecology: A Review, 53 OBSTETRICAL & GYNECOLOGICAL SURv. 45 (1998); John L. Emery,
Child Abuse, Sudden Infant Death Syndrome, and Unexpected Infant Death, 147 AM. J. DISEASES
CHILDREN 1097 (1993); D.M. Eminson & R.J. Postlethwaite, Factitious Illness: Recognition and
Management, 67 ARCHIVES OF DISEASE IN CHILDHOOD 1510 (1992); Donald Evans, The Investi-
gation of Life-Threatening Child Abuse and Munchausen Syndrome by Proxy, 21 J. MED. ETHICS 9
(1995); Sue Facey, Munchausen Syndrome by Proxy, NURSING TIMES, Jan. 27, 1993, at 54; Marc
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D. Feldman et al., Concurrent Factitious Disorder and Factitious Disorder by Proxy; Double Jeopardy,
19 GEN. HOSP. PSYCHIATRY 24 (1997); Geoffrey C. Fisher & Ian Mitchell, Is Munchausen Syn-
drome by Proxy Really a Syndrome?, 72 ARCHIVES OF DISEASE IN CHILDHOOD 530 (1995);
Geoffrey C. Fisher et al., Munchausen's Syndrome by Proxy: The Question of Psychiatric Illness in a
Child, 162 BRIT. J. PSYCHIATRY 701 (1993); David G. Folks, Munchausen's Syndrome and Other
Factitious Disorders, 13 NEUROLOGIC CLINICS 267 (1995); V. Godding & M. Kruth, Compliance
with Treatment in Asthma and Munchausen Syndrome by Proxy, 66 ARCHIVES OF DISEASE IN
CHILDHOOD 956 (1991); Johanna Goldfarb, A Physician's Perspective on Dealing with Cases of
Munchausen by Proxy, 37 CLINICAL PEDIATRICS 187 (1998) (editorial);Johanna Goldfarb et al.,
Infectious Diseases Presentations of Munchausen Syndrome by Proxy: Case Report and Review of the
Literature, 37 CLINICAL PEDIATRICS 179 (1998); Jenny Gray & Arnon Bentovim, Illness Induc-
tion Syndrome: Paper I-A Series of 41 Children from 37 Families Identified at the Great Ormond Street
Hospital for Children NHS Trust, 20 CHILD ABUSE & NEGLECT 655 (1996);James L. Griffith, The
Family Systems of Munchausen Syndrome by Proxy, 27 FAM. PROCESS 423 (1988); Vincent L.
Guandolo, Munchausen Syndrome by Proxy: An Outpatient Challenge, 75 PEDIATRICS 526 (1985);
S.R. Headow, Munchausen Syndrome by Proxy, 63 MEDICO-LEGALJ. 89 (1995); Karen Graynom
Hochhauser & Rhonda A. Richardson, Munchausen Syndrome by Proxy: An Exploratory Study of
Pediatric Nurses' Knowledge and Involvement, 9 J. PEDIATRIC NURSING 313 (1994); Dee Hodge,
III et al., The Bacteriologically Battered Baby: Another Case of Munchausen by Proxy, 11 ANNALS
EMERGENCY MED. 205 (1982); Shuji Honjo, A Mother's Complaints of Overeating by Her 25-Month-
Old Daughter: A Proposal of Anorexia Nervosa by Proxy, 20 INT'LJ. EATING DISORDERS 433 (1996);
SushmaJani et al., Munchausen Syndrome by Proxy, 22 INT'L J. PSYCHIATRY MED. 343 (1992);
David P.H. Jones, Commentary: Munchausen Syndrome by Proxy-Is Expansion Justified?, 20 CHILD
ABUSE & NEGLECT 983 (1996); David P.H. Jones, Editorial: The Syndrome of Munchausen by
Proxy, 18 CHILD ABUSE & NEGLECT 769 (1994);Jerry G. Jones et al., Munchausen Syndrome by
Proxy, 10 CHILD ABUSE & NEGLECT 33 (1986); V. FayeJones et al., The Role of the Male Caretaker
in Munchausen Syndrome by Proxy, 32 CLINICAL PEDIATRICS 245 (1993) [hereinafter Jones et
al., The Role of the Male Caretaker]; Jon Jureidini, Obstetric Factitious Disorder and Munchausen
Syndrome by Proxy, 181J. NERVOUS & MENTAL DISEASE 135 (1993); Bernard B. Kahan & Bea-
trice Crofts Yorker, Munchausen Syndrome by Proxy, 60J. SCH. HEALTH 108 (1990); Gerri Kahn
& Ellen Goldman, Munchausen Syndrome by Proxy: Mother Fabricates Infant's Hearing Impairment,
34J. SPEECH & HEARING RES. 957 (1991); Kaufman & Coury, supra note 9, at 141-47; Chris-
tine Klebes & Susan Fay, Munchausen Syndrome by Proxy: A Review, Case Study, and Nursing
Implications, 10J. PEDIATRIC NURSING 93 (1995); B. Kosmach et al., "Munchausen by Proxy"
Syndrome in a Small Bowel Transplant RecipienA 28 TRANSPLANTATION PROC. 2790 (1996); Chris-
topher S. Kovacs & Ellen L. Toth, Factitious Diabetes Mellitus and Spontaneous Hypoglycemia:
Consequences of Unrecognized Munchausen Syndrome by Proxy, 16 DIABETES CARE 1294 (1993);
Richard M. Kravitz & Robert W. Wilmott, Munchausen Syndrome by Proxy Presenting as Factitious
Apnea, 29 CLINICAL PEDIATRICS 587 (1990); Stuart R. Lacey et al., Munchausen Syndrome by
Proxy: Patterns of Presentation to Pediatric Surgeons, 28J. PEDIATRIC SURGERY 827 (1993); Debo-
rah A. Lee, Munchausen Syndrome by Proxy in Twins, 54 ARCHIVES OF DISEASE IN CHILDHOOD
646 (1979); Timothy G. Lesaca, At Mother's Mercy: The Nightmare of Munchausen Syndrome by
Proxy, 91 W. VA. MED. J. 318 (1995); D. Lesh, Munchausen Syndrome by Proxy, 7J. Am. ACAD.
NURSE PRACT. 83 (1995); Judith A. Libow, Munchausen by Proxy Victims in Adulthood: A First
Look 19 CHILD ABUSE & NEGLECT 1131 (1995);Judith A. Libow & Herbert A. Schreier, Three
Forms of Factitious Illness in Children: When Is It Munchausen Syndrome by Proxy?, 56 AM. J. OR-
THOPSYCHIATRY 602 (1986); Michael J. Light & Mary S. Sheridan, Munchausen Syndrome by
Proxy and Apnea (MBPA), 29 CLINICAL PEDIATRICS 162 (1990); Richard Livingston, Maternal
Somatization Disorder and Munchausen Syndrome by Proxy, 28 PSYCHOSOMATICS 213 (1987);
James G. Longhurst et al., False Psychiatric Symptoms in Children, 48 PSYCHIATRIC SERVICES 403
(1997); A.R. Magnay et al., Munchausen Syndrome by Proxy Unmasked by Nasal Signs, 108J. LA-
RYNGOLOGY & OTOLOGY 336 (1994); Vinit K. Mahesh et al., Application of Phannacokinetics in
the Diagnosis of Chemical Abuse in Munchausen Syndrome by Proxy, 27 CLINICAL PEDIATRICS 243
(1988); J. Jeffrey Malatack et al., Munchausen Syndrome by Proxy: A New Complication of Central
Venous Catheterization, 75 PEDIATRICS 523 (1985); A. Marcus et al., Munchausen Syndrome by
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Proxy and Factitious Illness: Symptomatology, Parent-Child Interaction, and Psychopathology of the
Parents, 4 EUR. CHILD & ADOLESCENT PSYCHIATRY 229 (1995); Zarko Martinovic, Fictitious
Epilepsy in Munchausen Syndrome by Proxy: Family Psychodynamics, 4 SEIZURE 129 (1995); James
Masterson et al., Extreme Illness Exaggeration in Pediatric Patients: A Variant of Munchausen's by
Proxy?, 58 AM. J. ORTHOPSYCHIATRY 188 (1988); Tona L. McGuire & Kenneth W. Feldman,
Psychologic Morbidity of Children Subjected to Munchausen Syndrome by Proxy, 83 PEDIATRICS 289
(1989); Roy Meadow, ABC of Child Abuse: Munchausen Syndrome by Proxy, 298 BRIT. MED. J. 248
(1989) [hereinafter Meadow, ABC]; Roy Meadow, False Allegations of Abuse and Munchausen
Syndrome by Proxy, 68 ARCHIVES OF DISEASE IN CHILDHOOD 444 (1993); Roy Meadow, Manage-
ment of Munchausen Syndrome by Proxy, 60 ARCHIVES OF DISEASE IN CHILDHOOD 385 (1985);
Roy Meadow, Munchausen Syndrome by Proxy, 57 ARCHIVES OF DISEASE IN CHILDHOOD 92
(1982); Roy Meadow, Munchausen Syndrome by Proxy and Pseudo-Epilepsy, 57 ARCHIVES OF DIS-
EASE IN CHILDHOOD 811 (1982) (letter to the editor); Roy Meadow, Munchausen Syndrome by
Proxy: The Hinterland of Child Abuse, 2 LANCET 343 (1977) [hereinafter Meadow, The Hinterland
of Child Abuse]; Roy Meadow, Neurological and Developmental Variants of Munchausen Syndrome by
Proxy, 33 DEV. MED. CHILD. NEUROL. 270, 270-72 (1991); Roy Meadow, Non-Accidental Salt
Poisoning, 68 ARCHIVES OF DISEASE IN CHILDHOOD 448 (1993); Roy Meadow, What Is, and
What Is Not, 'Munchausen Syndrome by Proxy'?, 72 ARCHIVES OF DISEASE IN CHILDHOOD 534
(1995) [hereinafter Meadow, What Is, and What Is Not]; Albert L. Mehl et al., Munchausen
Syndrome by Proxy: A Family Affair, 14 CHILD ABUSE & NEGLECT 577 (1990); Paulette Mehta &
Regina Bussing, Factitious Coagulopathy Due to Munchausen Syndrome by Proxy, 15 AM. J. PEDIAT-
RIC HEMATOLOGY/ONCOLOGY 124 (1993); C. Middleton, Controversy... in the Best Interests of
the Child!!!.. ., 21 CHILD: CARE HEALTH & DEV. 271 (1995); R.W. Mills & Susan Burke, Gastro-
intestinal Bleeding in a 15 Month Old Male: A Presentation of Munchausen's Syndrome by Proxy, 29
CLINICAL PEDIATRICS 474 (1990); Ian Mitchell et al., Apnea and Factitious illness (Munchausen
Syndrome) by Proxy, 92 PEDIATRICS 810 (1993); Barbara Mitchels, Munchausen Syndrome by
Proxy-Protecting the Child, 23J. FORENSIC ScI. Soc'Y 105 (1983); Colin J. Morley, Experts Differ
Over Diagnostic Criteria for Munchausen Syndrome by Proxy, 48 BRIT. J. Hosp. MED. 197 (1992);
Colin J. Morley, Practical Concerns About the Diagnosis of Munchausen Syndrome by Proxy, 72 AR-
CHIVES OF DISEASE IN CHILDHOOD 528 (1995) [hereinafter Morley, Practical Concerns]; John
B. Murray, Munchausen Syndrome/Munchausen Syndrome by Proxy, 131J. PSYCHOL. 343 (1997);
David M. Orenstein & Abby L. Wasserman, Munchausen Syndrome by Proxy Simulating Cystic
Fibrosis, 78 PEDIATRICS 621 (1986); Barbara M. Ostfeld & Marc D. Feldman, Factitious Disorder
by Proxy: Awareness Among Mental Health Practitioners, 18 GEN. HoSP. PSYCHIATRY 113 (1996);
Allen J. Palmer & G. Joji Yoshimura, Munchausen Syndrome by Proxy, 23 J. AM. ACAD. CHILD
PSYCHIATRY 503 (1984); Reinhard Plassmann, Munchausen Syndromes and Factitious Diseases, 62
PSYCHOTHERAPY & PSYCHOSOMATICS 7 (1994); Gerald E. Porter et al., Munchausen Syndrome
by Proxy: Unusual Manifestations and Disturbing Sequelae, 18 CHILD ABUSE & NEGLECT 789
(1994); George F. Richardson, Munchausen Syndrome by Proxy, 36 AM. FAM. PHYSICIAN 119
(1987); Carol Lynn Rosen et al., Two Siblings with Recurrent Cardiorespiratory Arrest: Munchausen
Syndrome by Proxy or Child Abuse?, 71 PEDIATRICS 715 (1983); Donna A. Rosenberg, Web of De-
ceit: A Literature Review of Munchausen Syndrome by Proxy, 11 CHILD ABUSE & NEGLECT 547
(1987); Martin P. Samuels & David P. Southall, Munchausen Syndrome by Proxy, 47 BRIT. J.
Hosp. MED. 759 (1992); Herbert A. Schreier, The Perversion of Mothering: Munchausen Syndrome
by Proxy, 56 BULL. MENNINGER CLINIC 421 (1992); Herbert A. Schreier, Repeated False Allega-
tions of Sexual Abuse Presenting to Sheriffs: When Is It Munchausen by Proxy?, 20 CHILD ABUSE &
NEGLECT 1135 (1996) (letter to the editor); Herbert A. Schreier & Judith A. Libow, Mun-
chausen by Proxy Syndrome: A Clinical Fable for Our Times, 33 J. AM. ACAD. CHILD & ADOLESCENT
PSYCHIATRY 904 (1994); Herbert A. Schreier & Judith A. Libow, Munchausen by Proxy Syn-
drome: A Modern Pediatric Challenge 125 J. PEDIATRICS Sl10 (1994); Herbert A. Schreier &
Judith A. Libow, Munchausen Syndrome by Proxy: Diagnosis and Prevalence, 63 AM. J. ORTHOPSY-
CHIATRY 318 (1993); Jane Scourfield, Anorexia by Proxy: Are the Children of Anorexic Mothers an
At-Risk Group?, 18 INT'L J. EATING DISORDERS 371 (1995); Anne Senner & Mary Jane Ott,
Munchausen Syndrome by Proxy, 12 ISSUES IN COMPREHENSIVE PEDIATRIC NURSING 345 (1989);
Mehmet E. Senocak et al., Urinary Obstruction Caused by Factitious Urethral Stones: An Amazing
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legal17 literature on the subject has been expansive
in the past decade . Media coverage has also
Manifestation of Munchausen Syndrome by Proxy, 30 J. PEDIATRIC SURGERY 1732 (1995); Mary S.
Sheridan, Munchausen Syndrome by Proxy, 14 HEALTH & SOC. WORK 53 (1989); Mircea Sigal et
al., Medical and Legal Aspects of the Munchausen by Proxy Perpetrator, 9 MED. L. 739 (1990); Mircea
D. Sigal et al., Munchausen Syndrome by Adult Proxy: A Perpetrator Abusing Two Adults, 174 J.
NERVOUS & MENTAL DISEASE 696 (1986) [hereinafter Sigal et al., Munchausen Syndrome by
Adult Proxy); Mircea Sigal et al., Munchausen Syndrome by Proxy: A Psychodynamic Analysis, 7
MED. L. 49 (1988); Mircea Sigal et al., Munchausen by Proxy Syndrome: The Triad of Abuse, Self-
Abuse, and Deception, 30 COMPREHENSIVE PSYCHIATRY 527 (1989); Kathryn Smith & Patricia
Killam, Munchausen Syndrome ("Maternal/Child"), 19 MCN: AM. J. MATERNAL CHILD NURSING
214 (1994); Richard D. Stevenson & Randell Alexander, Munchausen Syndrome by Proxy Present-
ing as a Developmental Disability, 11 J. DEVELOPMENTAL & BEHAVIORAL PEDIATRICS 262 (1990);
Jonathan A. Sugar et al., A 3-Year-Old Boy's Chronic Diarrhea and Unexplained Death, 30 J. AM.
ACAD. CHILD & ADOLESCENT PSYCHIATRY 1015 (1991); Nathan M. Szajnberg et al., Mun-
chausen-by-Proxy Syndrome: Countertrasference as a Diagnostic Too4 60 BULL. MENNINGER CLINIC
229 (1996); Stuart Taylor & Steven E. Hyler, Update on Factitious Disorders, 23 INT'L J. PSY-
CHIATRY MED. 81 (1993); LoriJ. Turk et al., Munchausen Syndrome by Proxy: A Nursing Overview,
13 ISSUES IN COMPREHENSIVE PEDIATRIC NURSING 279 (1990); Jimmie L. Valentine et al.,
Clinical and Toxicological Findings in Two Young Siblings and Autopsy Findings in One Sibling with
Multiple Hospital Admissions Resulting in Death; Evidence Suggesting Munchausen Syndrome by Proxy,
18 AM. J. FORENSIC MED. & PATHOLOGY 276 (1997); Anthony G. Volz, Nursing Interventions in
Munchausen Syndrome by Proxy, 33J. PSYCHOSOCIAL NURSING & MENTAL HEALTH SERVICES 859
(1995); Mary M. Von Burg & Roberta A. Hibbard, Munchausen Syndrome by Proxy: A Different
Kind of Child Abuse, 88 IND. MED. 378 (1995); David A. Waller, Obstacles to the Treatment of Mun-
chausen by Proxy Syndrome, 22J. AM. ACAD. CHILD PSYCHIATRY 80 (1983);J.O. Warner & M.J.
Hathaway, Allergic Form of Meadow's Syndrome (Munchausen by Proxy), 59 ARCHIVES OF DISEASE
IN CHILDHOOD 151 (1984); William L. Weston & Joseph G. Morelli, "Painful and Disabling
Granuloma Annulare": A Case of Munchausen by Proxy, 14 PEDIATRIC DERMATOLOGY 363 (1997);
Pamela Runge Wood et al., Fever of Unknown Origin for Six Years: Munchausen Syndrome by Proxy,
28J. FAM. PRAC. 391 (1989); Roslyn Yomtovian & Ronald Swanger, Munchausen Syndrome by
Proxy Documented by Discrepant Blood Typing, 95 AM. J. CLINICAL PATHOLOGY 232 (1991); Bea-
trice Crofts Yorker & Bernard B. Kahan, Munchausen's Syndrome by Proxy as a Form of Child
Abuse, 4 ARCHIVES OF PSYCHIATRIC NURSING 313 (1990); Basil J. Zitelli et al., Munchausen's
Syndrome by Proxy and Its Professional Participants, 141 AM. J. DISEASES CHILDREN 1099 (1987);
Yuval Zohar et al., Otolaryngologic Cases of Munchausen's Syndrome, 97 LARYNGOSCOPE 201
(1987).
17. See, e.g., Stephen J. Boros & Larry C. Brubaker, Munchausen Syndrome by Proxy: Case
Accounts, FBI L. ENFORCEMENT BULL.,June 1992, at 16; Flannery, supra note 9, at 1175; Kath-
ryn A. Hanon, Child Abuse: Munchausen's Syndrome by Proxy, FBI L. ENFORCEMENT BULL., Dec.
1991, at 8; Bernard Kahan & Beatrice Crofts Yorker, Munchausen Syndrome by Proxy: Clinical
Review and Legal Issues, 9 BEHAV. Scl. & L. 73 (1991); Robert Kinscherff & Richard Famularo,
Extreme Munchausen Syndrome by Proxy: The Case for Termination of Parental Rights, 42 Juv. & FAM.
CT.J. 41 (1991); Suellyn Scarnecchia, An Interdisciplinary Seminar in Child Abuse and Neglect with
A Focus on Child Protection Practice; 31 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 33 (1997); Melissa Searle, Mun-
chausen Syndrome by Proxy: A Guide for California Attorneys, 20 W. ST. U. L. REV. 393 (1993);
Beatrice Crofts Yorker, Covert Video Surveillance of Munchausen Syndrome by Proxy: The Exigent
Circumstances Exception, 5 HEALTH MATRIX: J. L.-MED. 325 (1995); Beatrice Crofts Yorker &
Bernard B. Kahan, The Munchausen Syndrome by Proxy Variant of Child Abuse in the Family Courts,
42 Juv. & FAM. CT. J. 51 (1991); Marie M. Brady, Note, Munchausen Syndrome by Proxy: How
Should We Weigh Our Options?, 18 LAw & PSYCHOL. REv. 361 (1994); Tracy Vollaro, Note,
Munchausen Syndrome by Proxy and Its Evidentialy Problems, 22 HOFSTRA L. REV. 495 (1993).
18. For a discussion of the literature surrounding Munchausen Syndrome and a history
of the use of the term in the medical field, see Amirault, supra note 15, at 173-75. Attention
focused on the disease in France has led to an enormous legal controversy over the definition
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increased. 9 In fact, actual video tapes of mothers abusing
their children in the hospital can be viewed on the
of a "novel," as a result of a purportedly fictional novel, Moloch, written by French crime nov-
elist Thierry Jonquet. See Ben Macintyre, Novelist Takes Fact as Fiction in Murder Plot, TIMES
(London), July 4, 1998, at 15. Jonquet's novel is allegedly based on the factual case of Liliane
Kazkaz, a 35-year-old nursing assistant, who in 1990 was accused of poisoning her nine-year-
old daughter, Caroline. See id. Kazkaz continually claimed that she was innocent, but was
found dead at her home in Paris in November 1994,just one month before her trial was to
begin. See id. Days after Moloch was published in May 1998, Kazkaz' husband Haitham was
placed under formal investigation on suspicion of murdering his wife and attempting to poi-
son Caroline four years earlier. See id. Lawyers for the mother have filed suit against the
author for posthumous defamation of Liliane Kazkaz, which is possible under French law. See
id. In response, Jonquet pointed to the enormous publicity of the case and the notoriety of
the disease, claiming that it was impossible that his topic could not be "inspired" by real
events. See id. Others argue that in such a highly publicized case of Munchausen Syndrome by
Proxy, the characters are "perfectly identifiable," and that thus the author may "designate a
guilty party before a definitive judgment." Id.
19. Munchausen Syndrome by Proxy has been the focal point of several TV news
broadcasts in the past several years. See generally Dateline NBC: From Cradle to Grave: Mother of 10
Babies Suspected of Killing All of Them (NBC television broadcast, Apr. 7, 1998), transcript avail-
able in 1998 WL 6615344 (profiling the case of Marie Noe, whose 10 children all died within
15 months of their birth, between 1949 and 1968, in what was then considered to be
"America's worst case of Sudden Infant Death Syndrome," but what is now suspected of being
a series of cases of Munchausen Syndrome by Proxy); PrimeTime Live, supra note 3 (reporting
on secret tapes made by an English doctor of parents with Munchausen Syndrome by Proxy);
Dateline NBC: Profile: Rush to Judgment?: Teresa and Jeff Timm, Accused of Child Abuse, Were Later
Found Innocent After Lack of Evidence and Other Testimony Was Found in Their Favor (NBC televi-
sion broadcast, Aug. 29, 1997), transcript available in 1997 WL 7755296 (profiling the case of
Teresa Timm, whom authorities at the Nebraska social services agency suspected of Mun-
chausen Syndrome by Proxy, and whose experience was the basis for a TV movie after it was
determined that the allegations were a hoax); 48 Hours: Profile: Florida Mother Under Investiga-
tion, Suspected of Intentionally Harming Her Child for Attention (CBS television broadcast, Aug. 7,
1997), transcript available in 1997 WL 7813470; 48 Hours: Profile: Jennifer Bush Is Taken into Pro-
tective Custody and Her Mother Is Arrested for Felony Child Abuse (CBS television broadcast, Aug. 7,
1997), transcript available in 1997 WL 7813469; 48 Hours: Profile: Jennifer Bush, Allegedly Made Ill
by Her Mother, Kathy Bush, Remains in Foster Care and Is Thriving- Mother Still Fighting to Regain
Custody of Child (CBS television broadcast, Aug. 7, 1997), transcript available in 1997 WL
7813468 [hereinafter 48 Hours: Jennifer Bush, Allegedly Made Ill] (all profiling the case ofJenni-
fer Bush, who was hospitalized over 200 times for more than 30 intrusive operations as a
result of what Florida Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services authorities believe to
be Munchausen Syndrome by Proxy perpetrated by Jennifer's mother, Kathy Bush). The use
of covert video surveillance of Munchausen Syndrome by Proxy in the study by Dr. David
Southall, see David P. Southall et al., Covert Video Recordings of Life-Threatening Child Abuse: Les-
sons for Child Protection, 100 PEDIATRICS 735 (1997), was profiled on the television news
program PrimeTime Live. See PrimeTime Live, supra note 3. For a discussion of the study by Dr.
Southall, see infra Part II.A and accompanying notes. For the opinion that PrimeTime Live's
coverage of the story sought merely to gain ratings, rather than to address the ethical conun-
drum, see Matt Zoller Seitz, CBS Beats ABC on Disney Boycott, STAR-LEDGER (Newark, N.J.),
Nov. 25, 1997, at 37.
Suspected and confirmed cases of Munchausen Syndrome by Proxy have consistently been
reported in newspapers throughout the United States during recent years. Most notable is the
case of Cynthia Lyda. The 31-year-old mother lost custody of her 1-month-old son Benjamin
on April 6, 1998. See Melissa Prentice, Judge Allows Mother Only Supervised Visits, SAN ANTONIO
ExPRsss-NEws, May 21, 1998, at IB, available in 1998 WL 5092668 [hereinafter Prentice,Judge
Allows Mother Only Supervised Visits]. Another son, Gideon, had been taken into custody by the
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state in December 1996. See Rick Casey, Undiagnosed Tragedy (Chapter V): Cindy's New In-Laws
Learn About Her Past; Another Baby Arrives-Court Order Obtained to Place New Child Into a Foster
Home, SAN ANTONio ExPREss-NEWS, Apr. 15, 1997, at 9A, available in 1997 WL 3168441; Pren-
tice, Judge Allows Mother Only Supervised Visits, supra.
Lyda's two other sons, Joseph and Daniel, are the subject of separate endangerment
charges brought against her, for which she faces up to 212 years in prison. See Prentice,Judge
Allows Mother Only Supervised Visits, supra. Trial for these charges is scheduled for February
1999. See Briefs: Mother Faces Trial in Boys'Injuries, SAN ANTONIO EXPREss-NEWS, June 26, 1998,
at 2B, available in 1998 WL 5098475. It is expected that the prosecution alone will call 102
witnesses from around the world. See id. Lyda is free on bond, but has been ordered by a
federal judge to wear an electronic monitor. See Melissa Prentice & Jacque Crouse, Mom Ac-
cused of Hurting Kids: Munchausen's Syndrome Case Leads to Federal Indictment, SAN ANTONIO
EXPRESS-NEWS, Apr. 30, 1998, at IA, available in 1998 WL 5089958. Daniel, who is now six
years old, has brain damage, which developed after he suffered a cardiac arrest while alone in
a hospital room with Lyda, and he essentially remains in a vegetative state. See Rick Casey,
Undiagnosed Tragedy (Chapter VI): Mom's Behavior Leads to Suspicions, SAN ANTONIO EXPRESS-
NEWS, Apr. 16, 1997, at IA, available in 1997 WL 3168621 [hereinafter Casey, Undiagnosed
Tragedy (Chapter VI)]; Rick Casey, Undiagnosed Tragedy: Kids' Mystery Deaths Probed--S.A. Judges
Restrict Mom's Contact with Sons, SAN ANTONIO ExPRESs-NEWS, Apr. 13, 1997, at IA
[hereinafter Casey, Undiagnosed Tragedy (Chapter I)].
Additionally, Lyda faces charges stemming from the death of another two-year-old son,
Aaron, in 1990, and the death of a foster child, Joshua, in 1993. See Rick Casey, Undiagnosed
Tragedy (Chapter IV): Deaths Spur Dad to Consider Abortion, SAN ANTONIO ExPRmss-NEws, Apr.
15, 1997, at IA [hereinafter Casey, Undiagnosed Tragedy (Chapter IV)]; Casey, Undiagnosed Trag-
edy (Chapter VI), supra. Both bodies were exhumed as part of the investigation into the later
incident involving Joseph, which was video taped. See Casey, Prosecutor Hitting Road for Baby
Case, supra note 3, at 2A; Casey, Undiagnosed Tragedy (Chapter I), supra. Although Lyda's oldest
child has never suffered from the effects of Lyda's alleged disease, see Casey, Undiagnosed
Tragedy (Chapter I), supra, reports suggest that with regard to her other children Lyda demon-
strated many of the classic symptoms of one suffering from Munchausen Syndrome by Proxy.
See Casey, Undiagnosed Tragedy (Chapter VI), supra. Evidence about David Martinez, Lyda's first
husband and father of Lyda's first four children, also supports suspicions of the disease,
based on the typical "father" role in the Syndrome: "Fathers in MSBP cases are typically ab-
sent a great deal because of theirjobs, giving the mother both the need for attention and the
opportunity to manipulate her child's condition." Rick Casey, Undiagnosed Tragedy (Chapter II):
Dad Recalls Son's Tragic Death--Sergeant Says He Never Saw Seizures Described by Wif4 SAN Awo-
NIo ExPREss-NEWS, Apr. 14, 1997, at 1A, available in 1997 WL 3168454.
With regard to eight-month-old Joseph, Lyda was the subject of covert video surveillance by
the Air Force Office of Special Investigation at Wilford Hall Medical Center in 1994. See Ca-
sey, Undiagnosed Tragedy (Chapter I), supra; Casey, Undiagnosed Tragedy (Chapter IV), supra:
Prentice, Judge Allows Mother Only Supervised Visits, supra. After ten days of constant video sur-
veillance, Lyda was observed blowing into the feeding tube of her son,Joseph, who writhed in
pain and screamed during the incident. See Casey, Undiagnosed Tragedy (Chapter I), supra; Ca-
sey, Undiagnosed Tragedy (Chapter IV), supra; Prentice, Judge Allows Mother Only Supervised Visits,
supra. Other evidence revealed that Lyda had also put formula in the child's stool, put a sy-
ringe cap under the child to make him cry during a doctor's visit, put gauze in his feeding
line, and poured feces into his feeding bag. See Rick Casey, Lyda Criminal Trial Previewed This
Week, SAN ANTONIO ExPREss-NEws, May 3, 1998, at 2A, available in 1998 WL 5090398; Casey,
Undiagnosed Tragedy (Chapter IV), supra; Judi Villa & Abraham Kwok, Former Mesa Mom Accused
in Sons' Abuse: Illness Drives Need to Hurt, ARIZ. REPUBLIC, Apr. 30, 1998, at Al. It is further
suspected that Lyda made inappropriate changes on Joseph's ventilator, interfered with dis-
charge planning, and made changes to feeding regimens without a physician's approval. See
Casey, Undiagnosed Tragedy (Chapter VI), supra. On other occasions when the child was in dan-
ger during an apnea episode, she would do nothing. See id. Upon restriction of contact
between mother and child, Joseph recovered quickly and, within a few months, had all of his
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feeding and breathing tubes removed, no longer needed medication, and began to thrive. See
Casey, Undiagnosed Tragedy (Chapter I), supra. Dr. Keith Kerr testified that, although the child
was not seriously injured by the incidents viewed on tape, it was all part of a deceptive plan by
Lyda for the child to receive complicated, but unnecessary surgeries and prolonged hospital
stays. See Prentice, Judge Allows Mother Only Supervised Vsits, supra.
Much of the federal criminal case hinges on the testimony of witnesses in the civil custody
case, particularly regarding visitation. See Casey, Lyda Criminal Trial Previewed This Week, supra.
Immediately after the original charges, Lyda was restricted to supervised visits with only Ben-
jamin and Gideon, wherein Lyda had to wash her hands and face and cover herself in a
smock before she could hold the children. See Melissa Prentice, Disorder Continues to Draw
Controversy: Judge to Determine Custody Rights of Parents Linked to Munchausen's Syndrome, SAN
ANTONIo ExPREss-NEws, May 5, 1998, at IB, available in 1998 WL 5090667 (describing the
extent of supervised visits with Benjamin and Gideon, which were limited to one hour per
week); Melissa Prentice, Visits by Mom Allowed:Judge to Let Lydas Be with Infant Son, SAN ANTO-
NlO ExPREss-NEws, May 8, 1998, at IA, available in 1998 WL 5091085 (describing the nature
of previous visits with Benjamin and Gideon) [hereinafter Prentice, Visits by Mom Allowed].
After a four-day hearing in May, however, it was determined that Lyda could have full, unsu-
pervised weekend visits with Benjamin, before and after which a social worker could examine
the child, and during which the social worker was able to appear unannounced. See Rick
Casey, No, Judge Wasn't Nuts in Munchausen's Case, SAN ANTONIO ExPREss-NEws, May 8, 1998,
at 3A, available in 1998 WL 5091095; Kelley Shannon, Judge Alters Visiting Time in Munchausen
Infant Case, AUSTIN AM.-STATESMAN, May 8, 1998, at B6, available in 1998 WL 3609476. One
report regarding the custody determination questioned the tactical decision by the attorneys
representing the Child Protective Services agency and the children to hold back in presenting
all the evidence. See Rick Casey, The Hovering Boys on the Back Bench, SAN ANTONIO ExPREss-
NEWS, May 10, 1998, at 2A, available in 1998 WL 5091300. The attorneys presented evidence
of only three of the six counts brought against Lyda. See Melissa Prentice, Munchausen's Judge
Urged to Look at Full Story, SAN ANTONIO ExPREss-NEws, May 20, 1998, at 7B, available in 1998
WL 5092444 [hereinafter Prentice, Munchausen's Judge Urged to Look at Full Story]. A few days
after the decision to allow unsupervised visits with Benjamin, the judge denounced the state's
attorneys for withholding "significant, critical evidence" in the custody hearing and over-
turned his own decision to allow unsupervised visits. Melissa Prentice, Mother's Visitations Gone:
Judge Says He Didn't Previously Have All the Evidence, SAN ANTONIO ExPREss-NEws, May 14,
1998, at IA, available in 1998 WL 5091842 [hereinafter Prentice, Mother's Visitations Gone]. It
wasn't until after his decision to allow unsupervised visits that the judge learned of the exis-
tence of 60 transcript pages of medical testimony from the Lydas' 1995 divorce hearing by Dr.
Keith Kerr, who originally diagnosed Lyda with Munchausen Syndrome by Proxy, which re-
futed testimony that the children suffered from a genetic disorder. See id. For a discussion of
Dr. Kerr's testimony, see Prentice, Munhausen s Judge Urged to Look at Full Story, supra. In his
opinion, Judge David Peeples wrote: "Whatever may be the state's reasons for presenting a
skeleton case, this court is unwilling to decide such an important child-safety matter without
the benefit of all the evidence." Prentice, Mother's Visitation's Gone, supra, Now, after only one
unsupervised weekend visit with Benjamin, Lyda's visitation has been returned to the original
supervised visits with both children, during which she and her husband are required to scrub
and wear surgical gowns. See Prentice, Judge Allows Mother Only Supervised Visits, supra. The new
order modified the original order insofar as the supervised visits could now occur two times
per week instead of only once, and the children's grandmother could continue to attend one
of the visits every week. See id. The judge also ordered DNA tests to clarify the varying testi-
mony about the existence of a genetic disorder. See id.
For a discussion of why it took so long for criminal charges to be brought against Lyda, see
Rick Casey, Another Baby Born to Munchausen Suspec SAN ANTONIO ExPREss-NEws, Apr. 8,
1998, at 3A, available in 1998 WL 5086727 (suggesting that the delay was due to jurisdictional
questions between the state and federal prosecutors). However, for commentary praising the
quick action taken by authorities in removing Lyda's newborns, see Melissa Prentice &Jacque
Crouse, Baby Taken from Mother Being Probed in Deaths of Kids, SAN ANTONIO ExPREss-NEWS,
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Internet. 20 These expanding sources of information are critical in
the effort to introduce the Syndrome to judges, juries, and society as a
unique but prevalent form of child abuse. This expanding body of
information may be a double-edged sword, however.2 ' As medical
knowledge of the disease grows and as medical professionals quickly
learn that courts are often skeptical about the disease, or require
clearer and more convincing evidence that such a bizarre condition
with such detrimental effects on the child actually occurs, medical
efforts to capture proof of the abuse on video are increasing. Some
Apr. 8, 1998, at IB, available in 1998 WL 5086705. Some commentators feel that the only
reason action is now being taken is because of the excessive media surrounding the case. See
Rick Casey, Munchausen Suspect Gets Vigorous Defense, SAN ANTONIO EXPRESS-NEws, Apr. 12,
1998, at 2A, available in 1998 WL 5087382; Thaddeus Herrick, State Takes Newborn from Mother:
Grand Jury Likely to Investigate Deaths of the Woman's Children, Hous. CHRON., Apr. 11, 1998, at 21A.
Commenting on the nature of such cases, Phoenix attorney Tom Ryan, who is known for defend-
ing women accused of perpetrating Munchausen Syndrome by Proxy, said: "Cases like this evaporate
in the courtroom. I guarantee that will be true of the Lyda case.... Munchausen [S]yndrome by
[P] roxy does not exist. ... It will go the way of ritual satanic abuse." Id. Ryan, who calls the syndrome
the "disease dujour," has won five cases in five years for accused mothers. See Gloria Padilla, Lawyer
Blasts Disease du Jour, SAN AN-rONIO EXPRESS-NEws, May 4, 1998, at IA, available in 1998 WL
5091535. Ryan daims that the syndrome is "nothing more than modem day medical McCarthyism"
and that it is "being used by fathers to gain sole custody of their children; in response to medical
malpractice complaints; and as a way for medical personnel to get rid of a 'pushy' mother." Id. He
further feels that the syndrome is "used against women by a male-dominated medical community,"
and that the Lyda case is "the shame of Texas." Id.
20. A very short, somewhat distorted clip of the videotape of Cynthia Lyda may be viewed on
the Internet. See Rick Casey, Undiagnosed Tragedy (visited Jan. 23, 1999) <http://
www.expressnews.com/extas/munch/>.
21. See Southall et al., supra note 19, at 755 (acknowledging the importance of the media in
promoting awareness of the disease, but also noting that media attention is attractive to the Mun-
chausen Syndrome by Proxy perpetrator and that the media may assist the perpetrator and hinder
child protection); see also Meadow, What Is, and What Is Not, supro note 16, at 534 (asserting that over-
use of the term "Munchausen Syndrome by Proxy" has confused medical, social work, and legal
professionals); Donald &Jureidini, supra note 16, at 753 (noting that there has been inconsistency in
the application of the term "Munchausen Syndrome by Proxy," which has been compounded by
commentators' failures to treat the syndrome as a form of child abuse); Morley, Practical C oncerns
supra note 16, at 528-29 (suggesting that the qualifications used to define Munchausen Syndrome
by Proxy are non-specific and can be misinterpreted; instead, the term should be abandoned alto-
gether in favor of a physical description of what happened to the child); Amirault, supra note 15, at
182-83 ("What would appear to mitigate the spread of Munchausen syndrome augments it in-
stead.").
22. SeeYorker, supra note 17, at 328-29. For a discussion of the use of covert video surveillance
in Munchausen Syndrome by Proxy cases, see Roger W. Byard & Richard H. Burnell, Covert V'tdeo
Surveillance in Munchausen Syndrome by Aroxy: Ethical Compromise or Esential Technique?, 160 MED. J.
AusTL. 352 (1994); TJ. David, Spying on Mothers, 344 LANcEr 133 (1994) (letter to the editor); Mark
A. Epstein et al., Munchausen Syndrome by Proxy: Considerations in Diagnosis and Confiration by Video
Surveillance, 80 PEDIATRIcS 220 (1987); Donald Evans, Covert Video Surveillance in Munchausen Syn-
drome by Proxy, 308 BRIT. MED. J. 341 (1994) [hereinafter Evans, Covert Video Surveillance]; Marc D.
Feldman, Spying on Mother, 344 LANcEr 132 (1994) (letter to the editor); D.M. Foreman & C. Far-
sides, Ethical Use of Covert Videoing Techniques in Detecting Munchausen Syndrome by Proxy 307 BRIT. MEn.
J. 611 (1993);J. Fox, Covert Video Surveillance of Children: Role of Police, 307 Birar. MED.J. 1145 (1993);
Jacqueline French, Pseudoseizurs in the Era of Vle-akroeepha/ogram Monitoring 8 CURRENT OPIN-
ION IN NEUROLOGY 117 (1995); James D. Frost et al., Munchausen's Syndrome by Proxy and Video
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legal commentators encourage such efforts. 3 This Article argues,
however, that employing covert video surveillance is both
unnecessary and unethical as a means of proving Munchausen
Syndrome by Proxy, despite the sometimes positive results from such
efforts, because the process not only permits child abuse to occur,
but also purposely creates an environment conducive to its
perpetration. This Article concludes that covert video surveillance
unreasonably places a child at risk of abuse, and that any abuse
permitted by a medical professional is inherently unethical and should
be prohibited. If medical professionals suspect Munchausen Syndrome
by Proxy, then they should take every added precaution to confirm the
diagnosis through comparative medical conclusions after observing the
child's condition when he or she is not within the care and control of
the suspected perpetrator.14 Legal professionals, like prosecutors,
attorneys, and judges, should help to promote the health, safety, and
well-being of the child by integrating a cumulative medical diagnosis
and a res ipsa loquitur standard to obviate the need for covert video
surveillance. To create an environment where physical and potentially
lethal child abuse is anticipated and permitted contravenes both legal
reason and medical ethics. 5 Such action, however well intentioned, is
tantamount to complicity in the abuse.
Surveillance, 142 AM.J. DIsE.AsEs CHILDREN 917 (1988); Raanan Gillon, Covert Surveillance by Doctors for
Life-ThreateningMunchausen's Syndrome by Proxy, 21J. MED. ETHics 131 (1995); Paul Johnson & Colin
Morley, Spying on Mothers, 344 LANcET 132 (1994) (letter to the editor); Brian Morgan, Covert Surveil-
lance in Munchausens Syndrome by Proxy, 308 BRrr. MED. J. 1715 (1994); Brian Morgan, Spying On
Mothers, 344 LANCET 132 (1994) (letter to the editor); Colin Morley, Concerns About Using and Inter-
preting Covert Vudeo Surveillance, 316 BRIrr. MED.J. 1603 (1998); Martin P. Samuels & David Southall,
Covert Surveillance in Munchausen's Syndrne by Pxy: Welfare of the Child Must Come Frs4 308 BRIT.
ME.J. 1101 (1994) (letter to the editor) [hereinafter Sanuels & Southall, Covert Surveillance: Welfare
of the Odd Must Come First]; Martin P. Samuels & David Southall, Video Surveillance in Diagnosis of
Intentional Suffocation, 344 LANcEr 414 (1994); Neela Shabde & Alan W. Craft, Commentary: Covert
Video Surveillance Is Acceptable-But Only with a Rigomus Protoco4 316 BRrr. MED. J. 1604 (1998); Elliot
A. Shinebourne, Covert Video Surveillance and the Prniple of Double Effect A Reponse to Cticisn, 22 J.
MED. ETHics 26 (1996); Southall et al., supra note 19, at 735; David P. Southall & Martin P. Samuels,
Ethical Use of Covert Videotaping for Potentially Life Threatening Child Abuse A Re"nse to Drs. Foreman and
Fmides, 307 BRirr. MED.J. 613 (1993); Sying On Mothers, 343 LANcET 1373 (1994) (editorial); Terry
Thomas, Covert Video Surveillance-An Asseisent of the Staffordshire Protoco 22 J. MED. ETHmics 22
(1996); Robert Wheatley, Covert Surveillance in Munchausens Syndrome by Proxy: Clinical Investigation,
Not Research Activity, 308 BRIr. MED.J. 1101 (1994) [hereinafterWheatley, Covert Surveillance].
23. Se, eg., Yorker, supra note 17, at 346 (favoring use of surveillance when legally valid); Vol-
laro, supra note 17, at 515 (encouraging video surveillance of the actual occurrence of Munchausen
Syndrome by Proxy in hospitals).
24. More effective and more timely medical intervention is critical because the alternative is
post-abuse intervention by the social orjudicial systems, both which have proven much less effective
sources of protection for the child. See Richard D. Krugman, Unimaginable Images: Seeing Is Believing,
100 PEDiATRIcs 890, 891 (1997).
25. Arguably, as a medical concept, Munchausen Syndrome is itself rooted in moral dilemma.
Its origin was first perceived to be of a moral nature; that is, patients were simply duping doctors by
falsifying symptoms and illnesses. Eventually, diagnosing the performance pathologically and creat-
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Part I of this Article briefly describes Munchausen Syndrome by
Proxy. It is beyond the scope of this Article to discuss the intricate dy-
namics of the disorder and its complicated etiology in great detail.
There are numerous medical and some legal resources that discuss
these areas, and a partial list of these sources is offered as reference.26
To understand the context of the unethical nature of video surveil-
lance of the disorder, however, it is necessary to understand the nature
of the disorder itself, since the incomprehensible nature of the disor-
der is used tojustify extreme investigative measures. There is extensive
debate within the medical field itself regarding whether the term
"Munchausen Syndrome by Proxy" should be used to define the per-
petrator's behavior or the abuse resulting from the behavior 27 The
answer to this debate is relevant to the existing discrepancy between
how the medical and legal fields treat the disorder and deal with its
consequences. Therefore, Part I of this Article will briefly describe the
nature of Munchausen Syndrome by Proxy in this context. If the term
is used to qualify a perpetrator's behavior, and the Syndrome is treated
as something from which the parent suffers, (i.e., the mother "suffers
from Munchausen Syndrome by Proxy"), then the medical and legal
fields' reaction to the Syndrome will tend to focus on the psychiatric
assessment of the perpetrator and the family, rather than on the clini-
cal condition of the child.2s Within this narrow context, this Article
ing a "medical" term for this concept transformed otherwise "bad" patients into "sick" patients, and
displaced the concept from the arena of moral discourse to that of medical discourse. See Anirault,
supra note 15, at 181.
26. Seesupra notes 16, 17.
27. See Meadow, What Is, and What Is Not, supra note 16, at 534. Meadow states that observers of
the most drastic cases-suffocation and poisoning-see that perpetrating parents share common
characteristics. They think that this warrants special approaches in dealing with this unique form of
abuse. See idi at 535. Therefore, he argues, "it is appropriate to decide how to use the term ... in a
way that is helpful to child protection workers and ... to the children." Id. He thinks it is inappropri-
ate to say that someone "suffer[s] from Munchausen syndrome by proxy." Id. He advocates
following the American Psychiatric Association's (APA) proposal, seeAPA, DIAGNosTiC AND STATIs-
T-CAL MANUAL OF MENrAL DisoRDERs (DSM IV) (4th ed. 1994), which applies the term "factitious
disorder by proxy" to the perpetrator and his or her behavior, rather than to the resulting abuse. See
Meadow, What Is, and What Is Not, supra note 16, at 534-35. But cf Donald &Jureidini, supra note 16,
at 756 (suggesting that even this definition is inadequate and should "contain a fifth criterion that
makes explicit the central role of the physician in the process, that is, misattribution by physicians of
the illness or injury to some medical cause(s), not necessarily deady defined."). Thus, it may be used
to categorize abusers of the elderly, handicapped, or disabled adults, and not just children. See
Meadow, What Is, and What Is Not, supra note 16, at 535. A third possible qualification of the term is
notjust the perpetrator, orjust the abuse, but a complex transaction among parent, child, and physi-
cian. See Donald & Jureidini, supra note 16, at 756. In any case, as Donald & Jureidini argue, the
focus on the perpetrator's psychological or psychiatric condition should not be overlooked; it is
critical to ongoing case management decisions and the prevention of further harm to the child or
other children. See id. at 758. The focus on diagnosing the perpetrator should not influence the
determination of whether child abuse has taken place, however. See id.
28. See Meadow, What Is, and What Is Not, supra note 16, at 538. Meadow argues that the term
Munchausen Syndrome by Proxy should be confined to situations in which the perpetrator's
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concludes that "Munchausen Syndrome by Proxy" must be accepted as
a form of child abuse that should be dealt with by focusing primarily
on the effects on the child.29 This Article further concludes that em-
ploying covert video surveillance to detect or confirm the disorder
subverts this primary focus on the child and leads to unethical results.
Part I also discusses the legal implications of the Syndrome. While
knowledge of the disease within the medical and legal fields is growing,
neither field addresses or accepts the disease and its very real conse-
quences. Both fields, however, are quite dependent upon each other's
treatment of the disease if the disease is to be properly addressed as a
form of child abuse.3 ' Thus, the hesitancy of the legal field to fully ac-
cept and treat Munchausen Syndrome by Proxy as a unique form of
child abuse has serious implications for medical professionals and,
more importantly, for the children who are victimized by the disease.
Part I also addresses the consequences on children and medical staffs,
which include the growing but misguided need for hospital staffs to
conduct covert video surveillance of abusive parents perpetrating
Munchausen Syndrome by Proxy.
Part II analyzes the ethical dilemma for hospital staffs created by
the legal system's hesitancy to accept Munchausen Syndrome by
Proxy as a unique form of child abuse. Because judges and juries re-
main skeptical of the disease and its consequences, hospital staffs are
forced to rely on covert video surveillance to prove that the disease
actually occurs, results in harmful effects on the child, and is, in fact,
a form of child abuse. Part II describes the procedures employed by
Dr. David Southall, who uses covert video surveillance as a means of
detecting or confirming Munchausen Syndrome by Proxy to assure
appropriate criminal dispositions for the perpetrators and appro-
priate domestic dispositions for the children.31 Part II argues that
the use of covert video surveillance is invalid under a Fourth
Amendment analysis and unnecessary. This Article further con-
cludes that orchestrating situations where child abuse is likely or
suspected to occur is unethical and should be prohibited. Instead,
other, more time-consuming but cautious methods of detection,
such as restricting a parent's visits with the child, should be employed
motivation is to assume a sick role for themselves or another form of attention-seeking behavior. Se
id. at 538.
29. There are generally three reasons why some clinicians have not accepted Munchausen
Syndrome by Proxy as a form of child abuse: (1) "Some claim that [Munchausen Syndrome by
Proxy] is, or is symptomatic of, a specific psychiatric disturbance in the perpetrator[;] (2) [r]eported
mortality and morbidity rates are higher[; and] (3) Munchausen [S]yndrome by [P]roxy seems to
be premeditated rather than motivated by acute frustration or rage." Donald & Jureidini, supra note
16, at 753.
30. SeeFlannery, supra note 9, at 1224-32.
31. See infra Part HlA
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in a controlled and protective environment as an alternative. Part II
also argues that, when considering the propriety of covert video sur-
veillance, courts should accept the health and safety of the child as
paramount, and should temporarily restrict visitation as an alternative
to covert video surveillance.
Part II argues that courts can obviate the need for covert video sur-
veillance by integrating the medical and legal perspectives on the
Syndrome. Part II suggests that when confronted with Munchausen
Syndrome by Proxy, courts should consider all cumulative circumstan-
tial medical evidence, including the change in the child's condition
when separated from the alleged perpetrator. Courts should then ap-
ply a res ipsa loquitur theory to the cumulative evidence, thereby
obviating the need for covert video surveillance, while still confirming
the diagnosis and protecting the child.
I. MUNCHAUSEN SYNDROME BY PROXY
A. The Dynamics of the Disease
Munchausen Syndrome by Proxy is an extended form of Mun-
chausen Syndrome 32 which incorporates a child as the recipient of
fabricated or falsely induced illnesses.33 Acute conditions in the child
are fabricated or induced by a parent-almost always a mother34-to
satisfy the perpetrator's need for attention or the need to assume a
35role of one parenting a child's illness. Thus, the parent is the proxy,
who provides information regarding the child's condition, rather than
his or her own condition.
Typically, there are four identifiable elements that categorize 'Mun-
chausen Syndrome by Proxy:
32. In cases of Munchausen Syndrome, adults pursue hospital admission or medical attention
for themselves by fabricating symptoms or actually inducing illnesses or conditions in themselves. See
Murray, supra note 16, at 343-49. The fabricated symptoms are usually accompanied by dramatic, yet
plausible, medical histories. See id at 343-44. The perpetrator usually has nothing to gain by this
behavior, other than satisfying the desire to deceive others. See id at 345. This desire is usually satis-
fied at several hospitals and through numerous doctors. See id. at 344. There have been several
interpretations of the cause for such behavior, including. a need to suffer a desire to be the focus of
attention; a need to adopt a passive controlling role; an attempt to deceive authority or parent fig-
ures; dependency, fulfillment of erotic desires; depression; symbolic castration; and a demonstrated
hatred for doctors. SeeA Cremona-Barbaro, The Munchausen Syndrome and Its Symbolic Significance: An
In-Depth CaseAnaysis, 151 BRrr.J. PSYCHIATRY 76 (1987).
33. See Murray, supra note 16, at 343.
34. SeeFlannery, supra note 9, at 1182.
35. See id at 1193.
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(1) the child's illness is simulated or produced by a parent
or someone acting in a parental role; (2) the parent repeat-
edly requests medical evaluation and care of the child; (3)
the perpetrator denies any knowledge of the etiology; and
(4) the symptoms quickly cease when the child and the per-
36petrator are separated .
While the nature of the fabricated or induced symptoms may
take many forms,37 the most common symptoms are seizures and38 39 40 41 - 42 42
apnea, " bleeding, fever, 0 diarrhea, vomiting, hypertension, 44 - 46
rashes," renal stones, 5 and failure to thrive. Some of the mostS 47
common abuses by the parent are suffocation, insulin
36. Flannery, supra note 9, at 1184 (citing Susan 0. Mercer &Jeanette D. Perdue, Munchausen
Syndrume by PAmsy: Soial Work Ro k 38 Soc. WORK 74, 74-75 (1993)); see Donald &Jureidini, supra note
16, at 757 (offering five criteria for suspecting Munchausen Syndrome by Proxy). But se Meadow, What
Is, and What Is Not, supra note 16, at 534 (asserting that common factors which indicate Munchausen
Syndrome by Proxy lack specificity and may be qualified by other abusive behaviors that are not classified
as Munchausen Syndrome by Proxy). SeegeneaLy Rosenberg, supra note 16, at 547-63.
37. One report describes a patient suffering from Munchausen Syndrome who went so far to
dupe her doctor into performing a hysterectomy that she scanned the letterheads from previous medi-
cal records into her computer and then recreated her own pathology so that a hysterectomy was
wananted. See Leo A. Gordon, Munchausen Patients Have Found the Compute, 74 MED. EcoN. 118 (1997).
For a discussion of how perpetrators of Munchausen Syndrome by Proxy abuse support groups on the
internet as a forum for their deception, see Joan Stephenson, Patient Prtendem Weave Tangled "Web" of
Deei 280JAMA 1297 (1998).
38. Seizures or apnea in the child are typically caused by poisoning or suffocation. See Flannery,
supra note 9, at 1185 n.31 (citing Meadow, ABC.; supra note 16, at 249); see also Rosen et al., supra note 16,
at 715-20 (discussing apnea); Roy Meadow, Fititous Epiepsy, LANCrc, July 7, 1984, at 25, 25-28
(discussing seizure disorders).
39. Bleeding in the child is usually caused by use of the perpetrator's blood, which, typically, is de-
rived from a vaginal tampon, or through the use of raw meat, or coloring agents that are added to the
child's stool. SeeFlannery, supra note 9, at 1185 n.31 (citing Meadow, ABC supra note 16, at 249); sw also
Malatack et al., supra note 16, at 523-25 (discussing gastrointestinal bleeding).
40. A child's fever may be fabricated by warming a thermometer or altering temperature charts,
or may be induced by injecting contaminated material into the child. SeeFlannery, supra note 9, at 1185
n.31 (citing Meadow, ABC supra note 16, at 249).
41. Diarrhea in the child is usually caused by the forced ingestion oflaxatives. See id
42. The child may be induced to vomit by forced salt ingestion, or vomiting may be mechanically
induced. See id; see alsoJames L Sutphen & Frank T. Saulsbury, Intentional Ipecac Poisoning Mlunchausen
Syndvwme by Prxy, 82 PEDIATRcS 453 (1988).
43. Hypertension is fabricated by altering blood pressure charts. Sw Flannery, supra note 9, at
1185 n.31 (citing Meadow, ABC supra note 16, at 249.)
44. Rashes can be caused by scratching the child's skin to cause blisters, or through the use of
caustics and dyes. See id
45. Renal stones can be caused by the addition of stone and blood to the child's urine. See id.
46. A child's failure to thrive may be caused by actually withholding food, or, if in the hospital, by
interfering with treatment or even sucking the child's stomach content through a nasogastric tube. See
id
47. See RJ. McClure et al., Epidemo of Munchausen Syndrne by Proxy, Non-Accidental Poisoning
and Non-Aacidental Suffocation, 75 ARcr-rvss OF DISEASE IN CHILDHOOD 57 (1996); Roy Meadow, Suffoca-
tian, ReunentApnea and Sudden Infant Deat, 117J. PEDiATrICS 351 (1990). In the study by Dr. Southall,
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48 49r5injections, ipecac poisoning,49 administration of laxatives, or
other manipulations.
There are basically five groups of people that form the typical in-
ter-relationships in a Munchausen Syndrome by Proxy case, prior
to legal involvement. The direct "participants" in the disorder are
52 53
mothers, fathers, and children. Social workers and doctors are
secondarily involved, but play a major role in the dynamics of the
perpetration and investigation of the Syndrome. Research reveals
that characteristics of individuals in these respective groups are
usually consistent. 54 The perpetrator of Munchausen Syndrome by
Proxy is usually a natural or adoptive mother,55 between the ages of
thirty-five, 6 who has had some history of psychiatrictwenty-two and  ,     itr  citi
symptoms or behavioral problems.5 7 The mothers are usually coop-
erative with medical staff and are overzealously involved in the
child's care, yet express little concern over the child's illness.58 The
mothers often express that they are the only ones with whom the
child seems to make progress.5 9 Mothers also are able to predict
30 out of 39 cases of abuse involved some form of suffocation of the child. See Southall et al., supra note
19, at 741-44 tbl. 3.
48. See Wdliam A. Bauman & Rosalyn S. Yalow, Child Abuse: Parental Insulin Administration, 99 J.
PEDIATRICS 588 (1981).
49. See Richard B. Colletfi & Richard C. Wasserman, Recurrent Infantile Vomiting Due to Inten-
tional Ipecac Poisoning 8J. PEDIATRIC GASTROENTEROLOGY & NUTRITION 394 (1989); Kenneth W.
Feldman et al., Munchausen Syndmne/Bulimia by Proxy: Ipecac as a Toxin in Child Abuse, 13 CHILD
ABUSE & NEGLECT 257 (1989); Jens Goebel et al., Cardiomyopathyfirmn Ipecac Administration in Mun-
chausen Syndrome y Px, 92 PEDIATRICS 601 (1993); H. Juhfing McClung et al., Intentional Ipecac
Poisoning in Cildren, 142 Am.J. DISEASES CHILDREN 637 (1988); DouglasJ. Schneider et al., Clinical
and Pathologic Apecls of Cardioryopathy fiam Ipecac Administration in Munchausen's Syndrome by Proy, 97
PEDIATRICS 902 (1996); Sutphen & Saulsbury, supra note 42, at 453 (suggesting that ipecac poison-
ing in children may be underestimated).
50. See McGuire & Feldman, supra note 16, at 289-90 (describing a case study involving the
administration of laxatives to induce diarrhea in the child).
51. See Flannery, supra note 9, at 1186-87 n.43 (citing Crouse, supra note 16, at 249; Malatack,
supra note 16, at 523-25).
52. For a discussion of the role of social workers in the perpetration and investigation
of Munchausen Syndrome by Proxy, see Flannery, supra note 9, at 1203-05; see also James
Masterson & Jacquelyn Wilson, Factitious Illness in Children: The Social Worker's Role in Identifica-
tion and Management, Soc. WORK HEALTH CARE, Summer 1987, at 21, 21-30; Mercer &
Perdue, supra note 36, at 74.
53. For a discussion of the role of doctors in the perpetration and investigation of
Munchausen Syndrome by Proxy, see Flannery, supra note 9, at 1206-09. For accounts of
physicians' views regarding Munchausen Syndrome by Proxy, see Mary S. Sheridan, Parents'
Reporting of Symptoms in Their Children: Physicians'Perceptions, 53 HAw. MED. J. 216 (1994).
54. See Flannery, supra note 9, at 1189-1209.
55. See Mercer & Perdue, supra note 36, at 76.
56. See HERBERT A. SCHREIER & JUDITH A. LIBOW, HURTING FOR LOVE: MUNCHAUSEN
BY PROXY SYNDROME 29 (1993).
57. See Alexander et al., supra note 16, at 585.
58. SeeFlannery, supra note 9, at 1189-90.
59. See id. at 1190.
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when the child will improve, which further evidences to hospital
staff that they are knowledgeable and should be trusted regarding
the child's care and condition. A surprising number of Mun-
chausen mothers have extensive backgrounds in nursing or some
aspect of the medical field. 6' Commonly, Munchausen Syndrome by
Proxy mothers usually have experienced an emotionally or physi-
cally abusive childhood62 and are probably involved in an unstable
relationship with the child's natural father.2
While Munchausen Syndrome by Proxy mothers often share
these common characteristics, perpetrators are generally classified
into three categories: (1) help seekers, (2) active inducers, and (3)
doctor addicts.6 Help seekers tend to displace their own personal
60. See id. at 1190-91; see also Epstein et al., supra note 22, at 222 (describing a mother
who predicted her child's improvement before leaving him in the hospital for several days).
Some researchers believe that a greater focus on the psychological diagnosis of the perpetra-
tor and on the interaction with the treating psychologist will be helpful in identifying
"countertransference," which could be used as a diagnostic tool to best help protect the in-
terests of the child. See Szajnberg et al., supra note 16, at 233. "Countertransference" results
from the perpetrator's ability to create a disinclination in the clinician to believe that the
perpetrator could have performed such acts. See id. at 234. This reaction is provoked by the
perpetrator's adoption of an "as-if" character, pursuant to which the perpetrator uncon-
sciously presents aspects of themselves that they believe would want to be perceived or
diagnosed by the clinician. See id. This explains why the same perpetrator may have varied
diagnoses by several different clinicians. See id.
61. See Libow & Schreier, supra note 16, at 606. For a discussion of Munchausen Syn-
drome by Proxy perpetrated by medical care workers, see Julie Repper, Munchausen Syndrome
&y Proxy in Health Care Workers, 21J. ADVANCED NURSING 299 (1995); see also In reAaron S., 625
N.Y.S.2d 786, 788 (Fain. Ct. 1993) (noting that statistics in various studies show that 30 to 50
percent of Munchausen Syndrome by Proxy mothers studied were nurses). Incidences of
Munchausen Syndrome by Proxy, many of which involve nurses as the perpetrators, have led
researchers to study the phenomenon of nurses who prey on their patients. See Schneider,
supra note 3. Beatrice Crofts Yorker, Professor of Nursing at Georgia State University, has
documented 13 cases of 14 nurses who were involved in 206 suspicious deaths in various hos-
pitals, which led to 47 murder charges and 69 assault charges. See id. Eleven nurses were
convicted (two convictions were overturned on appeal) and two nurses were found not guilty.
See id. One hospital orderly admitted to killing 60 patients. See id. Yorker concluded that all of
the criteria for Munchausen Syndrome by Proxy cases were present in the cases involving the
nurses, with the simple substitution of an otherwise "dependent person" in the nursing cases
for the child in a Munchausen Syndrome by Proxy case. See id.
In Ohio, 32-year-old Sherry Davis pretended to be a nurse and subjected her daughter, 12-
year-old Kristy, who is deaf and diabetic, to numerous but unnecessary medications and
medical procedures, including a feeding tube in her stomach. SeeJane Prendergast, 'This Is
Different than Being an Ouverprotective Parent; Woman Accused of Making Girl Ill; Abuse Charged After
Dozens of Treatments, CIN. ENQUIRER, July 12, 1998, at CI, available in 1998 WL 3778523. Davis
is being charged with criminal abuse in the first degree. See id.
62. See Mercer & Perdue, supra note 36, at 78 ("Some studies report that the mother
had a bereft childhood, and a high proportion had been sexually abused."). But see SCHREIER
& LIBOW, supra note 56, at 20 (stating that evidence of physical and emotional abuse was
inconsistent, but loneliness and isolation were common themes in mothers' lives).
63. See Mercer & Perdue, supra note 36, at 78 (discussing family dynamics of Mun-
chausen Syndrome by Proxy mothers).
64. See Libow & Schreier, supra note 16, at 604.
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65problems by reporting distressing symptoms in the child. They
also thrive on medical attention and intervention and are very re-
66
ceptive to counseling and professional interaction. Contrary to
help seekers are active inducers, who resist medical intervention by
camouflaging their psychiatric problems with overtly commendable
67parenting. Doctor addicts closely resemble active inducers, but
obsess on the child's illness and demonstrate paranoid tendencies
toward the treatment team. 68
It is rare that fathers are reported as the perpetrators of Mun-
chausen Syndrome by Proxy.69 Some believe that one reason for
underestimated statistics of perpetrating fathers may be that fathers
do not typically demonstrate the patterned characteristics demon-
strated by the more common, female perpetrators, thereby making
detection of the male perpetrator more difficult. 70 Others believe,
however, that while usually not the primary perpetrators, fathers
commonly take a passive role within the dynamics of the family af-
fected by Munchausen Syndrome by Proxy.71 Not surprisingly,
Munchausen fathers commonly display denial and disbelief of the
mother's behavior.72 In the few studies that have revealed active
participation by fathers, some observed common traits have been
dominance over female participants and hospital staff, exaggerated
affection for the child in the presence of hospital staff, and frustra-
tion with medical professionals in failing to diagnose the child
accurately.73 Although it is unclear whether male and female perpe-
trators demonstrate the same characteristics and traits, it is clear
that fathers and male care givers must be closely considered in di-
agnosing Munchausen Syndrome by Proxy.
65. See Flannery, supra note 9, at 1193.
66. See id.
67. See Libow & Schreier, supra note 16, at 606; see also Penelope Krener & Raymond
Adelman, Parent Salvage and Parent Sabotage in the Care of Chronically Ill Children, 142 Am. J.
DISEASES CHILDREN 945, 946, 949-50 (1988) (comparing difficulties in dealing with active
inducers and "difficult" parents of chronically ill children).
68. See Libow & Schreier, supra note 16, at 606-07.
69. See Flannery, supra note 9, at 1196 (citations omitted). For a more detailed discus-
sion of fathers' roles in Munchausen Syndrome by Proxy cases, see Jones et al., The Role of the
Male Caretaker, supra note 16, at 245-46; Adel F. Makar & PaulaJ. Squier, Munchausen Syndrome
by Proxy: Father as a Perpetrator, 85 PEDIATRICS 370 (1990).
70. See Makar & Squier, supra note 69, at 372.
71. See Crouse, supra note 16, at 250.
72. See Basil J. Zitelli et al., Munchausen's Syndrome by Proxy and Its Professional Participants,
141 AM.J. DISEASES CHILDREN 1099, 1101 (1987).
73. See Flannery, supra note 9, at 1197-98.
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Although there have been reported cases of adult victims of
Munchausen Syndrome by Proxy,74 the Syndrome is usually perpe-
trated upon children between infancy and eight years of age.75 The
victims' age is particularly problematic in terms of investigating and
providing evidence in court because children of this age may be
76pre-verbal or incapable of providing reliable testimony. Younger
children tend to suffer from direct abuse inflicted by the parent,
whereas older children tend to undergo unnecessary diagnostic
procedures resulting from factitious injuries or illnesses.
As with mothers-and arguably fathers-there are common
characteristics shared by children who are victims of Munchausen
Syndrome by Proxy. First, the child usually demonstrates one or
more of the commonly fabricated symptoms. 7 8 Second, the child's
condition is usually inconsistent with the medical history offered by
the parent.79 Third, the child typically demonstrates inappropriate
behavior for his or her age.80 Finally, the child learns to treat his or
her symptoms and illnesses as preconditions for the parent's love.8'
Despite these commonalities among child victims, there are clear
distinctions between the behaviors of younger children versus older
children.
82
74. See Sigal et al., Munchausen Syndrome by Adult Proxy, supra note 16, at 696-98; N.J.
Smith & M. H. Ardern, More in Sickness than in Health: A Case Study of Munchausen by Proxy in
the Elderly, IIJ. FAM. THERAPY 321 (1989).
75. SeeJones et al., supra note 16, at 35.
76. Cf Flannery, supra note 9, at 1199 & n.97 ("As with most forms of child abuse, the
victim is often too young to know of his or her predicament or too incapacitated to tell those
in authority."). First-hand accounts of Munchausen Syndrome by Proxy are rare, since the
syndrome is so unfamiliar and since the victims are often infants and young children. See id.
As the syndrome becomes better understood and medical literature regarding the syndrome
expands, new reports of Munchausen Syndrome by Proxy are being reported by victims, now
adults, who suffered from the disease before it was even identified in 1977. See, e.g., Brian
Bergstein, Psychology-Rare Mental Disorder Blamed for Child Abuse, DAYTON DAILY NEWS, July
13, 1997, at 16A, available in 1997 WL 11426086 (describing the story of Mary Bryk, who now
believes that she was a victim of Munchausen Syndrome by Proxy for eight years in the 1960s,
when her mother broke her bones with a hammer and infected her wounds by inserting top
soil and coffee grounds under her skin);James Tobin, A Childhood of Mysterious Pain, A Mother
Blamed, DET. NEWS, Feb. 8, 1998, at Al (recounting the history of Mary's childhood, which
included 24 operations before she turned ten years old); see also Brian Bergstein, Woman's
Allegations Focus on Rare Syndrome: Mother Denies Beating Daughter to Gain Attention, FORT WORTH
STAR-TELEGRAM,July 13, 1997, at 9, available in 1997 WL 11892865; Tobin, supra note 3. For a
chronicled account of the actual experiences of Mary Bryk, see Bryk & Siegel, supra note 16,
at 1-7.
77. See SCHREIER & LIBOW, supra note 56, at 24-26.
78. See supra notes 38-46 and accompanying text.
79. See Crouse, supra note 16, at 249.
80. See id.
81. See id. at 250.
82. See Flannery, supra note 9, at 1201 n.I I (citing SCHREIER & LIsow, supra note 56,
at 135-37, 143-45).
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Each of these respective groups plays a critical role in perpetrat-
ing, identifying, and dealing with Munchausen Syndrome by Proxy.
It is beyond the scope of this Article to fully discuss the details and
dynamics of each group. The fact that each group has different dy-
namics adds to the difficulty in understanding the relationships
among the groups. However, the fact that each group demonstrates
common characteristics which, though not determinative, clearly
serve as possible indicators of the Syndrome, is extremely relevant
to the ethical considerations involved in determining when, or
whether, such a drastic measure as video surveillance is necessary
or appropriate. It is critical to understand that, regardless of the
interplay between the groups, and regardless of whether the term
"Munchausen Syndrome by Proxy" is used to describe the perpetra-
tor's behavior or the abuse that results from it, the complicated
dynamics of this interplay results in both direct and indirect physi-
cal and psychological harm to the child. The Syndrome cannot be
treated as if it is caused by one identifiable and treatable psychiatric
condition of the perpetrating parent. s While, legally, this may be
easier and more understandable, it is medically impossible and
ethically unsound.
As a matter of research, psychiatric treatment, or narrowly fo-
cused discourse in specific branches of the medical field, such
perspectives on the Syndrome may be beneficial. In terms of pre-
venting further harm to the child, however, the Syndrome should
be viewed solely in terms of its consequences for the child.84 Thus,
the legal field should accept the term and the Syndrome as a form
of child abuse, with direct consequences on the child's condition
that are caused by the behavior of the parent, rather than as a psy-
chiatric condition of the parent which happens to result in harmful
83. See Donald & Jureidini, supra note 16, at 756 ("T] he current lack of clarity in the
use of the term [Munchausen Syndrome by Proxy] and the ambiguities in its definition lead
to overinclusiveness in its use, trivialization of abuse, and a lack of clarity about prognosis and
long-term management."). Unless the parent acknowledges the existence and the nature of
his or her abuse, which is rarely the case, even where the parent observes himself or herself
abusing the child on tape, psychiatric intervention is likely to prove unsuccessful. See Byard &
Burnell, supra note 22, at 354 (describing how a mother initially denied guilt, even after being
informed of a video recording which showed her smothering her baby, but then confessed
and pleaded guilty to manslaughter of her first baby and to causing grievous bodily harm to
her third child); Krugman, supra note 24, at 890; see also Marc D. Feldman, Denial in Mun-
chausen Syndrome by Proxy: The Consulting Psychiatrist's Dilemma, 24 INT'L J. PSYCHIATRY MED.
121 (1994); A.R. Nicol & M. Eccles, Psychotherapy for Munchausen Syndromne by Proxy, 60 AR-
CHIVES OF DISEASE IN CHILDHOOD 344 (1985). The dispositional options, then, are to return
the child to an abusive parent, for whom psychiatric intervention will be fruitless, or to re-
move the child from the parent because of the abuse.
84. See Donald &Jureidini, supra note 16, at 754 (asserting that the medical profession's
failure to treat the syndrome as a form of child abuse actually contributes to the development
of the syndrome).
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consequences for the child. Accordingly, if the Syndrome is ac-
cepted as a condition of the parent, using the child in video
surveillance to identify or evaluate this condition would seem con-
ducive to that end despite the continuing harmful consequences
for the child. If the Syndrome is accepted as a form of abuse, how-
ever, with the focus on the condition of the child, then using the
child in video surveillance to perpetuate further abuse is illogical
and contrary to its own end. In either case, the perpetuation of
child abuse must be viewed as inherently unethical.
B. Legal Implications of Munchausen Syndrome by Proxy
It was not long after Munchausen Syndrome by Proxy was first
discovered and defined in 1977 that it produced evidentiary issues
for the courts. In 1981, in People v. Phillips,5 Priscilla Phillips ap-
86pealed a conviction for the murder of her adopted child.s The
court considered the issue of the admissibility of expert testimony
regarding Munchausen Syndrome by Proxy, even though the psy-
chiatrist did not testify about his first-hand observations of the child
or the mother; rather, he testified based on the available medical
literature about the Syndrome at the time. 7 Phillips argued that the
Syndrome was not a recognized illness generally accepted by the
medical community and, therefore, medical testimony on the sub-
ject was inadmissible."8 This standard came to be known as the
"Kelly-Frye" test. 9 The court held that the "Kelly-Frye" test was not
applicable and allowed the testimony, however, finding that the
testimony regarding the disorder was relevant to prove or support
the mother's motive in perpetrating otherwise inexplicable behav-
ior but not to prove the behavior itself.90 The court held that "[t] he
85. 175 Cal. Rptr. 703 (Cal. Ct. App. 1981).
86. See id. at 703-04.
87. See id. at 711-14. But see In re MAV., 425 S.E.2d 377, 379 (Ga. Ct. App. 1992)
(holding expert testimony inadmissible because doctor did not observe mother and child),
overruled on other grounds by In reJ.P., 480 S.E.2d 8, 8 (Ga. 1997).
88. See Phillips, 175 Cal. Rptr. at 713.
89. See People v. McDonald, 690 P.2d 709, 723-24 (Cal. 1984); Frye v. United States 293
F. 1013, 1014 (D.C. Cir. 1923) (holding that systolic blood pressure deception test was not
scientifically reliable); People v. Kelly, 130 Cal. Rptr. 144, 148 (Cal. 1976) (holding that ad-
mission of testimony concerning voice print analysis was not scientifically reliable). The
"Kelly-Frye" test is "the rule that evidence based on a new scientific method of proof is admis-
sible only on a showing that the procedure has been generally accepted as reliable in the
scientific community in which it developed." McDonald, 690 P.2d at 723.
90. See Phillips, 175 Cal. Rptr. at 714; see also Reid v. State, 964 S.W.2d 723, 729 (Tex.
App. 1998) (allowing evidence of Munchausen Syndrome by Proxy to show motive).
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existence, nature, [and] validity... of the phenomenon character-
ized as 'Munchausen [S]yndrome by [P]roxy' are all matters
sufficiently beyond common experience that expert opinion would
assist the trier of fact."91 Despite the fact that this was the first pub-
lished opinion dealing with the issue of Munchausen Syndrome by
Proxy,92 that it was .only four years after the Syndrome had been
discovered, and that Munchausen Syndrome by Proxy had not yet
even been listed in the diagnostic manual of the American Psychi-
atric Association, the court still determined that the "Kelly-Frye"
test was inapplicable and that the trial court had abused its discre-
tion in allowing expert testimony about admitted evidence of the
Syndrome for limited purposes.93
Since Phillips, there have been only 31 published court opinions
that mention the term "Munchausen Syndrome by Proxy."9 4 Four-
teen of those cases do not mention the term within any substantive
context-eight mention the term solely in citing to Phillips regard-
ing the application of the "Kelly-Frye" test,95 and five mention it
91. Phillips, 175 Cal. Rptr. at 712.
92. The case of Bosel v. State, 398 P.2d 651 (Alaska 1965), was the first case to mention
the term "Munchausen Syndrome." The court was considering the mental state of the crimi-
nal defendant, who possibly suffered from the disease. See id. at 656.
93. See Phillips, 175 Cal. Rptr. at 712-14.
94. See Thomason v. SCAN Volunteer Servs., Inc., 85 F.3d 1365, 1368 (8th Cir. 1996);
Fessler v. State Dep't of Human Resources, 567 So. 2d 301, 302 (Ala. Civ. App. 1989); People
v. Stoll, 783 P.2d 698, 711 (Cal. 1989); McDonald, 690 P.2d at 724; Ramona v. Superior Court,
66 Cal. Rptr. 2d 766, 776 (Cal. Ct. App. 1997); Garcetti v. Superior Court, 57 Cal. Rptr. 2d
420, 435 (Cal. Ct. App. 1997); People v. Cegers, 9 Cal. Rptr. 2d 297, 303 (Cal. Ct. App. 1992);
People v. Leon, 263 Cal. Rptr. 77, 92 (Cal. Ct. App. 1989); People v. Bowker, 249 Cal. Rptr.
886, 895 (Cal. Ct. App. 1988); In re Cheryl H., 200 Cal. Rptr. 789, 804 (Cal. Ct. App. 1984); In
re Patrick C., 1998 WL 227770, at *1 (Conn. Super. Ct. May 1, 1998); In reAida M., 1997 WL
178063, at *2 (Conn. Super. Ct. Mar. 25, 1997); Case v. Richardson, No. FA 910446348S, 1996
WL 434281, at *2 (Conn. Super. Ct. July 16, 1996); State v. De Jesus, No. CR92-73269, 1993
WL 171866, at *1 (Conn. Super. Ct. Apr. 27, 1993); In re M.A.V., 425 S.E.2d 377, 378 (Ga. Ct.
App. 1992); In reJordan, 616 N.E.2d 388, 389 (Ind. Ct. App. 1993); In re Tucker, 578 N.E.2d
774, 777 (Ind. Ct. App. 1991); Geringer v. Iowa Dep't of Human Servs., 521 N.W.2d 730, 730
(Iowa 1994); In re B.B., 500 N.W.2d 9, 12 n.2 (Iowa 1993); State v. Lumbrera, 845 P.2d 609,
618-20 (Kan. 1992); In re Colin R., 493 A.2d 1083, 1086 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1985); Com-
monwealth v. Robinson, 565 N.E.2d 1229, 1237-38 (Mass. App. Ct. 1991); Place v. Place, 525
A.2d 704, 706 (N.H. 1987); In re C. Children, 672 N.Y.S.2d 134, 135 (App. Div. 1998); Straton
v. Orange County Dep't of Soc. Servs., 628 N.Y.S.2d 818, 819 (App. Div. 1995); In re Suffolk
County Dep't of Soc. Servs., 626 N.Y.S.2d 227, 228 (App. Div. 1995); In re Aaron S., 625
N.Y.S.2d 786, 787 (Fam. Ct. 1993), aff'd sub nom. In re Suffolk County Dep't of Soc. Servs., 626
N.Y.S.2d 227, 228 (App. Div. 1995); In rejessica Z., 515 N.Y.S.2d 370, 371-78 (Fam. Ct. 1987);
Littlejohn v. Cuyahoga County Dep't of Children and Family Servs., Nos. 71354-56, 1998 WL
230443, at *2 (Ohio Ct. App. May 7, 1998); In reDylan C., 699 N.E.2d 107, 108 n.1 (Ohio Ct.
App. 1997); Reid v. State, 964 S.W.2d 723, 725 (Tex. App. 1998); In re S.R., 599 A.2d 364, 364-
65, 367-68 (Vt. 1991).
95. See Stoll 783 P.2d at 711; McDona/d, 690 P.2d at 724; Ramona, 66 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 776;
Garcetti, 57 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 435; Cegers, 9 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 303; Leon, 263 Cal. Rptr. at 92; Bowker,
249 Cal. Rptr. at 895; Cheryl H., 200 Cal. Rptr. at 804.
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within a procedural context or as part of the factual background
related to other issues. 96 Notwithstanding the holding in Phillips,
however, courts that have dealt substantively with the issue of Mun-
chausen Syndrome by Proxy have recognized that although the
Syndrome may be recognized and accepted within the medical
community, it is still a bizarre, perplexing, dangerous phenome-
non, with far-reaching consequences, 97 and it is one about which
96. See Aida M., 1997 WL 178063, at *2 (stating that the doctors felt the case had sugges-
tions of Munchausen Syndrome by Proxy); Case, 1996 WL 434281, at *2 (stating in discussion
of facts of custody dispute that the doctor saw in mother signs of Munchausen Syndrome by
Proxy); Tucker, 578 N.E.2d at 777 (commenting, in consideration of termination of parental
rights, that as a factual matter, the doctor thought the mother might have Munchausen Syn-
drome by Proxy); Place, 525 A.2d at 706 (mentioning Munchausen Syndrome by Proxy as a
factual matter addressed by the lower court); Littlejohn, 1998 WL 230443, at *2 (stating that
psychologist thought mother might be suffering from Munchausen Syndrome by Proxy).
97. In addition to the medical, legal, and ethical consequences of Munchausen Syn-
drome by Proxy discussed in this Article, there are also various criminal, administrative, and
even economic consequences that arise from the far-reaching effects of the disease. Mun-
chausen Syndrome by Proxy typically involves some criminal consequences for the
perpetrators. A typical example is Christina Rubio, who is now serving thirteen years in prison
for the death of her son, Pedro, on whom she perpetrated Munchausen Syndrome by Proxy.
See Rick Barry, A Diagnosis in Search of a Disease TAMPA TRIB., May 20, 1997, at 1. One man in
Kentucky pled guilty to, and is now serving sixteen years in prison for, nine counts of at-
tempted murder after he attempted to suffocate his daughter. See Beverly Bartlett, Meeting
Shows Uses of Medical Science in Investigating Crime, COURER-J. (Louisville, Ky.),June 3, 1997, at
B3. In Arizona, Stacey Frisinger was sentenced to 45 years in prison for suffocating her three-
year-old son, Mitchell. See Jon Burstein, Frisinger Gets 45 Years in Prison for Slaying Son, ARiz.
DAILY STAR, Dec. 17, 1997, at IB, available in 1997 WL 16299418. As in many Munchausen
Syndrome by Proxy cases, Frisinger had another child, Neal Jr., who died in 1992 of what was
diagnosed as a respiratory infection. See id. Julie Skinner has been charged with the murder of
her two-year-old son, Lane Ross, after suffocating him in the hospital. See Susan Schramm,
Riley Staff Suspected Mom Suffocated Tot, INDIANAPOLIS STAR, June 9, 1998, at BI. Skinner admit-
ted to the police that she attempted to suffocate the child on numerous occasions to get
attention from the child's stepfather. See id.
The Oxford Crown Court in England accepted Munchausen Syndrome by Proxy as suffi-
cient for a plea of "manslaughter on grounds of diminished responsibility," after Caroline
Lloyd killed her son with lethal doses of salt. See Richard Duce, Woman Killed Her Four-Year-Old
Son by Salt Poisoning, TIMES (London), June 18, 1997, at 3. Commenting to the police on what
she had done, Lloyd said, "I never wanted him to die. I just wanted him to feel poorly." Id.
Lloyd was committed to prison for life. See Kate Watson-Smyth, Mother Given Life for Killing Son
by Lacing Drink with Salt, INDEPENDENT (London), June 18, 1997, at 6. Her psychiatrists say
that her disorder is so severe that it is untreatable in the hospital. See Michael Fleet, Woman
Jailed for Killing Son with Salt, DAILY TELEGRAPH (London), June 18, 1997, at 9, available in
1997 WL 2318153.
Marybeth Davis, a 44-year-old nurse from Pennsylvania, was found guilty of intentionally
poisoning her then 10-week-old son, Seth, with insulin in 1981, and with killing her three-
year-old daughter, Tegan, with an overdose of caffeine in 1982. SeeJ.R. Withers, Mother Re-
ceives Life Sentence in Deaths; Jurors Find Woman Guilty of Poisoning Children 15 Years Ago,
CHARLESTON DAILY MAIL (W. Va.), Sept. 16, 1997, at IC, available in 1997 WL 7122170
[hereinafter Withers, Guilty of Poisoning Children 15 Years Ago]; Maryclaire Dale, Diagnosis
Called a 'Blatant' Mistake; Maybeth Davis' Children Obviously Abused, Doctor Says, CHARLESTON
DAILY MAIL (W.Va.), Sept. 13, 1997, at IA, available in 1997 WL 7121780. Davis received a life
sentence without the possibility of parole on the first-degree murder charge, and three to
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eighteen years for the poisoning charge. See Guilty of Poisoning Children 15 Years Ago, supra. At
the time of sentencing, Davis had two other children, ages 13 and 11, in her care. See Mary-
claire Dale, Davis Guilty of Killing Daughter: Defendant Also Convicted of Poisoning Son, Receives Life
in Prison Without Mercy, CHARLESTON DAILY MAIL (W. Va.), Sept. 16, 1997, at IA, available in
1997 WL 7122021 [hereinafter Dale, Davis Guilty]. In the closing arguments of Davis' criminal
trial, the defense attorney accused the prosecution of manufacturing a case of "Munchausen
by prosecution.., where the prosecutor poisons jurors['] minds." SeeWithers, Guilty of Poison-
ing Children 15 Years Ago, supra. Prosecutors believe that the case set a record in West Virginia
for the longest interval between a homicide and a conviction. See Dale, Davis Guilty, supra. In
June 1998, Davis petitioned the state Supreme Court to overturn the verdict. See Woman Wants
Child Poison Verdict Gone, CHARLESTON DAILY MAIL (W. Va.),June 12, 1998, at 9A.
Economic consequences result from either extensive medical bills or tedious criminal tri-
als. For example, the first Munchausen Syndrome by Proxy case in Tennessee, which involved
Sharon Hicks, who allegedly killed her two oldest children, Ashley Renee Crawford and James
Rippy, is expected to be the most expensive trial in Sumner County's history. See Leon Alli-
good, Mother's Murder Trial Raises Medical Issues, TENNESSEAN (Nashville), Mar. 1, 1998, at 6B,
available in 1998 WL 5270187. Hicks is free on bail until her trial, but she is not permitted to
have any contact with her other child. See id. In Florida, a judge has ruled that the state must
pay the legal expenses for Kathy Bush, who faces charges of aggravated child abuse and or-
ganized fraud as a result of her alleged Munchausen Syndrome by Proxy. See Douglas C.
Lyons, Judge Grants Bush Public Aid for Trial SUN-SENTINEL (Ft. Lauderdale, Fla.), Apr. 26,
1997, at 6B, available in 1997 WL 3099521. Bush compiled legal fees in excess of $13,000just
for one custody hearing. See id. She also faces criminal charges, including fraud, for causing
her eight-year-old daughter, Jennifer, to be hospitalized some 200 times and undergo 40
operations, utilizing more than $3 million in unnecessary medical expenses. See Kestin, supra
note 3, at 2. For other references to the case involving Kathy Bush, see supra note 19. In the
Lyda case, see supra note 19, one Air Force doctor estimates that the family racked up more
than $4 million in medical costs. See Casey, Undiagnosed Tragedy (Chapter I), supra note 19.
Munchausen Syndrome by Proxy is so far reaching that the scope of the syndrome may
even have been extended to animal victims. See Marc D. Feldman, Canine Variant of Factitious
Disorder by Proxy, 154 Am. J. PSYCHIATRY 1316 (1997) (letter to the editor). In a California
case, physician Dorothy Calabrese was found guilty of cruelty to animals and faces up to one
year in prison for starving her horses and llamas. See Carol Masciola, Doctor in Horse-Abuse Case
Faces Loss of Pets; Courts: She Also Is Suing Officials Who Temporarily Took Her Children Away, Pur-
portedly out of Fear She Was Harming Them, ORANGE COUNTY REG., May 19, 1998, at B4, available
in 1998 WL 2629137.
The Syndrome also affects criminal, civil, and administrative cases in other contexts. For
example, in United States v. Welch, No. 93-4043, 1994 WL 514522, at *4 (6th Cir. Sept. 19,
1994), the defendant claimed that the police coerced her confession to the murder of her
two children by feeding into her Munchausen Syndrome by Proxy. See id. at *4-*5. Her doc-
tor testified that individuals with Munchausen Syndrome by Proxy will "comply with the
demands of authority figures. The way that, typically, they tend to deal with authority is often,
rather than ... expressing outright rebellion ... they[] . .. tell a person what they want to
hear in order to make some kind of gains." Id. at *3. In Geringer v. Iowa Department of Human
Services, the diagnosis of Munchausen Syndrome by Proxy prevented the expungement of an
abuse report. See Ceringer v. Iowa Dep't of Human Servs., 521 N.W.2d 730, 730-32 (Iowa
1994). In Geringer, one doctor diagnosed the syndrome; a second doctor refuted the diagno-
sis. See id. at 731. An administrative judge determined the report to be "unfounded," in which
case the report could be immediately expunged. See id. at 732. A Department of Human Serv-
ices administrator subsequently determined that the report was neither founded nor
unfounded, but was qualified as "undetermined," in which case the report could not be ex-
punged for one year. See id. In State v. Pasicznyk, No. 14897-1-111, 1997 WL 79501, at *1
(Wash. Ct. App. Feb. 25, 1997), a diagnosis of Munchausen Syndrome by Proxy was used to
support a determination of exceptional sentencing. See id. at *1 n.3.
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the medical and legal fields do not yet have a comprehensive un-
derstanding.
For example, despite the pioneering efforts of the Phillips court,
a Massachusetts court in Commonwealth v. Robinson," one of the ear-
lier Munchausen Syndrome by Proxy cases, barred prosecutors
from introducing any evidence concerning the Syndrome. 99 In Rob-
inson, the mother was convicted of involuntary manslaughter for
poisoning her child with massive amounts of salt while the child
was in the hospital.0 ° One year later, in In re Bowers,01 an Ohio
court stated that "the advent of [Munchausen Syndrome by Proxy]
into the jurisprudence of custodial proceedings has been, rela-
tively, recent in nature,"102 and it recognized the hesitancy of courts,
like that in Robinson, to admit evidence of the Syndrome. °3 In a
footnote in the opinion, the court acknowledged that, "[a]lthough
[Munchausen Syndrome by Proxy] now appears to have been gen-
erally accepted as a very real and dangerous condition, there may
still be reluctance on the part of some courts to accept this as a
bona fide mental illness."
0 4
In State v. Lumbrera,0 5 a mother who allegedly perpetrated Mun-
chausen Syndrome by Proxy appealed her conviction for the
murder of her child.'0 6 The mother had five other children who
died in a similar manner.' 7 The trial court had erroneously allowed
the prosecutor to mention Munchausen Syndrome by Proxy during
his opening statement when there was no subsequent evidence
admitted into the record that the defendant suffered from the
Syndrome.08 The judge admonished the jury, stating: "[Y] ou are to
completely disregard ... [the] testimony as it has to do with ...
[Munchausen Syndrome by Proxy], and you are to remove that
term from any of your deliberations and strike that from your ...
considerations."0 9
98. 565 N.E.2d 1229 (Mass. App. Ct. 1991).
99. See id. at 1237-38.
100. See id. at 1231.
101. No. 1490, 1992 WL 2870, at *1 (Ohio Ct. App.Jan. 2, 1992).
102. Id. at *3 n.2.
103. See id.
104. Id. (citing Robinson, 565 N.E.2d at 1238).
105. 845 P.2d 609 (Kan. 1992).
106. See id. at 612.
107. See id.
108. See id. at 619. In his opening statement, the prosecutor said: "[T]he second motive
that the State's going to show is a different type of motive. A motive that people are not nec-
essarily accustomed to hearing about.... [It] is called Munchausen Syndrome by Proxy...
Id. at 618.
109. Id. at 619.
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Seventeen years after the Phillips court first admitted evidence of
the Syndrome, the perplexity of the Syndrome remained evident to
the court in Reid v. State.110 In discussing Munchausen Syndrome by
Proxy, the Reid court noted: "there is a paucity of cases which have
considered and discussed Munchausen Syndrome by Proxy." '' In
addressing the same "Kelly-Frye" issue that was addressed in Phillips,
the Reid court went to great lengths to demonstrate how medical
and legal awareness of the Syndrome has developed over time, and
yet the disease is still misunderstood and problematic for the
courts. The court noted the testimony of Dr. Thomas Bennet, the
Iowa State Medical Examiner,"' who stated:
[T] his theory has been studied, it has been written up in doz-
ens and dozens of articles, and it has ... achieved widespread
acceptance, and it is now being taught in the schools, because
if you don't ... teach it the doctor won't think of it; if you
don't think of it you won't diagnose it because it is such a se-
vere form of child abuse. It has been taught and it is
recognized and accepted, it's even in the latest addition [sic]
of the diagnostical manual, the DSM-4 has recognized it, it's
finally made that recognized entity."3
In Reid, the prosecutor demonstrated to the court the
widespread awareness of the Syndrome by offering six photocopies
of complete articles and a med-line database search covering the
period between 1922 and May 1996, which produced abstracts of
122 articles related to the Syndrome." 4 The prosecutor also
produced a bibliography of related articles dating back to 1977,1
5
as well as a compilation of seventeen legal articles dealing with the
disease.1 6 Dr. Bennet also testified that there were many books and
publications that discussed Munchausen Syndrome by Proxy," 7 and
"dozens and dozens and dozens of experts" (twenty in the state of
Iowa, alone) who would be prepared to testify regarding the
110. 964 S.W.2d 723 (Tex. App. 1998).
111. Id. at 725-26. In support of this contention, the court cites two cases. See Reid, 964
S.W.2d at 726 (citing Olivier v. State, 850 S.W.2d 742, 747 (Tex. App. 1993) and Crocker v. State,
573 S.W.2d 190, 200 (Tex. Crim. App. 1978), but both cases mention only "Munchausen
Syndrome," not Munchausen Syndrome by Proxy). Therefore, in effect, Reid was the first
published case in Texas dealing with the extension of the syndrome to be perpetrated "by
proxy.
112. See Reid 964 S.W.2d at 727.
113. Id. at 728.
114. See id.
115. See id.
116. See id.
117. See id.
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disease."" The witness concluded that the Syndrome is "universally
accepted."" 9 Despite all this evidence about the Syndrome, as in
Phillips, the court struggled with the appropriate use of expert
testimony regarding the disease. 2 0 As in Phillips, the court
concluded that the jury could only consider the testimony of the
disease as it related to motive, intent, plan, pattern, the absence of
illness, mistake or accident, state of mind, medical diagnosis, the
child's relationship with the mother, or the cause of death.'
2
'
The language used by these courts makes it clear that, since
Munchausen Syndrome by Proxy was first identified and described
as a medical phenomenon, it has continued to develop as an evi-
dentiary issue for the courts as well. But the effect of the Syndrome
on the legal field is even farther reaching. Once a court decides if it
is going to allow testimony and evidence regarding Munchausen
Syndrome by Proxy, it must then decide how it is going to use it.
Many courts after Phillips have struggled with the secondary effect
of the Syndrome as it relates to the appropriate disposition for the
child. The first case after Phillips where a court substantively strug-
gled with the issue of the child's disposition was In re Colin R 122 In
that case, the defendants appealed a finding that their son was a
"child in need of assistance ('C.I.N.A.')." 3 The hospital staff con-
tacted social services, and members of the Sheriffs Department
obtained a warrant to search the parents' home.'2 4 In the mother's
bedroom, the police found hypodermic needles and two vials of
diuretics, which she had used to make the child ill. 2 5 When con-
fronted with this evidence, the mother stated, "'If I am crazy I am
glad you found out about it." ,1 26 The child was found to be a
C.I.N.A. and was initially placed in foster care. 27 The court affirmed
the finding of the lower court that the child was at risk; 28 during
the appeal, at a dispositional hearing for the child, however, the
lower court sent the child home to his parents with supervision.
29
118. Id.
119. Id.
120. See id. at 731-32.
121. See id. at 733.
122. 493 A.2d 1083 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1985).
123. Id. at 1085.
124. See id. at 1086.
125. See id.
126. Id. at 1088.
127. See id. at 1086.
128. See id. at 1089.
129. See id. at 1092.
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The court in In re Bowers130 recognized a general trend of findings
in Munchausen Syndrome by Proxy cases, yet acknowledged the
difficulties inherent in disposing of such cases. The court recog-
nized that in cases where the parent introduces foreign substances
into the child's body, the child is typically found to be "abused."
131
In cases where there is no direct ingestion or injection of some
physical element, the court will only find abuse if the symptoms of
the Syndrome are in conjunction with some other element of
abuse or neglect.1 2 Having made the distinction, the court recog-
nized the risks of an improper disposition for the child (i.e.,
returning him or her home to the perpetrating parent), such as
when a parent "doctor shops," which leads to increased invasive
procedures for the child, or when doctors overlook a true disease
because they perceive the parent as "crying wolf."3 3 Despite its rec-
ognition of these trends and its concern for the risks inherent in
returning the child to the parent, however, the court also recog-
nized the difficulties involved in each case and the legal system's
role in that difficulty:
[T] he legal system has been criticized as an impediment to
managing [Munchausen Syndrome by Proxy] cases because of
the skepticism with which those cases are approached. This
court, however, takes very seriously the dangerous and poten-
tially lethal effects which such condition may have on its child
victims. Nevertheless, we can perceive the difficulty which the
trier of fact may experience in distinguishing between a par-
ent with [Munchausen Syndrome by Proxy] and one who is
merely over protective [sic] of a minor medical problem. This
could be particularly troublesome where ... the minor child
appears healthy and there is no indication whatsoever that the
mother is harming her. Under these circumstances, determin-
ing the credibility of the expert testimony diagnosing the
[Munchausen Syndrome by Proxy] condition would be para-
mount. 1
4
130. No. 1490, 1992 WL 2870 (Ohio Ct. App.Jan. 2, 1992).
131. See id. at *3 (citing In rejessica Z., 515 N.Y.S.2d 370, 372 (Fam. Ct. 1987)); see also
People v. Phillips, 175 Cal. Rptr. 703, 709 (Ct. App. 1981); In re Colin R., 493 A.2d 1083, 1086
(Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1985).
132. See Bowers, 1992 WL 2870, at *4 n.3 (citing Fessler v. State Dep't of Human Re-
sources, 567 So. 2d 301, 302 (Ala. Civ. App. 1989)); In re Tucker, 578 N.E.2d 774, 776-78
(Ind. Ct. App. 1991); Place v. Place, 525 A.2d 704, 709 (N.H. 1987).
133. See Bowers, 1992 WL 2870, at *4.
134. Id. at *5 (citation omitted).
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The court in In re Bowers heard expert testimony that, even
though there was no outward indication of physical abuse, the
child was still at extremely high risk for "medical or parental misad-
venture" given the fictitious nature of the disease and the risks
inherent in the disease, which the court expressly recognized.1 3
5
Nevertheless, despite the recognition of the difficulties of diagnos-
ing the disease, the deceptive nature of the disease, the inherent
risks of an improper disposition, and its own acknowledgment that
the courts have been an obstacle to the further diagnosis and man-
agement of these cases, the court affirmed the lower court's finding
that the child was not dependent or neglected and returned the
child to the mother.
36
The same difficulty that confronted the court in In re Bowers,
which influenced it to return the child to the alleged perpetrator,
was faced by the jury in In re Clarissa M. S. 37 In that case, where a
mother was tried for perpetrating Munchausen Syndrome by Proxy
on her daughter,'3 the jury answered three verdict questions:
whether the child had been physically abused, whether any neglect
had endangered the child, and whether the child, therefore, was in
need of services. 39 The jury found that the mother did not neglect
135. See id. at *4; see also In re Clarissa M. S., No. 94-2017, 1995 WL 27793, at *3 (Wis. Ct.
App. Jan. 24, 1995) (finding jury's verdict to be inconsistent with evidence because it found
no abuse, but that child needed services based on mother's perpetration of Munchausen
Syndrome by Proxy).
136. See Bowers, 1992 WL 2870, at *5, *6.
137. See ClarissaM. S., 1995 WL 27793, at*1.
138. In Clarissa M. S., the mother, Sandra S., took Clarissa to numerous doctors and hos-
pitals for alleged emergency treatment for diarrhea and vomiting. See id. Clarissa went to the
hospital more than thirty times-sometimes twice in one day-before she was six and a half
months old. See id. Clarissa was subjected to numerous painful procedures, including a rectal
sigmoidoscopy, barium enemas, and blood tests. See id. Medical personnel became suspicious
when Clarissa was presented to three separate hospitals for the same condition, but no medi-
cal explanation for the alleged symptoms could be determined. See id. Finally, when a hospital
tested and discharged Clarissa without any medical diagnosis, only to see her again the next
day with her mother alleging the very same symptoms, the medical staff reported Sandra to
social services. See id. Subsequently, social service workers visited the family as much as three-
times per week to observe the child and to assist Sandra with her parenting skills. See id. In
less than one month, Clarissa returned to the hospital, but no illness was diagnosed. See id.
Upon Clarissa's return home, a visiting nurse observed that the child was quite healthy. See id,
The next day, Sandra presented Clarissa, a vomiting and dehydrated little girl with blood in
her stool and in need of intravenous antibiotics, to the hospital. See id. After finding no medi-
cal reason for the symptoms, Clarissa was discharged in a healthy condition. See id. The
doctor soon diagnosed Munchausen Syndrome by Proxy, and Clarissa was placed in foster
care, where she experienced no symptoms and required no hospitalizations. See id. at *2.
139. The verdict consisted of three questions to which the six-person jury gave the fol-
lowing unanimous answers:
Was Clarissa M. [S.] the victim of physical abuse? 6 No
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the child and that the child was not seriously endangered because
of any neglect by the mother, but it also determined that, based on
the mother's diagnosis of Munchausen Syndrome by Proxy, the
child was in need of services. 140 Thus, as was problematic in In re
Bowers, the jury in In re Clarissa M.S. determined that, although
there was no clearly identifiable physical harm to the child, the na-
ture of the mother's condition warranted that the child receive
protective services. 141 The court determined that such a finding was
inconsistent, and ordered a new trial. 42 In so doing, however, the
court failed to recognize the unique dynamics of the disease and
the possibility that the disease may warrant intervention by the
courts if the medical and legal fields are going to deal with it collec-
tively and consistently.
Some courts, however, are beginning to consider more fully ex-
pert testimony about the dynamics of Munchausen Syndrome by
Proxy and to appreciate the interplay among the various parties
involved when considering appropriate dispositions for the child.
Some courts are beginning to consider the ineffectiveness of ther-
apy treatment or counseling for the perpetrator in alleviating the
risk inherent in the Syndrome.143 Several courts that have dealt sub-
stantively with the Syndrome are considering testimony that
therapy has proven ineffective for Munchausen mothers, particu-
larly when the mother denies the reality of the Syndrome. 144 For
example, in In re S.R, the court considered the termination of the
parental rights of the mother, who was diagnosed as having Mun-
chausen Syndrome by Proxy. 145 Because the mother did not
Did the child's mother Sandra [S.] either neglect, refuse or was unable for reasons
other than poverty, to provide the necessary care, food, clothing, medical or dental
care or shelter so as to seriously endanger the physical health of the child? 6 No
Is Clarissa M. [S.] in need of protection or services? 6 Yes
Id. at *3 n.5.
140. Seeid.at*1.
141. See id.
142. See id. But see In re B.B., 500 N.W.2d 9, 9 (Iowa 1993) (reversing court of appeals de-
cision to return child to mother and holding that, despite lack of physical harm, child was still
in need of services).
143. See, e.g., In re S.R., 599 A.2d 364, 366 (Vt. 1991). But cf In re M.A.V., 425 S.E.2d 377,
378-79 (Ga. Ct. App. 1992) (holding that expert testimony of the ineffectiveness of therapy
for Munchausen Syndrome by Proxy was not compelling enough to sever custodial relation-
ship).
144. See, e.g., M.A.V., 425 S.E.2d at 378-79; S.R, 599 A.2d at 366.
145. See S.R., 599 A.2d at 366. The mother caused breathing difficulties in S.R., requiring
extensive medical evaluations. See id. Although the family received extensive services for more
than three years prior to the termination of parental rights-including counseling, parent
education, and supervised home visits-the services were ineffective because the parents did
not acknowledge the "Munchausen Syndrome by Proxy" diagnosis. See id.
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acknowledge the diagnosis of the Syndrome, the court concluded
that the mother's behavior was not likely to change. The psy-
chologist who testified stated that the child "faced a ten-to-twenty
percent chance of death based on her parents' denial of th[e] dis-
order. 14 7 The court affirmed the termination of parental rights. 
4 8
In State v. DeJesus,'49 a criminal matter in a rare case where the
perpetrator of Munchausen Syndrome by Proxy was a grand-
mother, the defendant requested a reduction in sentence because
an expert witness who was prepared to testify that her condition
was treatable was not allowed to testify.' 50 In making a determina-
tion not to reduce the defendant's sentence, the court relied on
testimony from another doctor who stated that there was no evi-
dence demonstrating that extreme Munchausen Syndrome by
Proxy could be treated with any type of psychotherapy.
1 5
1
In In re M.A.V,152 however, testimony regarding the ineffective-
ness of therapy for the perpetrator led to still other difficulties in
dealing with the disease. 5 3 The court considered similar testimony
in determining whether to transfer custody of a sibling of a child
who, in an earlier proceeding, was determined to be the victim of
Munchausen Syndrome by Proxy. 54 In the earlier case for the
younger sibling, B.C.C., the doctor testified that there was "no evi-
dence that therapy for the parent was helpful based on reports of
146. See id. at 367. But see In re C. Children, 672 N.Y.S.2d 134, 135 (App. Div. 1998)
(affirming lower court's findings of abuse but allowing the children to remain in their
mother's custody because the mother had obtained treatment for the Syndrome).
147. S.R, 599 A.2d at 367. The doctor also testified that the risk to the child due to the
parents' denial increased with the level of stress in the home. See id.
148. See id. at 368.
149. No. CR92-73269, 1993 WL 171866, at *1 (Conn. Super. Ct. Apr. 27, 1993). Alleging
that her grandchild was having seizures, a grandmother presented the child to the hospital.
See id. The child was admitted, and the grandmother never left the child's bedside. See id.
Early one morning, a nurse witnessed the grandmother leaning over the child's crib and,
with a sudden motion, breaking the child's leg. See id. An examination revealed that the child
had suffered other broken bones, which were suspected to be non-accidental. See id. The
grandmother subsequently received "[a] sentence of eight years, execution suspended after
four years, with five years probation." Id. One of the conditions of her probation was that she
have no contact with any children under 18 years of age. See id.
150. See id.
151. See id.
152. 425 S.E.2d 377 (Ga. Ct. App. 1992).
153. See id. at 378-79.
154. See id. In the earlier case involving B.C.C., testimony revealed that the mother in-
duced respiratory arrest in the child on two separate occasions by suffocation and drowning
before summoning emergency help to resuscitate the child. See id. at 378. Upon presenting
B.C.C. to various hospitals, the mother gave different names for her and the child, offered
various and unreasonable explanations for the child's conditions, and withheld information
of the first incident to the second hospital. See id. Upon conferring, the doctors at the two
hospitals diagnosed Munchausen Syndrome by Proxy. See id.
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'serial Munchausen['s Syndrome] by Proxy where one child after
another is victimized despite' the parent receiving therapy."'15
Based on that testimony, the court found B.C.C. to be deprived and
awarded custody to the state. 56 In a separate hearing, the court
considered whether the evidence presented at the hearing for
B.C.C. was sufficient to find that M.A.V. was also a deprived child
who required placement by the State.157 The doctor had testified at
B.C.C.'s hearing that M.A.V. might be at risk upon the removal of
B.C.C. from the home, despite the fact that M.A.V. had not been
previously abused. 158 The court held, however, that the evidence of
Munchausen Syndrome by Proxy on the younger child did not jus-
tify transferring custody of the older sibling.
159
Despite some progress by the courts in responding to the various
effects of Munchausen Syndrome by Proxy, evidentiary and disposi-
tional determinations clearly vary,1'0 and there has been no clear
and comprehensive focal point in viewing Munchausen Syndrome
by Proxy from which other courts may orient their perspective. In
155. Id. at 379 (quoting child psychiatrist Dr. Bernard Kahan).
156. See id. at 378.
157. See id. at 379.
158. See id.
159. See id. Compare In re Aaron S., 625 N.Y.S.2d 786, 793 (Fam. Ct. 1993) (protecting sib-
lings based on the presumption that abusive behavior would continue against them upon
removal of abused child), and Reid v. State, 964 S.W.2d 723, 734-35 (Tex. Crim. App. 1998)
(holding that evidence of Munchausen Syndrome by Proxy regarding subject child's sibling
was admissible), with In re B.C., 356 N.W.2d 328, 331 (Minn. Ct. App. 1984) (terminating
parental rights based on evidence that mother murdered child's sibling) and In re R.A.M.,
755 S.W.2d 431, 435 (Mo. Ct. App. 1988) (justifying termination of parental rights to other
children because of abuse to one child). See also In re I.N.M., 735 P.2d 1170, 1174-75 (N.M.
Ct. App. 1987) (terminating parental rights in two children despite lacking evidence of abuse
of one child); In reWilliam D., 603 N.Y.S.2d 825, 825 (App. Div. 1993) (terminating mother's
rights to five children based on evidence that she beat one of their siblings to death).
In 1985, in Oklahoma, Teresa Redd's six-month-old son, Steven, was thought to have died
of SIDS. See Ed Godfrey, Rare Disorder May Be Key in Baby Death, DAILY OKLAHOMAN, Nov. 17,
1997, at 1 [hereinafter Godfrey, Rare Disorder]. In 1996, Redd was suspected of having suffo-
cated her nine-month-old daughter, Lenora, while the child was in the hospital. See id.
Although Redd was never charged with the death of her son, prosecutors used evidence of
Steven's death to prove that Munchausen Syndrome by Proxy was related to Lenora's death.
See Ed Godfrey, Baby's Alarm Didn't Beep, Nurse Testifies, DAILY OKLAHOMAN, Nov. 20, 1997, at
1; Ed Godfrey, Doctor Testifies in Child's Death: Defense Expert Won't Rule Out S1DS as Cause, DAILY
OKLAHOMAN, Dec. 4, 1997, at 34. A jury found Redd guilty of first-degree murder of Lenora,
and Redd was sentenced to life in prison without the possibility of parole. See Juy Convicts
Oklahoma Woman in Her Infant's Death, DALLAS MORNING NEWS, Dec. 10, 1997, at 26A, available
in 1997 WL 16183512.
Other cases of Munchausen Syndrome by Proxy have been reported in Oklahoma, such as
one involving Jeff and Linda Hastings, whose parental rights were terminated after allega-
tions were made that Linda spit into her son's intravenous tube while he was in the hospital.
See Godfrey, Rare Disorder, supra. Laura Bateman was sentenced to 15 years in prison for insert-
ing air and urine into her daughter's intravenous tube while in the hospital. See id.
160. See supra notes 85-159 and accompanying text.
[VOL. 32:1
The Use of Covert Video Surveilance
fact, in Bowers, the court specifically expressed the sentiments of
most courts dealing with Munchausen Syndrome by Proxy in that
they "adopt no hard rule, or litmus test, for determining neglect or
dependency whenever there is a diagnosis of [Munchausen Syn-
drome by Proxy] ... The decisions detailed above imply that, in
effect, these courts have adopted a rule that each Munchausen case
must be reviewed on an ad hoc basis, including evidentiary deci-
sions and the effect of -the evidence on other, substantive
determinations. As a result, the original difficulty remains: how can
the legal field effectively, comprehensively, and consistently address
the medical implications associated with the disease while still ad-
hering to the legal mandate placed on the courts to protect the
rights and interests of all of the parties involved, particularly the
interests of the child?
C. Medical Implications of Munchausen Syndrome by Proxy
In addition to the legal implications of Munchausen Syndrome
by Proxy,16 the Syndrome also has medical implications. The fore-
most medical implication of Munchausen Syndrome by Proxy is the
obvious physical effect on the child, which can occur in a variety of
ways. First, and most obviously, is the direct infliction of physical
harm on the child by some specific act of the perpetrator that re-
sults in symptoms that the physician cannot explain.1 63 The second
way a child may be harmed is by the perpetrator's fictitious presen-
tation of the child as ill, which normally results in extensive tests
and, often, intrusive procedures to identify or correct a non-
existent condition. In some cases, the child does suffer from a
real condition that warrants treatment, but the perpetrator induces
other symptoms, further complicating already existing symptoms.1
65
161. In re Bowers, No. 1490, 1992 WL 2870, at *4 (Ohio Ct. App. Jan. 2, 1992).
162. See discussion supra Part I.B.
163. Courts should be suspicious of abuse when parents' explanations of a child's inju-
ries or symptoms are inconsistent with medical testimony or if the condition of the child
cannot be medically explained. See, e.g., In re M.S.H., 656 P.2d 1294, 1297 (Colo. 1983)
(noting that nature of child's injury was inconsistent with parents' explanation); In re Sonia
H., 576 N.Y.S.2d 165, 167 (App. Div. 1991) (noting unexplained injuries to child); In rejessica
M.M., 504 N.Y.S.2d 850, 853 (App. Div. 1986) (noting that parents' explanations for infant's
multiple fractured ribs and broken arm were inconsistent with medical evidence).
164. In one scenario, a child endured approximately 100 operations to correct a condi-
tion that did not exist because the mother was making up the child's condition. See PrimeTime
Live, supra note 3.
165. In Vancouver, a 37-year-old mother lost custody of her adopted ten-year-old daugh-
ter after doctors suspected she caused infections around the child's intravenous lines and
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A third possibility exists when, although the child suffers from a
real condition, the doctor overlooks it because of a history of the
mother presenting the child with conditions that do not exist.
166
Also, if a parent is falsely accused of perpetrating the Syndrome,
the child could have a real condition that warrants treatment but
would not be presented for treatment because the parent fears
medical suspicion and subsequent legal involvement. 167 Of course,
psychological harm to the child may result from being victimized by
the disease, and in cases where the Syndrome has been determined
to exist, the child may be psychologically or emotionally harmed by
being removed from his or her family.' 68 In each scenario, related
harms affect the perpetrator, such as criminal prosecution, therapy,
and separation from her existing or future children.169
In addition to the physical effects on the child and the related
effects on the mother and family, there are general implications for
the medical profession. As medical knowledge and understanding
of Munchausen Syndrome by Proxy grow, so does the disagreement
among medical professionals over an accurate definition of Mun-
chausen Syndrome by Proxy, and how it is qualified. 17 0 This
disagreement appears magnified as the effects of the Syndrome
after she collected $70,000 from an insurance policy. See Neal Hall, Kamloops Mother Fails to
Regain Custody of Daughter: A Judge Rules It Was Likely the Woman Harmed the Child to Draw Atten-
tion to Herself VANCOUVER SUN, Mar. 13, 1997, at BI. The girl suffered from cerebral palsy and
fetal alcohol syndrome and has trouble eating and speaking. See Neal Hall, Mother Temporarily
Denied Custody of Special-Needs Child, VANCOUVER SUN, Mar. 27, 1997, at B2; Mom Loses Custody
Fight for Disabled Gir, CALGARY HERALD, Mar. 13, 1997, at A17, available in 1997 WL 5643172.
166. Dr. C. Thomas Clark has stated:
If doctor shopping was allowed to occur... [and] if [the perpetrator] convince[s]
someone unknown to that person that the child was ill.., more evasive procedures
would be done until the child is put at risk either from the procedure or if they con-
tinue in our practice ... they would be at risk for us missing a diagnosis by overlooking
the mother's complaint as being valid.
Bowers, 1992 WL 2870, at *4.
167. See In reJessica Z., 515 N.Y.S.2d 370, 378 (Fam. Ct. 1987).
168. See id. ("Removal of the child to the unknown circumstances of foster care... would
result in the child's separation not only from... [her] ... mother, but from her father, her
sibling, and her grandparents... [which] ... would cause her further trauma, and possibly
permanent damage.").
169. Michele Lynn Price pled guilty to manslaughter and aggravated child abuse charges
after smothering her 14-month-old daughter, Bonnie Jean Bolden, in March 1996. See Sue
Carlton, Mom Pleads Guilty in 1-Year-Old's Death, ST. PETERSBURG TIMES (Fla.), Mar. 27, 1997,
at 4B, available in 1997 WL 6188866. Hospital staff became suspicious of Price when she used
a different name to admit the child to the hospital because she had already lost custody of
two other children after allegations of child abuse. See id. Price agreed to ten years in prison
and twelve years of probation, during which time she is allowed to have no contact with chil-
dren and must inform authorities if she becomes pregnant. See id.
170. See Meadow, What Is, and What Is Not supra note 16, at 534.
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enter the legal field. As this Article demonstrates, a common un-
derstanding of the Syndrome in these contexts is critical to the
medical and legal fields' cooperative efforts to deal with the effects
of the Syndrome, particularly as they apply to the children who are
victimized by it.
Because professionals continue to disagree regarding the qualifi-
cation of the disease, and because the medical and legal fields
respond inconsistently to the disease, the degree to which medical
professionals must demonstrate that the disease actually exists and
how much the child is harmed by the Syndrome varies considera-
bly. This uncertainty about how the legal community will deal with
the effects of Munchausen Syndrome by Proxy has forced the
medical community to resort to covert video surveillance in order
to bridge the gap between the professions in managing the disease,
assuring the safety of the child, and assuring criminal prosecution
and treatment for the perpetrator.
D. The Need for Covert Video Surveillance
Many cases of suspected Munchausen Syndrome by Proxy are
not treated appropriately and promptly because medical profes-
sionals hesitate to cloak parents with the inherent implications of
the diagnosis.17 This reaction causes medical staffs to focus their
attention on gathering evidence to prosecute the suspected per-
petrator, rather than focusing on the child's condition and the
level of precautions necessary to assure the child's safety, while
still assuring an appropriate diagnosis.17 Even the highest suspi-
cion by medical authorities is sometimes insufficient to overcome
the legal field's hesitancy to accept the disease. In one case where
a woman was indicted for allegedly suffocating her child while
they were alone in a hospital room, but where video surveillance
was not used, one expert doctor testified that it was seventy to
171. See Donald & Jureidini, supra note 16, at 757. For a discussion of a case involving
Munchausen Syndrome by Proxy (described therein as "factitious disorder by proxy"), where
a physician who reported his suspicions of the disorder was sued by the parents when the
suspicions proved to be false, see Marc D. Feldman & David B. Allen, "False-Positive" Factitious
Disorder by Proxy, 89 MED. J. 452 (1996).
172. One study demonstrates that covert video surveillance is not always necessary to re-
move the child from an abusive parent. In the study, although 32 of 34 children subjected to
covert video surveillance were taken into protective custody, not all of the parents had been
abusive during the surveillance. See Morley, supra note 22, at 1604 (citing Wheatley, Covert
Surveillance, supra note 22, at 1101-02). If the children were placed into foster care regardless
of the results of the surveillance, then the use of the surveillance to achieve that end was
unnecessary. See id.
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eighty percent likely that she caused the injury.'73 However, the
prosecutor who reviewed the case and declined to prosecute said,
"[t] hat's the definition of a reasonable doubt. It's just not good
enough for a criminal case." 74 The mother subsequently filed a civil
malpractice claim against the hospital. After a ten to two verdict for
the hospital, the jury members were asked who they felt was re-
sponsible for the death. Eleven members said the mother was
responsible, but one of those eleven felt the hospital could have
been more vigilant in protecting the child. 75 This example demon-
strates how the hospital is saddled with the diagnosis and treatment
of the child, the confrontation of the parent, the difficulty of con-
firming suspicions, the hesitancy of the legal field, the possibility of
civil liability, and the strict standard of proof established by the
courts. Understandably, many medical professionals favor the use
176of covert video surveillance, 6 which, when effective, resolves many
of these difficulties for the medical profession. As this Article dem-
onstrates, however, the use of covert video surveillance only leads
to further ethical and legal complications and the additional risk of
harm to the child.
II. COVERT VIDEO SURVEILLANCE IN CASES OF
MUNCHAUSEN SYNDROME BY PROXY
A. The Study by Dr. David Southall
Covert video surveillance of the Syndrome as it occurs has been
employed by dozens of hospitals. 77 The most public and
controversial were two hospitals in London and North Staffordshire
where Dr. David Southall has been taping occurrences of
Munchausen Syndrome by Proxy for more than ten years. 78 The
videos taken by the doctor in this study show children being abused
by their parents in the hospital. 179 One video shows a man
smothering his six-week-old son, while hospital staff sit idly by,
173. See Rick Casey, Child Abuse, Lies and, Too Rarely, Videotape, SAN ANTONIO ExPREss-
NEWS, Apr. 13, 1998, at 3A, available in LEXIS, Market Library, PROMT File.
174. Id. (quotingJudge Cynthia Morales, who prosecuted the case).
175. See id.
176. See, e.g., Shabde & Craft, supra note 22, at 1603-05; Shineboume, supra note 22, at
26-31; Southall et al., supra note 19, at 735-60.
177. See PrimeTime Live, supra note 3.
178. See Southall et al., supra note 19, at 736.
179. See PrimeTime Live, supra note 3.
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videotaping the abuse.18 Yet even the mother of the child who was
being suffocated by his father claims that, were it not for the video
surveillance conducted by Dr. Southall, the father surely would
have killed their son.181
The ethical dilemma created by such tactics can be seen in the
very language used by supporters of the tactic to describe the need
for such extreme measures. For example, Dr. Southall states: "The
kind of abuse that we've been working on involves premeditated,
sadistic abuse. And this is the kind of abuse that we feel must be
stopped."8 2 Southall's statement is inherently contradictory, how-
ever. It describes the abuse as insidious, sadistic, and something
that must be prevented, yet to effectuate this prevention, the very
insidious and sadistic abuse sought to be prevented is orchestrated
and permitted. In fact, Dr. Southall's study seems to report more
on the comparative uses and effectiveness of covert video surveil-
lance than it does on the study's ability to actually protect the
children in the study from harm."3 If not readily apparent as an
ethical abhorrence, it must be concluded that promoting a condi-
tion in a child which, as Dr. Southall describes it, "may cause death
or permanent neurologic impairment... [and] ... may be accom-
panied by immeasurable suffering" 4 poses, at the very least, an
ethical, if not a legal, dilemma.
The study by Dr. Southall was conducted between June 1986 and
December 1994.185 Throughout the study, thirty-nine patients un-
derwent covert video surveillance.'86 Extensive family information
180. See id.
181. See id.
182. Id.
183. The "objective" of the study, as expressly stated in its "abstract," was "[tjo describe
historic markers and clinical observations of life-threatening child abuse as diagnosed using
covert video surveillance (CVS)." Southall et al., supra note 19, at 735. Although the scope of
the study must be considered within its educational context, it is interesting-even shock-
ing-to note that "to protect the children in the study and prevent them from being harmed"
is not mentioned as part of the "objective" of the study. Rather, it is stated that covert video
surveillance is used in the study "as a clinical tool" in the investigation of suspected cases of
abuse. Id. Even the stated "outcome" of the study does not include "protection of x number
of children," but rather includes only "[c] onfirmation of attempted suffocation or other child
abuse from CVS." Id. These statements clearly indicate that the subject of the study is the
ability of CVS to confirm suspicions, rather than for children to be protected.
184. Id.
185. See id. at 736.
186. See id. Of the 39 patients, covert video surveillance had been initiated on 36 patients
because of a previous apparent life-threatening event (ALTE), one patient for suspected
strangulation, one patient for fabricated epilepsy, and one patient for severe failure to thrive
and suspicion of poisoning. See id.
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was gathered from child protection cases, social workers, police,
health professionals, and psychiatric reports."'
In the study, parents who were suspected of abusing a child were
invited to bring the child to the hospital for observation. 1 88 The child
was placed in a hospital room arranged with four hidden cameras.19
Nurses were stationed approximately twenty yards away from the
child's room as observers viewed the parent and child on video.1 90
When abuse was observed, the observer sounded an alarm and the
nurse would immediately move to the child's room to check on the
child's condition. 19'
In one television excerpt that showed some of Dr. Southall's
videos of abuse, at least three videos were shown where the parent
attempted to smother the child. 92 The narrator notes: "Experts say
depriving an infant of oxygen for as little as [fifty] to [sixty] seconds
can cause permanent brain damage."93 In Dr. Southall's study, Ray
Needham, a former police inspector, was in charge of dispatching
the nurses to the child's room upon the observation of abuse on the
video; he asserted that nurses were dispatched to the room within
twenty-five seconds of the beginning of the abuse. 9 4 However, of the
thirty-nine incidents of abuse recorded by Dr. Southall's videos,
thirty-three of the children endured life-threatening attacks.9"5 Thirty
of the incidents involved intentional suffocation; 96 two involved
187. See id. The 39 family histories of abusive parents gathered in the study revealed that:
25 cases involved fabricated or induced illness in the parent; 23 parents were diagnosed by a
psychiatrist as having a personality disorder; 15 parents deliberately harmed themselves
through drug overdose or self-mutilation; there were 15 cases of nonfatal abuse in siblings of
the children undergoing the video surveillance, 12 of which were proven or admitted, three
of which were suspected; ten parents suffered severe behavioral problems as a child or ado-
lescent; nine parents experienced sudden and unexpected child deaths in their families; nine
parents were involved in some form of criminal activity in addition to the abuse of the child
in the study; and several parents had been involved in other unusual activities-three had
been involved with some sort of fire, three had had extensive involvement with the media,
two had falsely posed as nurses, and two were known to have demonstrated cruelty to ani-
mals. See id. at 739 tbl. 2. Of the abusing parents, 19 were married; 11 were single without a
partner; four were single with a partner; and five were divorced. See id. Of the 39 parents, 29
were older than 20 years of age at the time of the birth of the subject child; seven were be-
tween 17 and 19 years of age; and three were under 16 years of age. See id.
188. See PrimeTime Live, supra note 3.
189. See Southall et al., supra note 19, at 737.
190. See PrimeTime Live, supra note 3.
191. See id.
192. See id.
193. Id.
194. See id.
195. See id.
196. See id, Of the 30 incidents of suffocation captured by covert video surveillance, 18
cases involved suffocation by hand or hands; eight involved some form of fabric, cloth, or
article of clothing; and three involved the use of a pillow, one of which also involved a clear
plastic wrapping. See Southall et al., supra note 19, at 741-44 tbl. 3.
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poisoning; 97 and, in one case, the mother actually broke the child's
arm.'98 When confronted with the argument that exposing any
child to further abuse is wrong, Dr. Southall responded:
This part of [the] ... argument I understand. If we had
enough evidence it would have been wrong to have gone
ahead with covert surveillance. And in every case, we did not
feel that we had enough evidence. What must go on in the
home of these families is going to be far in excess of anything
that happens in the hospital.' 99
Still, other occurrences observed on tape were not interrupted
by hospital staff-incidents like kicking and slapping the child, dis-
connecting monitors, forcing ingestion of disinfectant and other
objects, cruelly waking the child from sleep, and roughly pushing
the child away as the child reached out to the parent for comfort or
affection.)° These abuses were not interrupted because the hospital
staff was waiting for something more abusive to occur. Dr. Southall
stated, "we were looking for.., a life-threatening abuse .... ,,201 Dr.
Southall describes this aspect of the surveillance as the worst part of
his work, yet he insists that the end justifies the means.0 2 In support
of this contention, Dr. Southall relies on the fact that British
authorities took action in thirty-eight of the thirty-nine cases that
203were captured on tape. In those cases, the child was usually re-
moved from the abusive parent and placed in long-term foster
care.2 0 4 In one case, after a father was arrested for the abuse caught
on Dr. Southall's tape, he confessed to also murdering another
child, whom he had suffocated only two years earlier and who was
originally thought to have died from Sudden Infant Death Syn-
drome (SIDS) .5 Surprisingly, 12 siblings of Dr. Southall's 39
197. See PrimeTime Live, supra note 3.
198. See id.
199. Id.
200. See id.
201. Id.
202. See id.
203. See id.
204. See id.
205. See id. SIDS is defined as follows:
SIDS is the sudden and unexpected death of an apparently healthy child under one
year of age whose death remains unexplained after the performance of an adequate
postmortem investigation including an autopsy, investigation of the scene and circum-
stances of the death and exploration of the medical history of the infant and family.
Richard A. Knox, Deadly Deception: SIDS Is Sometimes Blamed When Mothers with Bizarre Syndrome
Called Munchausen by Proxy Harm Their Children, BosToN GLOBE, Sept. 15, 1997, at C1
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patients had previously died suddenly or unexpectedly-ilI were
originally suspected to have died of SIDS. 2°6 After Dr. Southall's
study, three other parents confessed to murdering seven of their
own children.2 °7
[hereinafter Knox, Deadly Deception]. The article notes: "SIDS accounts for one-third of all
deaths among infants older than one month.... " Id. SIDS is the leading killer of babies be-
tween the ages of one week and one year, at a rate of one in every five hundred infants. See
Peter Gorner, Editorial, When a Child Dies: Why Does the Pendulum of Blame Have to Swing Back
25 Years, TULSA TRIB. & TULSA WORLD, Nov. 2, 1997, at G2. Between 3500 and 4500 babies
die of SIDS every year in the United States. See id. In 1995, there were approximately 3300
reported cases of SIDS. See Knox, Deadly Deception, supra. As early as 1972, it was thought that
SIDS was hereditary; however, a growing knowledge about Munchausen Syndrome by Proxy
has seriously questioned that theory. See Knox, Deadly Deception, supra.
Since 1977, when Munchausen Syndrome by Proxy was first introduced as a form of child
abuse, see Meadow, The Hinterland of Child Abuse, supra note 16, at 343-45, many supposed
SIDS cases have been revealed to have actually been caused by Munchausen Syndrome by
Proxy. See, e.g., Flannery, supra note 9, at 1194-95 n.81 (discussing the case of Waneta Hoyt,
who was originally thought to have lost five children to SIDS, but who, 23 years after the
death of her fifth child, was discovered to have murdered all five of her children); Brian Maf-
fly, Three Infant Deaths at Day-Care Home Raise Questions, Lead to Lawsuit; SIDS Deaths Raise
Questions, Lead to Lawsui SALT LAKE TRIB., Mar. 2, 1998, at DI (describing the case of Karen
Biddulph, in whose care three babies died of what was originally thought to be SIDS but was
later suspected to be murder); Joe O'Dowd, Mother Admits Killing 5 Infants; Textbook Sudden
Infant Death Syndrome Case Turns Out to Be Infanticide, PITT. POST-GAZETTE, Apr. 5, 1998, at B6,
available in 1998 WL 5242195 (describing the case of Marie Noe, who confessed in 1998 to
killing five of her ten children where all ten children were thought to have died of SIDS and
eight had died in her care). In some cases, mothers have been found to have murdered up to
nine of their children under the guise of SIDS. See Knox, Deadly Deception, supra.
Although it is impossible to pinpoint accurate statistics regarding the prevalence of cases
that are thought to be SIDS but are actually Munchausen Syndrome by Proxy cases, some
experts state that "95[%] to 98[%] of all SIDS cases are correctly diagnosed...." Id. Other
experts place the true homicide percentage of SIDS cases at as much as 10%. See id. Still oth-
ers suggest that as many as 20% of suspected SIDS deaths are actually caused by parents
killing their infants. See PrimeTime Live, supra note 3. What is becoming more certain, how-
ever, is that the likelihood of multiple cases of SIDS in one home is extremely rare. See Maffly,
supra. The odds of three SIDS deaths in one home, like the Biddulphs', are as high as one in
1.88 trillion. See id.
The increased awareness and suspicion of child abuse in cases where SIDS was originally
suspected may do a disservice to the SIDS research community, see Gorner, supra (criticizing
the sensationalization of "serial cases of child abuse," like that portrayed in RICHARD
FIRSTMAN & JAMIE TALAN, THE DEATH OF INNOCENTS (1997), which contends that serial
abuse cases may have been covered up by supporters of SIDS research. See also Cyril H.
Wecht, The Death of Innocents: A True Story of Murder, Medicine, and High-Stakes Science, 279 JAMA
85 (1998) (book review of THE DEATH OF INNOCENTS).
206. See Southall et al., supra note 19, at 738.
207. See PrimeTime Live, supra note 3. Increased awareness of the disease, which has alleg-
edly led to increased false accusations of the disease, has even led to the formation of a
Mississippi-based organization called "Mothers Against Munchausen [S]yndrome by [P]roxy
Allegations (MAMA)," whose members believe that allegations of Munchausen Syndrome by
Proxy are used by doctors to evade malpractice lawsuits or simply to rid themselves of cases in
which they are unable to render an accurate medical diagnosis. See Knox, Deadly Deception,
supra note 205.
Some experts, however, feel that medical professionals too often overlook factors that
should raise suspicions of Munchausen Syndrome by Proxy. See id. For example, at
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In Dr. Southall's study, the determination of whether to use cov-
ert video surveillance in 37 of the 39 cases was authorized after a
"multiagency planning meeting," which was organized and chaired
2011by social service professionals. It was decided that those were ex-
treme cases in which covert video surveillance "was the only mean
[sic] through which abuse could be confirmed or refuted and long-
term protection ensured., 20 9 In one of the cases, the use of video
surveillance was authorized after an inter-agency telephone conver-
sation, based on what was perceived to be an "immediate threat to
the child."2 1 In another case, surveillance was initiated after only a
"close discussion" with Dr. Southall.
Interestingly, at the outset of the surveillance, the Staffordshire
police initially refused to participate in the surveillance unless
trained nursing observers were present.21 2 Dr. Southall, however,
"considered the surveillance aspect of... [the] work to be police
activity. '212 Eventually, Dr. Southall reluctantly agreed to train the
214
nursing staff in covert video surveillance so that it could continue.
During the surveillance, electronic communication between the
observers and a senior pediatric nurse was divided between low-
215priority and high-priority calls. Upon a low priority call, when, for
example, the parent might disconnect the child's monitor, the sen-
ior nurse would merely contact the observing team by telephone
for discussion. 6 If an episode of abuse was observed, the ward
nurse would dispatch immediately to the child's room, ideally
Massachusetts General Hospital, one specialist studied 156 cases of repeated apnea episodes
or cessation of breathing cases-20 of which involved patient deaths-and determined that
although 56 of the cases should have raised suspicions of abuse, very few were documented or
referred to the proper authorities. See id.; Richard A. Knox, Suspicions Surface in Cases Termed
'Sudden Infant Death', BOSTON GLOBE, Sept. 9, 1997, at Al, available in Lexis, News Library,
BGLOBE file. Red flags of abuse in cases that would otherwise be diagnosed as SIDS cases
include the following scenarios: a child who has suffered numerous apnea episodes dies; a
child whose sibling has died of SIDS or has also suffered numerous apnea episodes dies; the
only witness to an apparent life-threatening event is always the same care giver; and the life-
threatening incident occurs when the child is reportedly awake. See Richard A. Knox, Some
SIDS Deaths Linked to Munchausen Syndrome by Proxy, FORT WORTH STAR-TELEGRAM, Sept. 21,
1997, at 38, available in 1997 WL 11907471.
208. Southall et al., supra note 19, at 736.
209. Id.
210. Id.
211. Id.
212. See id. at 737.
213. Id.
214. See id.
215. See id.
216. See id.
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never more than twenty-five seconds after the onset of the abuse. 7
In cases of suffocation, Dr. Southall felt that because the child was
not likely to show signs of cerebral hypoxia for up to sixty or sev-
enty seconds, a twenty-five second lapse from the onset of the
suffocation until intervention was permissible.2 18 The delay "helped
ensure that the video evidence was adequate for legal purposes.
2
11
Shockingly, not until one parent broke her child's arm while under
surveillance were "the guidelines for observers [] modified for ear-
lier intervention if the parents' behavior indicated imminent abuse
involving physical violence of this type." 2 0 After an episode of
abuse, the nurse would remain with the child until police arrived.2 1
The abusive incidents were of sufficient intensity that ward nurses
and observers were offered individual counseling following the epi-
sodes, and any nurse who felt uncomfortable with the surveillance
procedure was free to discontinue his or her participation.222
Under British law, the breach of privacy involved in the surveil-
lance process is not illegal. 23 Because the hospital trust lawfully
occupied the premises, they were entitled to use video surveillance
there.224 In a British proceeding in which the use of covert video
surveillance was considered, the court held: "If a doctor considers
that covert video surveillance is essential for the treatment of his
patient, the doctor would be entitled to undertake this process
without parental consent, provided that he is satisfied that there is
no risk that the patient will come to any serious harm."
2 25
A North Carolina case illustrates vividly the quandary of those
who watch and wait for the abuse to happen. The case involved a
mother who suffocated her child-notjust once, but three separate
times, all within two hours, all of which were videotaped by hospital
staff.226 The first incident of smothering lasted for fifty-one seconds
before a nurse interrupted the abuse.2 27 The second incident lasted
for an additional fifty seconds. 22 Larry Brubaker, an FBI agent who
specializes in Munchausen Syndrome by Proxy cases, described the
217. See id. "Episode of abuse" is a relative term; however, participants in the study stated
that they would not interfere with certain clearly abusive activities because they were not "life-
threatening" events. See PrimeTime Live, supra note 3.
218. See Southall et al., supra note 19, at 737.
219. Id.
220. Id.
221. See id.
222. See id.
223. See id.
224. See id.
225. Id. (quoting In re DH, A minor (Child Abuse), Fam. L. Rep. 619-716 (1994)).
226. See PrimeTime Live, supra note 3.
227. See id.
228. See id.
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child's response to the abuse as he watched the video: "[S] he's hav-
ing a lot of difficulty holding that child down to have the child quit
breathing. You can see how much he is fighting. ... That child is
fighting back.... [I] t's no different than a rape victim or a victim
of any other type of assault [who] 's fighting back." 22 He described
another incident of a father suffocating his daughter, uninter-
rupted, for more than a minute: "You can see her little feet... at
the bottom of the screen just kicking, vehemently kicking."230
B. The Legal Issues in the Use of Covert Video Surveillance
The employment of covert video surveillance to prove Mun-
chausen Syndrome by Proxy raises two legal questions: whether the
use of such surveillance is a "search," as defined by the Fourth
Amendment,23' and whether the employment of surveillance vio-
lates the caregiver's right to privacy. The use of video surveillance is
inherently intrusive and susceptible to abuse.13 Video surveillance
triggers Fourth Amendment considerations when it intrudes upon
one's reasonable expectation of privacy.2 3 Thus, under a Fourth
Amendment analysis, the propriety of covert video surveillance de-
pends upon a series of related issues, the first of which is whether the
surveillance constitutes a search.3 For the surveillance to constitute a
search, the trier of fact must find that the subject had an actual, sub-
jective expectation of privacy, and that his or her expectation of
229. Id. A North Carolina mother pled guilty to attempted murder and lost her parental
rights. See id. She was sentenced to three years in prison, of which she served thirteen months.
See id. She obtained counseling while in prison and claims that she can control her urges,
even though she is not cured. See id. At the time of the broadcast, she was in the process of
becoming a licensed a nurse. See id.
230. Id.
231. The Fourth Amendment of the U.S. Constitution guarantees individuals freedom
from unreasonable searches and seizures. See U.S. CONST. amend. IV. The Fourth Amend-
ment provides:
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects,
against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no Warrants
shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation and particu-
larly describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized.
Id.
232. See United States v. Torres, 751 F.2d 875, 882 (7th Cir. 1984) (describing electronic
visual surveillance as "inherently indiscriminate"); State v. Thomas, 642 N.E.2d 240, 247 (Ind.
Ct. App. 1994).
233. See Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 352-53 (1967); see also Smith v. Maryland,
442 U.S. 735, 740 (1979).
234. See supra note 231.
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privacy was one that society would find reasonable.235 If the surveil-
lance is considered a search under the Fourth Amendment, a
search warrant is required to sustain its use. 6 A warrandess search
may be conducted if the situation qualifies under one of three ex-
ceptions to the warrant requirement relevant to the context of this
Article. 37 First is the exigent circumstance, where there must be
probable cause to believe that a person is in imminent harm or that
evidence may be destroyed.238 The second is the private party ex-
ception, where a private party who is not acting with government
interests conducts the search.2 9 The third exception requires the
consent of the party involved in the search.240
This Section argues that covert video surveillance of Mun-
chausen Syndrome by Proxy does not qualify under any of these
three exceptions to the Fourth Amendment warrant requirement.
Furthermore, this Section argues that, given the standard required
to procure a warrant, the evidence required to obtain the warrant is
also sufficient to temporarily restrict the parent's supervision of the
child, which is preferable to placing the child at risk of harm by
conducting the surveillance. Finally, even if a warrant were re-
quired, procurable, and necessary, this Section argues that it is
simply medically unethical to place the child at risk through the
use of covert video surveillance.
1. Is it a Search?-The Fourth Amendment provides: "The right
of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and
effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be
violated....,,41 In the landmark case of Katz v. United States, the
United States Supreme Court expanded the Fourth Amendment
protection from property and possessory interests to unreasonable
242invasions of personal privacy. In Katz, the Court held that "[w] hat
235. See Minnesota v. Olson, 495 U.S. 91, 95-96 (1990); see also Katz, 389 U.S. at 361
(Harlan,J., concurring).
236. See Katz, 389 U.S. at 357-59.
237. Exceptions to the Fourth Amendment warrant requirement that are not applicable
within the context of this Article include search incident to a lawful arrest, see Chimel v. Cali-
fornia, 395 U.S. 752, 762-68 (1969); seizure of contraband in an automobile, see Carroll v.
United States, 267 U.S. 132, 158-59 (1925); and searches made in "good faith," see United
States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897, 926 (1984).
238. SeeKer v. California, 374 U.S. 23, 47 (1963) (Brennan,J., concurring).
239. See Burdeau v. McDowell, 256 U.S. 465, 475 (1921) (holding that the Fourth
Amendment warrant requirement was not intended to apply to the activities of individuals
who are not employed by the government).
240. See Zap v. United States, 328 U.S. 624, 630 (1946); Davis v. United States, 328 U.S.
582, 593-94 (1946).
241. U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
242. See Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 350-53 (1967) (holding that eavesdropping
on telephone booth conversation constituted an unreasonable search and seizure). For a
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a person knowingly exposes to the public, even in his own home or
office, is not a subject of Fourth Amendment protection. But what
he seeks to preserve as private, even in an area accessible to the
public, may be constitutionally protected. 2 43 Justice Harlan's con-
curring opinion voiced a rationale of the case: a "search," which
triggers the protections afforded by the Fourth Amendment, oc-
curs any time police investigatory activities infringe on an
"expectation of privacy" that "society is prepared to recognize as
'reasonable. ' ' 44 Therefore, covert video surveillance of Mun-
chausen Syndrome by Proxy will only be a search that would trigger
a Fourth Amendment analysis if the parent has a reasonable expec-
tation of privacy in the hospital room where the surveillance takes
place.
2. Is There a Reasonable Expectation of Privacy in a Hospital Room?-
Courts have interpreted the phrase "expectation of privacy" to mean
that the person claiming a Fourth Amendment violation must have
manifested an intention that his or her conduct will be private.2 45 In
Katz, where the defendant claimed a reasonable expectation of pri-
vacy in a phone booth,46 the Court reasoned that the question is not
whether the subject space is "accessible to the public" at other times,
but whether it is a "temporarily private place," in which its
"momentary occupants' expectations of freedom from intrusion" are
manifestly intended.47 It is reasonable to conclude that a Mun-
chausen mother manifestly intends that the hospital room in which
she perpetrates the Syndrome will be private, at least at the moment
of action; otherwise she would not act or would act in the presence of
hospital staff, which would defeat her very intention-deceiving the
hospital staff by what she does to the child in private. The very nature
of the behavior demonstrated in Munchausen Syndrome by Proxy
245'
makes the behavior one which is manifestly intended to be private.
The second prong of the Katz test is more problematic: whether the
expectation of privacy is reasonable.249
discussion of Katz, see Elan Gerstmann, Letting Katz out of the Bag: Re-evaluating Probable Cause
in the Context of Electronic Eavesdropping, 22 Loy. U. CHI. L.J. 193 (1990).
243. Katz, 389 U.S. at 351-52 (citations omitted).
244. Id. at 361 (Harlan,J., concurring).
245. See, e.g., Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735, 740 (1979); United States v. Taborda, 635
F.2d 131, 137 (2d Cir. 1980).
246. See Katz, 389 U.S. at 348-50.
247. Katz, 389 U.S. at 361 (Harlan,J., concurring).
248. The fact that, in one study, six of at least eight mothers who were confronted with
evidence obtained via covert video surveillance expressed outrage at the violation of their
privacy supports this contention. SeeYorker, supra note 17, at 339-40.
249. See Smith, 442 U.S. at 740; Katz, 389 U.S. at 361 (Harlan,J., concurring).
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The Supreme Court has determined that a reasonable expecta-
tion of privacy depends upon whether the expectation is based on
"understandings that are recognized and permitted by society.",2 5
Commentators who advocate or accept the propriety of covert
video surveillance in Munchausen Syndrome by Proxy cases rely on
courts that state that an expectation of privacy is not reasonable in
251 252a hospital room. In Buchanan v. State, the court held that there
was no reasonable expectation of privacy when there is a constant
flow of medical personnel in and out of the room. However, the
holding in Buchanan must be viewed as very narrowly limited to theS 254
emergency room of a hospital, and not necessarily applying to the
room where video surveillance for Munchausen Syndrome by Proxy
is commonly employed. Although a holding that even a semi-
private hospital room does not provide a setting wherein one may
reasonably expect privacy due to the fact that doctors, nurses, visi-
tors, and roommates have regular, unfettered access to the room is
not unheard of,2 55 other courts recognize that hospital rooms carry
some indicia of privacy, even if not to the degree otherwise enjoyed
in one's private home.256 Hospital rooms are not considered "public
places" for purposes of Fourth Amendment analysis." Yet other
250. Rakas v. Illinois, 439 U.S. 128, 143-44 n.12 (1978); see also Taborda, 635 F.2d at 138
(requiring that "the action occur in a place in which society is prepared, because of its code of values
and its notions of custom and civility, to give deference to a manifested expectation of privacy").
251. See, e.g., Yorker, supra note 17, at 340 ("The health care community, child protective
services, and the courts support the idea that society would not consider an expectation of
privacy in a pediatric hospital room to be 'reasonable.'"); cf United States v. George, 987
F.2d 1428, 1432 (9th Cir. 1993); People v. Courts, 517 N.W.2d 785, 786 (Mich. Ct. App. 1994);
People v. Hayes, 584 N.Y.S.2d 1001, 1002-03 (Sup. Ct. 1992). But cf David Grande-Cassell,
Note, "Scalpel, Forceps, Hemostat, Fourth Amendment .... ": The Michigan Court of Appeals Gives
Criminal Suspects Protection Against Searches and Seizures of Clothing Held by Hospitals, People v.
Jordan, 9 T.M. CooLEY L. REv. 217, 228 (1992) (citing Morris v. Commonwealth, 157 S.E.2d
191, 194 (Va. 1967) (comparing hospital room paid for by patient to a hotel room paid for by
guest, requiring a warrant to do a search)).
252. 432 So. 2d 147 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1983).
253. See id, at 148.
254. See id. at 147; see also Pitt v. State, Nos. A-6292, 3730, 1997 WL 796503, at *3 (Alaska
Ct. App. Dec. 24, 1997) (holding that, even if the defendant had an actual expectation of
privacy in a hospital emergency room, that expectation was not reasonable); State v. Smith,
559 P.2d 970, 976 (Wash. 1977) (holding that a defendant had no reasonable expectation of
privacy in his clothing located in a semipublic area of the hospital); Wagner v. Hedrick, 383
S.E.2d 286, 291-92 (W. Va. 1989) (holding that a defendant who was taken to hospital emer-
gency room following a motorcycle accident did not maintain a reasonable expectation of
privacy in his clothing because the area was freely accessible to police officers).
255. See, e.g., Courts, 517 N.W.2d at 786; Campos-Garcia v. State, No. A14-93-00076-CR,
1995 WL 150238, at *8 (Tex. Crim. App. Apr. 6, 1995).
256. See, e.g., Jones v. State, 648 So. 2d 669, 675 (Fla. 1994); Morris v. Commonwealth,
157 S.E.2d 191, 194 (Va. 1967).
257. See Jones, 648 So. 2d at 676-77. But cf Green v. Chicago Tribune Co., 675 N.E.2d
249, 252 (Ill. App. Ct. 1996) (holding that the general public has no right to enter a private
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courts have held that the constant flow of medical personnel does
not preempt a patient's otherwise reasonable expectation of pri-
vacy within "his" or "her" own room.258
Because of the unique circumstances surrounding the dynamics
of Munchausen Syndrome by Proxy and its surveillance, additional
factors are relevant in the Fourth Amendment analysis of whether
an expectation of privacy is reasonable. For example, the circum-
stances under which one is brought to the hospital may be
significant.25 9 In cases not involving Munchausen Syndrome by
Proxy, the defendant is typically rushed into a common area of the
hospital, most likely the emergency room-where others are free to
move about-where the defendant has little or no control over the
circumstances. 260 The emergency room, by its very nature, functions
as a freely accessible area over which a patient has no control and
where his privacy is diminished. For example, in a hospital emer-
gency room during the throes of an emergency, a patient may
neither expect to restrict access to the room to specific individuals
according to his or her desire, nor to regulate whether other pa-
tients or families are present in the room.
In a private or semi-private hospital room, however, although the
hospital staff must enter the room regardless of the patient's
wishes, the patient may at least restrict the access of visitors or non-
medical personnel. In that way, a patient may control the degree of
privacy within the room. In fact, it is possible for the hospital to re-
spect a patient's request for privacy in the room for a certain time
period; such a request would be unreasonable in an emergency
hospital room in use); Courts, 517 N.W.2d at 786 (holding that, while patients in hospitals
have a legitimate expectation of privacy in their closed closets or drawers, the privacy interest
is not similar to the expectations of privacy people have in their homes and hotel rooms,
where one legitimately expects to keep the whole world out; thus, the hospital room is a suffi-
ciently public place such that the police may lawfully enter without a warrant to make an
arrest when supported by probable cause).
258. See, e.g., People v. Cook, 710 P.2d 299, 304 (Cal. 1985); People v. Brown, 151 Cal.
Rptr. 749, 754 (Ct. App. 1979); Morris v. Commonwealth, 157 S.E.2d 191, 194 (Va. 1967)
(affording patient in hospital room same privacy as guest in hotel room).
259. See Wagner, 383 S.E.2d at 291 (holding that the defendant's expectation of privacy
was diminished because of the circumstances under which he was brought to the emergency
room).
260. See id. These "common area" cases typically involve the emergency room. See, e.g.,
United States v. George, 987 F.2d 1428, 1430 (9th Cir. 1993); Pitt v. State, Nos. A-6292, 3730,
1997 WL 796503, at *3 (Alaska Ct. App. Dec. 24, 1994); Buchanan v. State, 432 So. 2d 147,
148 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1983); People v. Torres, 494 N.E.2d 752, 753-55 (Ill. App. Ct. 1986);
see also State v. Abislaiman, 437 So. 2d 181, 183 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1983) (holding that the
defendant had no reasonable expectation of privacy in hospital parking lot); State v. Herbest,
551 A.2d 442, 444 (Me. 1988) (holding that the defendant had no reasonable expectation of
privacy in reception area of hospital emergency room); Sullivan v. District Court of Hamp-
shire, 429 N.E.2d 335, 338-39 (Mass. 1981) (holding that the plaintiff could have had no
expectation of privacy in hospital canteen, a common area open to all hospital staff).
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room setting. Even when a patient consents to the presence of
hospital employees in the room, it has been held that such consent
does not waive the otherwise reasonable expectation of privacy
from police intrusion that one may enjoy in a hospital room.2 61 The
court in People v. Brown held:
[T] he question of privacy in a hospital does not merely turn
on a general expectation of privacy in use of a given space, but
to some degree depends on the person whose conduct is
questioned. Clearly, although by checking himself into a hos-
pital, a patient may well waive his right of privacy as to hospital
personnel, it is obvious that he has not turned "his" room into
a public thoroughfare. 62
The rooms used in covert video surveillance in a hospital must
be made private by the hospital staff. Were they not private, the
surveillance would be pointless. Additionally, as in the study by Dr.
Southall, 63 the mother and child generally do not come to the hos-
pital on an emergency basis where they are treated randomly in a
room where covert video surveillance is being used. Instead, they
are requested to come to the hospital under the auspices of testing
or treatment264 (or perhaps they were already being treated, unnec-
essarily, in the hospital), but then are purposely situated in a room
that, at the time of surveillance, will be made private by the hospital
265
staff for the sole purpose of conducting surveillance.
An additional factor courts may consider that is especially rele-
vant to Munchausen surveillance cases is whether the individual
"took normal precautions to maintain his privacy-that is, precau-
tions customarily taken by those seeking privacy, 2 66 and how the
individual uses the location. 67 In Munchausen cases, perpetrators
typically take precautions to ensure their behavior is private-that
no one else is in the room or sees them-since privacy and decep-
tion are the very essence of perpetrating the Syndrome. On the
surveillance tapes, one can see a parent who is about to harm the
child checking the door to see if anyone is approaching the room.
Therefore, based on both the dynamics of the disease itself and the
necessary environment for covertly videotaping the perpetration of
261. See Brow, 151 Cal. Rptr. at 754-55.
262. Id. at 754.
263. See Southall et a]., supra note 19, at 735.
264. See PrieTime Live, supra note 3.
265. See id.
266. Rakas v. Illinois, 439 U.S. 128, 152 (1978) (Powell,J., concurring).
267. See id. at 153 (Powell, J., concurring).
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the disease, it is reasonable to conclude that perpetrators have a
reasonable expectation of privacy in the hospital room in which
they are observed.
3. Is a Warrant Required?-Lower courts have permitted the use
of warrantless video surveillance when it covers areas that are in
"plain view. ' '2"' Because one may have a reasonable expectation of
privacy in a hospital room, the use of covert video surveillance to
detect Munchausen Syndrome by Proxy in the hospital must be
considered a "search" for Fourth Amendment purposes.2 69 There-
fore, in order to conduct the search legally, either a warrant must
be obtained or one of the exceptions to the warrant requirement
must apply.2 70 As noted above, three commonly accepted exceptions
that are potentially relevant to the issue of video surveillance of
suspected perpetrators of Munchausen Syndrome by Proxy are: (1)
exigent circumstances; (2) consent; and (3) lack of government
271involvement or exclusive involvement by a private party.
i. The Exigent Circumstances Exception to The Warrant Requirement-
The United States Supreme Court has recognized that sometimes
"[t] here are exceptional circumstances in which, on balancing the
need for effective law enforcement against the right of privacy, it
may be contended that a magistrate's warrant for search may be
dispensed with." 27 2 To show that "exigent circumstances" exist,
probable cause must show that, if a warrant must be obtained, evi-
dence will be imminently destroyed, a suspect will escape, or a risk
of danger to the police or other persons exists.Y
268. See United States v. Felder, 572 F. Supp. 17, 20 (E.D. Pa. 1983) (requiring no war-
rant for surveillance of an open work area), affd, 722 F.2d 735, 735 (3d Cir. 1983); State v.
Abislaiman, 437 So. 2d 181, 182-83 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1983) (holding that footage of a drug
transaction taken from a surveillance camera in a hospital parking lot was admissible);
Sponick v. City of Detroit Police Dep't, 211 N.W.2d 674, 690 (Mich. Ct. App. 1973) (holding
that video surveillance conducted in local bars was admissible without a search warrant be-
cause camera was simply making a permanent record of what the general public could
witness).
269. See supra Part Il.B.1.
270. SeeU.S. CONST. amend. lV.
271. See, e.g., Minnesota v. Olson, 495 U.S. 91, 100-01 (1990) (exigent circumstances);
United States v. Jacobsen, 466 U.S. 109, 113-14 (1984) (Fourth Amendment's requirement
for government action); Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 221 (1973) (consent ex-
ception). Of course, the scope of the Fourth Amendment exceptions to the warrant
requirement is not limited to these exceptions. In his concurring opinion in Calfornia v.
Acevedo, 500 U.S. 565 (1991), Justice Scalia noted that the "'warrant requirement' had be-
come so riddled with exceptions that it [had become] basically unrecognizable." Id. at 582
(citing Craig M. Bradley, Two Models of the Fourth Amendment, 83 MICH. L. REv. 1468, 1473-74
(1985) (cataloguing more than twenty exceptions to the Fourth Amendment warrant re-
quirement)).
272. Johnson v. United States, 333 U.S. 10, 14-15 (1948).
273. See Minnesota v. Olson, 495 U.S. 91, 91-100 (1990).
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The typical Munchausen Syndrome by Proxy case fits into none
of these warrant exceptions. First, no imminent risk of destruction
of evidence exists in Munchausen Syndrome by Proxy cases. In-
deed, there is no evidence to be destroyed in these cases because
the very aim of video surveillance is to create evidence. Thus, the
first criterion for the exigent circumstance exception to the war-
rant requirement is inapplicable in Munchausen cases.
The second criterion-the risk that the suspect will escape-is
also inapplicable to Munchausen cases. It may be argued that,
without direct video evidence of a perpetrator's child abuse, the
perpetrator will eventually kill the child, continue to abuse the
child at home, or possibly continue the abuse and deception at an-
other hospital. However, none of these possibilities implies that the
perpetrator will "escape," and they are thus insufficient to satisfy
the second criterion for the exigent circumstance exception.
The third criterion-that there is a risk of danger (in this case,
to the child)-provides the strongest argument that video surveil-
lance should be allowed as an exigent circumstance exception to
the search warrant requirement. However, three reasons exist why
this criterion is also not met in most Munchausen Syndrome by
Proxy cases. First, when video surveillance is being considered, al-
though the child is presumably in the hospital, the surveillance is
not yet being conducted so the child can be observed at all times by
hospital staff. There is no imminent harm to the child because the
mother is neither alone with the child in the room nor about to
harm the child. Second, the hospital staff or the police themselves
create the environment that places the child at risk; the situation is
not the same as one where the mother is currently in the process of
perpetrating the crime and where there is insufficient time to ob-
tain a warrant in order to videotape her behavior. In the time it
would take for hospital staff to conclude that their suspicions war-
rant surveillance, to contact the police, and to set up the
surveillance or move the child to a surveillance-ready room, a war-
rant could be obtained. Moreover, in Munchausen cases, the
hospital staff is very much in control of the environment and the
dynamics of the setting, and, to a certain degree, can regulate the
imminence of the risk to the child simply by monitoring the child
and by being present in the room. Therefore, the child need be
placed in no danger until a warrant is obtained. Third, any evi-
dence indicating a risk of harm to the child so great that the delay
in obtaining a warrant would allow the child to be injured must
necessarily also be sufficient evidence upon which to restrict the
parent's supervision of the child until the risk can be either con-
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firmed as legitimate or dismissed as unfounded. Therefore, Mun-
chausen Syndrome by Proxy cases cannot qualify under the exigent
circumstances exception to the Fourth Amendment warrant re-
quirement.
ii. The Consent Exception to the Warrant Requirement-A subject's
consent to surveillance satisfies the second exception to the war-
rant requirement.2 7 4 To be valid, the consent must be given
voluntarily and without coercion. 275 The Supreme Court has held
that a third party who is acting as an agent of the principal subject
may consent to a search.276 In Stoner v. California, police pursuing a
lead on a robbery went to the hotel where the defendant was stay-
277ing. Because the defendant was not in, the police obtained access
to the defendant's room from the night desk clerk employed by the
278hotel. Upon entering the defendant's room, the police found
evidence implicating him in the robbery.279 The Supreme Court
reversed Stoner's conviction, holding: "Our decisions make clear
that the rights protected by the Fourth Amendment are not to be
eroded by strained applications of the law of agency or by unrealis-
tic doctrines of 'apparent authority.' , 28 0 The Court held that only
the defendant himself, as a subject of the search, or an agent ap-
pointed by him, could waive the right to be free from unreasonable
searches.2 8 ' Because the defendant did not anticipate that type of
intrusion simply by being a guest at the hotel, the Court held that
there was no consent given, and that the search was invalid.2 2
Similarly, in searches involving covert video surveillance of Mun-
chausen Syndrome by Proxy neither the mother nor the child gives
consent to the search, and the hospital has no authority to waive
the constitutional rights of the mother, who does not contemplate
such a search merely by admitting her child to the hospital. There-
fore, because neither subject of the search (the mother or the
child) consents, and because hospital employees are not appointed
274. SeeSchneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 221 (1973).
275. See id.
276. See Stoner v. California, 376 U.S. 483, 488 (1964); see also Illinois v. Rodriguez, 497
U.S. 177, 182-89 (1990) (allowing police to enter a home where they reasonably believed a
third party had authority to grant consent to a search); Tammy Campbell, Note, Illinois v.
Rodriquez: Should Apparent Authority Validate Third-Party Consent Searches?, 63 U. COLO. L. REv.
481,486 (1992).
277. See Stoner, 376 U.S. at 484-85.
278. See id. at 485.
279. See id. at 485-86.
280. Id. at 488.
281. See id. at 489.
282. See id.
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as agents of the mother, the typical Munchausen search would not
qualify under the consent exception to the warrant requirement.
iii. The Private Party Exception to the Warrant Requirement-The
third exception to the Fourth Amendment warrant requirement is
the "private party" exception.283 The Fourth Amendment applies
only to searches and seizures conducted by government officials or
third parties acting on behalf of the government.8 4 The only limita-
tion is that any evidence discovered by a private party must be
legally acquired by the government if it is to be valid. 85 Despite the
limited scope of Fourth Amendment protection to cases involving
searches by private parties, no precedent supports the proposition
that private searches insulate subsequent government use of the
evidence from Fourth Amendment scrutiny.2 86 State- or federally-
operated hospitals are considered government agencies.87 In the
event that hospital personnel are considered to be private parties,
the validity of the search will depend on the purpose for which the
search was conducted.
Generally, there are three reasons a hospital might videotape a
mother suspected of Munchausen Syndrome by Proxy: (1) to con-
duct research; (2) to monitor the child's physical condition; or (3)
to pursue criminal prosecution. The first two reasons do not apply
to covert surveillance of Munchausen Syndrome by Proxy cases be-
cause the video in those situations is not likely to be conducted
covertly. In those situations, the parents would be informed of and,
most likely, would consent to the surveillance, knowing that it was
for the child's benefit or for other medical purposes.
In United States v. Black, 8 the court held that medical personnel
who initiated a search of an unconscious patient's personal prop-
erty and completed a physical exam revealing drugs, were
considered private parties and were, therefore, exempted from the
restrictions of the Fourth Amendment. 2'9 The court reasoned that
the search was not conducted for the purpose of criminal prosecu-
283. See Burdeau v. McDowell, 256 U.S. 465, 475 (1921).
284. See United States v. Jacobsen, 466 U.S. 109, 113-14 (1984) (quoting Walter v. United
States, 447 U.S. 649, 662 (1980) (Blackmun,J., dissenting)).
285. See Walter, 447 U.S. at 656; Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443, 487-90
(1971).
286. See Walter, 447 U.S. at 660 n.2 (White,J., concurring).
287. See Yorker, supra note 17, at 343; see also 40 AM. JUR. 2D Hospitals & Asylums § 2
(1968). Hospitals created by the agreement of private individuals and managed by people
selected by those private individuals are considered private corporations, even though they
may be dedicated to public service under the terms of their charter and notwithstanding their
receipt of state aid via tax exemptions or appropriations. See id.
288. No. 88-5266, 1988 WL 107375, at *1 (6th Cir. Oct. 14, 1988).
289. See id. at * 1-*3.
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tion, but rather for the medical treatment of the subject, and,
therefore, was not conducted with the interest of the government
in mind. 90 Evidence obtained by private actors may be subject to
the exclusionary rule if the government explicitly instigates the
search, however.291
Typically, video surveillance in a Munchausen case is conducted
covertly in order to pursue criminal prosecution of a parent already
suspected of perpetrating harm on the child. In such cases, the po-
lice are usually contacted and are involved in the surveillance. This
arrangement suggests that the hospital is not acting as a private
party and is, therefore, subject to Fourth Amendment scrutiny and
•292
the warrant requirement.
d. Even If Required, a Search Warrant Is Not Necessary-In cases
where a warrant is required, because the subject has a reasonable
expectation of privacy and there are no applicable exceptions to
the warrant requirement, the government must show probable
cause in order to obtain a warrant to conduct the search.29 All Cir-
cuit Courts of Appeal have held that the standard of probable
cause in surveillance cases is the same as that for traditional war-
rants. 294 The Supreme Court has held that probable cause exists
when, given practical, common-sense consideration, the totality of
the circumstances set forth a "fair probability that contraband or
evidence of a crime will be found in a particular place. 295 To satisfy
290. See id. at *3.
291. See United States v. Walther, 652 F.2d 788, 793 (9th Cir. 1981) (holding that evi-
dence obtained by a private actor may be excluded where the government encourages,
directly or indirectly, the private citizen to engage in activity that the government is prohib-
ited from pursuing); State v. Cox, 674 P.2d 1127, 1130 (N.M. Ct. App. 1983) (applying the
Fourth Amendment to a search conducted through joint efforts between the police and pri-
vate citizens). At least one court has placed the burden of proof upon the defendant to
demonstrate that the government was involved in the private search. See State v. Dold, 722
P.2d 1353, 1356 (Wash. Ct. App. 1986).
292. Even in the rare case where a private hospital initiates covert video surveillance in a
Munchausen case without police involvement and without intention of using the tape as
evidence to prosecute the parent or to pursue an appropriate disposition for the child, but
rather conducts the surveillance solely for the child's medical treatment, I would argue that
such surveillance is still medically unethical because it places the child at risk.
293. Cf Draper v. United States, 358 U.S. 307, 310-11 (1959) (holding that the Fourth
Amendment requires al! searches to be based upon probable cause, even when a warrant is
not required).
294. See Gerstmann, supra note 242, at 218-27 (citing circuit court cases and questioning
whether the standard of probable cause for eavesdropping should be higher than that in
traditional warrant applications).
295. Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 238 (1983). The Supreme Court did not specifically
define the term "fair probability." The Court stated instead that: "[S] tandards such as proof
beyond a reasonable doubt or by a preponderance of the evidence, useful in formal trials,
have no place in the magistrate's decision." Id. at 235. Accordingly, there is no formally-
defined threshold to be met for probable cause.
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that probable cause exists, the government must have more than a
mere suspicion, but is not required to present evidence that would
confirm guilt.296 There need not be a prima facie showing of crimi-
nal activity, but there must be a probability that such evidence will
be found. 7 In considering the totality of the circumstances, the
court may consider several factors, including the reliability of the
information, the basis of the knowledge, corroboration of facts,
and the extent of the detail.98
Despite the inconclusive nature of Munchausen Syndrome by
Proxy cases, more often than not there is likely to be sufficient
medical evidence to satisfy the probable cause requirement based
on the doctor's reasonable suspicions, the child's unsolvable medi-
cal history, and increasingly, the characteristics and dynamics of
the family and its members that may indicate Munchausen Syn-
drome by Proxy.99 If there is enough evidence to show probable
cause that the child is at risk, then there should be enough evi-
dence to remove the child temporarily from the unsupervised care
of the suspected perpetrator until suspicions can be confirmed orS300
withdrawn. The standard for such a response is generally that
such action is in the best interest of the child.3 1
Although the standard required to obtain a warrant may be
lower than the standard required to remove a child from the cus-
tody of a parent, in the case of Munchausen Syndrome by Proxy,
there is only a temporary infringement on the parent's right to
296. See Locke v. United States, 11 U.S. 339, 348 (1813).
297. See Gates, 462 U.S. at 235 (quoting Spinelli v. United States, 393 U.S. 410, 419
(1969)).
298. SeeUnited States v. Zayas-Diaz, 95 F.3d 105, 111 (1st Cir. 1996).
299. Dr. Southall noticed common characteristics among children who had been suffo-
cated, including bleeding from the nose or mouth, a sibling who died suddenly and
unexpectedly, and hemorrhages of the face. See Southall et al., supra note 19, at 745. Clearly,
his study was useful in identifying characteristics and traits that may be used in assessing the
risk in other suspected cases. Other characteristics common to the perpetrators, such as cer-
tain psychiatric and social history traits, are also identifiable, but more elusive. See id. Dr.
Southall noted that further research is needed to assist in more effectively defining the per-
sonality disorders that are indicators of abuse. See id. One physician noted, after reviewing Dr.
Southall's study, that there are two telling findings in the study that could help in the early
diagnosis of apparent life threatening events, such as those occurring in Munchausen Syn-
drome by Proxy cases: (1) the presence of oral or nasal bleeding; and (2) a family history
involving other sibling deaths. See Krugman, supra note 24, at 890.
300. See, e.g., In reJordan, 616 N.E.2d 388, 390 (Ind. Ct. App. 1993) (upholding against a
due process challenge in a Munchausen Syndrome by Proxy case a state's detention statute
allowing removal of a child for up to 72 hours without a hearing based on probable cause to
believe that the child was in need of services). Compare id. (holding that probable cause that
child is in need of service is sufficient to remove child) with Minnesota v. Olson, 495 U.S. 91,
95 n.1 (holding that probable cause of exigent circumstances is necessary to obtain warrant
under Fourth Amendment).
301. See infra note 303.
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provide unsupervised care for the child while in the hospital. Given
that there is enough evidence to show a strong suspicion that the
child is otherwise at risk, it is arguably sufficient that the child be
supervised until the medical team can determine whether the
child's condition improves once the alleged perpetrator is no
longer providing unsupervised care, rather than to subject the
child to the suspected harm. Thus, there is no need for a warrant
(nor video surveillance) because there is sufficient evidence to re-
strict the parent's unsupervised care of the child. In fact, in some
cases of suspected Munchausen Syndrome by Proxy, courts have
restricted the parent's supervision of the child before the alleged
perpetrator has been found guilty.302 Typically, the standard re-
quired in applying a restriction on visitation, such as supervision, is
simply that it be in the "best interest" of the child.3° To modify the
parent's custody of the child, however, the higher standard of clear
and convincing evidence must be shown.0t Thus, in considering
the options, the court may choose between covertly surveilling the
child with the parent, in which case the child is at risk, or tempo-
rarily separating the child from the parent's sole supervision, in
which case the child is assured protection. If a court is willing to
accept probable cause as the standard to conduct surveillance
when a child is at risk, then it should also be willing to separate the
302. See, e.g., supra note 19 (describing the case of Cynthia Lyda).
303. SeeAcklin v. Acklin, 690 So. 2d 869, 871 (La. Ct. App. 1997) ("A modification of visi-
tation rights is not so substantial as a change in actual physical custody.... As such, a showing
[of] ... the best interest of a child is sufficient.") (citations omitted); Lancaster v. Brenneis,
417 N.W.2d 767, 768 (Neb. 1988) (stating that questions concerning visitation of a child are
resolved by considering the best interest of the child); Alfano v. Alfano, 542 N.Y.S.2d 313, 314
(App. Div. 1989) (stating that the determining factor in imposing supervised visitation is the
best interest of the child); In reW.S., 939 P.2d 196, 199 (Utah Ct. App. 1997) (stating that the
legal standard governing visitation orders is the best interest of the child); Peterson v. Peter-
son, 818 P.2d 1305, 1308 (Utah. Ct. App. 1991) (stating that the standard governing visitation
orders is the best interest of the child); Mary Ann P. v. William R.P., 475 S.E.2d 1, 10 (W. Va.
1996) (holding that supervised visitation should be ordered when necessary to protect the
best interests of the child); cf McKay v. Johnson, No. C6-95-1626, 1996 WL 12658, at *4
(Minn. Ct. App. Jan. 16, 1996) (holding that court shall modify visitation when in the best
interest of the child and that court shall restrict visitation when visitation is likely to endanger
child's physical or emotional health or impair child's emotional development). But see
Heldebrandt v. Heldebrandt, 623 N.E.2d 780, 785 (Ill. App. Ct. 1993) (holding that trial
court's use of best interest standard rather than serious endangerment standard in a motion
to restrict visitation of a parent was reversible error); Margaret Tortorella, Note, When Super-
vised Visitation Is in the Best Interests of the Child, 30 FAM. L.Q. 199, 202 (1996) (discussing
modification of traditional best interest standard to endangerment standard to curtail visita-
tion).
304. See Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745, 768 (1982). The termination of a parent's cus-
tody of a child is more intrusive than an adjudication of abuse or neglect or than subjecting a
parent to supervision in raising his or her children. See In re Colin R, 493 A.2d 1083, 1089
(Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1985).
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child from the parent, under the same probable cause standard, so
that the child is not at risk. This analysis obviates the need for cov-
ert video surveillance and avoids unnecessary risk to the child.
C. The Practical and Ethical Issues in the
Use of Covert Video Surveillance
Application of the Fourth Amendment to the issue of covert
video surveillance illustrates a few scenarios where the use of covert
video surveillance to detect Munchausen Syndrome by Proxy may
be legally validated-when the surveillance is not considered a
search, when the surveillance is considered a search but qualifies as
a valid exception to the requirement for a search warrant, and
when a warrant is required and granted based on a finding of
probable cause. In each scenario, however, covert video surveil-
lance should not be employed because, even if legally justified, it is
either ethically intolerable or simply illogical. In cases where the
surveillance is not considered a search, it is still unethical for a doc-
tor or hospital staff to take any action that would magnify the risks
to the children. Where the search qualifies as an exception to the
need for a warrant, such as where no government interest is in-
volved, the surveillance still poses a risk to the child and should not
be promoted or accepted. In other scenarios, such as when a war-
rant may be obtained or when exigent circumstances preempt the
need for a warrant, if there is enough evidence to obtain a warrant
or to preempt the requirement for a warrant, then logically, there
should be enough evidence to temporarily restrict the parent's ac-
cess to the child until a diagnosis of Munchausen Syndrome by
Proxy may be confirmed or ruled out.3°6 There are additional prac-
tical and ethical concerns, however, that relate to the covert video
surveillance process.
1. The Practical Issues-Even some experts who have testified in
covert video surveillance cases have recognized inherent problems
in its use.0 7 The very mode by which the subjects are maneuvered
into observation is questionable. Arguably, it is the covert nature of
305. See supra notes 231-304 and accompanying text.
306. Terry Thomas notes: "If sufficiently strong evidence exists to justify the use of CVS
[covert video surveillance] it might be argued that it also exists to tip the balance in favour of
action without recourse to CVS." Thomas, supra note 22, at 22.
307. See, e.g., Morley, supra note 22, at 1603 (arguing that covert video surveillance vio-
lates the liberty interests of the parent and child and should be used only as a last resort for
diagnosing the child's condition).
[VOL. 32:1
FALL1998] The Use of Covert Vzteo Sureillance
the surveillance that leads to a successful outcome.0 8 Therefore,
before the commencement of surveillance, a bias toward suspicion
of the alleged perpetrator must already exist; otherwise the surveil-
lance would not be used.s°9 While this bias does not invalidate the
use of video surveillance per se, it warrants comment. As a tactical
matter, it is worth noting that a subject of video surveillance is not
randomly assigned to a hospital room equipped with video cam-
eras that are then used by the hospital to capture abuse on video
tape serendipitously. Dr. Southall's study is a case in point.310 The
308. See, e.g., Byard & Burnell, supra note 22, at 352 (suggesting that employing alterna-
tive techniques in their study, such as videotaping only after informed consent, would have
placed the infant at risk of serious morbidity or death).
309. In the study conducted by Dr. Southall, almost all of the subjects were referred from
other hospitals and had already been suspected of experiencing or perpetrating life threaten-
ing events. See Southall et al., supra note 19, at 736. Dr. Southall admits that there was
"certainly a bias toward referrals," and that the figures in his study "cannot provide a true
epidemiologic indication of the frequency of intentional suffocation as a mechanism for
ALTE [apparent life threatening events]." Id. Some commentators, concerned over the use
of covert video surveillance, note that there are no accurate studies wherein the subjects were
observed, free of any history or previous bias, and that the studies therefore lack any objective
statistical validity. See Morley, supra note 22, at 1604.
310. See David P. Southall & Martin P. Samuels, Guidelines for the Multi-Agency Management
of Patients Suspected or at Risk of Suffering from Life-Threatening Abuse Resulting in Cyanotic-Apnoeic
Episodes, 22J. MED. ETHICS 16 (1996) (describing the protocols used in Dr. Southall's study)
[hereinafter Southall & Samuels, Guidelines]. Interestingly, although the guidelines offer
suggestions on the optimal application of covert video surveillance when it is employed, the
guidelines offer no criteria to determine if covert video surveillance should be employed.
With regard to its use, the Guidelines provide:
5.2 CVS should begin preferably early in the week and not at weekends. This allows
the maximum number of working days to be available when adequate senior medical
staff and ward staff are on duty.
5.4 Child and parent must not move into the surveillance cubicle until all prepara-
tions required for CVS are completed.
5.5 Cameras must be positioned to allow observation of child at all times, but must
not be invasive of the parents' privacy when he, she, or they are not handling the child
or equipment. To ensure adequate observation and safety of the child, attention must
be paid to:
(a) adequate lighting of the cubicle...
(b) the sound levels...
(c) adequate communication systems between the observers of the video surveil-
lance and ward staff...
(d) access to the cubicle...
(e) functioning of equipment.
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referred patients were specifically placed in a cubicle alreadyS 311
equipped for video surveillance. Some feel that this scenario is
artificially conditioned because the parent must stay with the child
in a cubicle all day and is told that the staff is looking for "acute life
threatening events," which may sound alarms, but which the nurses
may not hear.312 Consequently, the parent feels the child's life is at
stake and must remain with the child in case such an event were to
take place. This produces a stressful environment and may lead to
behavior that is not otherwise demonstrated by the parent in a less
stressful, more natural setting. 3 One might conclude that "[c] overt
video recordings of the parent's behaviour are unlikely to repre-
sent how he or she behaves at other times" and "do[] not 'provide
certainty over the diagnosis.' ,314
Once surveillance is arranged, a primary concern is that the be-
havior of the parent is open to various interpretations. Generally,
when an observed parent demonstrates suspicious behavior that
observers believe could lead to an assault or harm to the child, the
observers wait for a short period of time-usually twenty-five sec-
onds, but sometimes for as long as one minute 31--to confirm their
5.8 To provide continuous video surveillance, there will be two nursing staff... on
duty at any one time who must undergo prior training.... In some instances it would
be appropriate for medical staff to be present to aid interpretation of the parent/child
interaction.
5.10 During CVS, two videotapes will be used simultaneously.... At the conclusion
of recording, videotapes and logs will be stored by... police, and available to social
services.... If no proceedings are being considered, then the tapes and log sheets will
form part of the medical record and will be retained by the [hospital].
5.11 Following an observed incident, police and a child protection social worker will
be asked to attend. They will be responsible for proceeding with the investigation, in-
cluding any discussion with the alleged perpetrator and for providing immediate
protection for the child. The nurse in charge of the ward will ensure the cubicle is se-
cured until advised by the police.
Id. 5.2-5.11, at 18-19.
311. See id. 15.4, at 19.
312. Morley, supra note 22, at 1604.
313. See id.
314. Id.
315. As noted above, in one case of covert video surveillance, the parent suffocated the
child on three separate occasions within a two-hour period; two of the occasions lasted for
almost one minute. See PrineTime Live, supra note 3. Even in Dr. Southall's study, the descrip-
tions of the observations made during covert video surveillance tell of numerous, continuous,
and often uninterrupted, occasions of inappropriate and obviously painful behavior perpe-
trated on the child. See Southall et al., supra note 19, at 755-56.
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suspicions and to be certain that the video has captured sufficient
evidence to protect the child in the future or to prosecute the par-
ent. However, any discrepancy in interpretation could easily lead to
harm to the child'16 or to false accusations against a grieving, caring
316. For example, as noted above, one of the children in Dr. Southall's study suffered a
broken arm during the video surveillance. See Southall et al., supra note 19, at 737, 755-56,
757; see also H. Klonnin et al., Non-Accidental Fracture Occurring in Hospital, 74 ARCHIVES OF
DISEASE IN CHILDHOOD 89 (1996) (letter to the editor) (describing the same case). The log
of the child's case indicates that video surveillance began at 12:44 PM. See Southall et al., supra
note 19, at 755. At 2:02 PM, the mother slapped the child on the head and repeated this
behavior at 2:03 and 2:09 PM, without interruption. See id. At 2:53 PM, the mother tore up the
nursing record and threw it out the window of the hospital. See id. Five minutes later, the
visibly angry mother began swearing at the child, accusing the child of being the reason why
she had to remain in the hospital, and then began ordering the child to kiss her. See id. at
755-56. Less than three minutes later, the mother was observed roughly patting the child's
face 14 times, forcibly pressing her hand against the child's face in an unusual manner, and
shaking the child like a doll. See id. at 756. No hospital personnel interrupted the mother at
this point. At 3:02 PM, the mother deliberately and forcefully bent the child's elbow back-
wards beyond 180 degrees. See id. The child began screaming in pain and the mother pressed
the alarm for the nurse. See id. When the nurse arrived, the mother explained that the child
caught her arm in a toy. See id. A doctor examined the child and was unsure whether there
was a fracture of the child's arm. See id. Unbelievably, the mother was again left alone with the
child and within thirty seconds again bent the child's arm backwards and broke the child's
arm. See id.
Commenting on this incident, Dr. Southall writes:
The log of case 24 illustrates the dilemma for observers faced with abusive behavior
that did eventually result in an injury to the infant. During observation of the events
leading to the injury, we had decided to intervene only if the mother's behavior was
considered sufficiently violent to produce or be about to produce an injury. Without
seeing the videorecordings for the logs, it is difficult for the reader to know precisely
the degree of violence that accompanied, for example, a slap to the infant's head or
an episode of shaking. We might be criticized for risking a serious injury such as a
subdural hemorrhage and, in retrospect, we might have avoided the incident in which
the child's arm was fractured. We acknowledge that the risk of an unexpected violent
act is a potential problem during CVS and that more discussion and experience are
needed to minimize the risk of such adverse outcomes.
Id. at 754.
In another case in Dr. Southall's study, the log of the surveillance, taken over a period of
six days, describes continuous and uninterrupted abusive behavior by the child's father while
the child is in the hospital:
Day 1
Time, 22:51 PM: the father said to the infant, "I will bounce you off the canteen
roof."
22:52 PM: the father said to the infant that when the infant became older he "will
beat, whip, remove fingernails, and amputate his limbs."
Day 2
Time, 14:03 PM: the father deliberately wakes him up.
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parent.31 7 Also problematic is that any accusation of abusive or in-
appropriate behavior will be denied by the innocent parent.
14:11 PM: the father wakes him by tweaking ear.
14:13 PM: repeated.
14:15 PM: repeated.
14:17 PM: repeated.
14:19 PM: the father flicks his eyelids while asleep.
14:22 PM: the father obstructs his nasal orifices for 20 seconds before a nurse enters.
21:38 PM: the father wakes him from sleep.
21:38 PM: the father pinches his hand to wake him again.
21:39 PM: the father fingers around his nose; the infant awakes.
21:41 PM: the father places his hand over the mouth; the infant struggles for 25 sec-
onds. The father hears a noise outside and stops.
Day 3
Time, 21:51 PM: the father puts his finger into the infant's throat.
21:53 PM: as above; the infant gags and cries, and the mother appears.
22:29 PM: the father pinches his hands. Infant wakes from sleep, cries, and then
sobs. The father tells the mother who comes in that the infant had "just woke up cry-
ing."
Day 6
Time 21:16 PM: the father digs his nail into the infant's palm repeatedly. The infant
cries.
21:20 PM: the father pinches his left hand.
21:38 PM: the infant is asleep. The father shouts "wakey, wakey," and the infant
wakes up.
21:38 PM: the father pinches his hand.
21:39 PM: the father fingers around the infant's nose; the infant cries.
21:41 PM: the father suffocates the infant by placing his right hand over the nose
and mouth and forcing the back of the infant's head into his left hand. The infant
struggles for 25 seconds before a noise outside the room causes the father to remove
his hand. The infant takes a gasp of air and starts crying.
Id. at 755.
317. Colin Morley, who has testified as an expert witness in seven cases in which covert
video surveillance has been used, comments on the difficulty of interpreting the behavior
FALL 1998] The Use of Covert Video Surveillance
Although a sincere and truthful denial, it will be construed as a
"typical" response by one who suffers from Munchausen Syndrome
by Proxy.3'8 Thus, not only may appropriate behavior of an inno-
cent parent be misinterpreted as abusive, but an appropriate
response by an innocent parent to a false accusation may be fur-
ther misinterpreted as indicative of guilt. Thus, there are practical
concerns inherent in the use of covert video surveillance that may
that is being observed: "Actions that appeared to me to be innocent were interpreted as at-
tempts to harm the child: a mother cuddling a fussing child into her breast; playing with the
child by putting a hand over his face; brushing the teeth of an irritable child; or smacking a
fractious child." Morley, supra note 22, at 1603. Even in the case of Cynthia Lyda, see supra
note 19, one neonatologist testified that, based on her observation of the video, which
showed Lyda blowing forcefully into her son's feeding tube, the mother appeared to be act-
ing appropriately. See Melissa Prentice, Doctor Finds Mom's Actions OIK SAN ANTONIO ExPREss-
NEWS, May 6, 1998, at 1B, available in 1998 WL 5090804 (discussing Dr. Alice Gong's state-
ment that it might have been appropriate to blow through the tube if the child's feeding tube
were blocked); see also Melissa Prentice, Doctors Debate Munchausen's Findings, SAN ANTONIO
ExPREss-NEwS, May 7, 1998, at 1B, available in 1998 WL 5091007 (discussing Dr. John Jef-
frey's opinion that, while Lyda may suffer from poor judgment, she does not suffer from
Munchausen Syndrome by Proxy, and that she was only acting "in what she considered her
son's best interest"). Jeffrey has reviewed twelve similar cases and has agreed with only two
diagnoses of Munchausen Syndrome by Proxy. See id.
The result of a discrepancy in interpreting the behavior on covert video is clearly demon-
strated in a West Virginia case involving 18-year-old Tabithy Thaxton. In Thaxton's case, a
hospital video surveillance tape was used to try to prove that Thaxton attempted to suffocate
her four-month-old son Sebastian. See Maryclaire Dale, Mother Raised Suspicions, CHARLESTON
DAILY MAIL (W. Va.), Nov. 20, 1997, at 1A, available in 1997 WL 7133734. The mother of two
was initially placed under surveillance because she frequently brought her child to the hospi-
tal for respiratory problems and pneumonia, which is a red flag for cases of Munchausen
Syndrome by Proxy. See Brad McElbinny, Teen Mom Was Under Stress, CHARLESTON DAILY
MAIL (W. Va.), Nov. 19, 1997, at 1A, available in 1997 WL 7133417; Dale, supra. The police
who observed the tape alleged in their complaint that Thaxton turned off the child's heart
monitor and squeezed the child against her chest in an effort to suffocate the child. See
McElhinny, supra. The complaint further alleged that the child cried and struggled for air as
the mother eyed the door to see if anyone was coming. See id. Thaxton was arrested and
charged with attempted murder after police observed the tape; she was jailed for five days
and her children were placed in the custody of the state. See Kay Michael, Tale of Tape Ends
with Teen's Release: Attempted Murder Charge Against Ripley High School Senior Dropped, CHARLES-
TON DAILY MAIL (W. Va.), Nov. 22, 1997, at 1A, available in 1997 WL 7134226. However,
charges were dropped when prosecutors determined, after reviewing the hospital tape, that
there was insufficient evidence to prove that Thaxton made such an attempt. See id. Prosecu-
tors reviewed the tape and determined that Thaxton was merely "holding and rocking her
crying child, then carrying him around the hospital room in an apparent attempt to calm
him." Michael, supra.
As noted by District Judge David Peeples, who presided over the Lyda case, see supra note
19, another problem associated with video surveillance is that, where the public has the op-
portunity to view the video (as was true in the Lyda case), "[t]he judiciary as an institution
can lose its credibility when the public sees one thing on TV and comes to a conclusion that
is completely contradictory to what a judge [who hears the medical facts] decides." Prentice,
Visits by Mom Allowed, supra note 19.
318. See Morley, supra note 22, at 1603 (noting that it is difficult for the accused parent to
defend himself or herself because denials are typical of Munchausen Syndrome by Proxy).
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tarnish the effectiveness of the technique in confirming an accu-
rate diagnosis and in protecting the child.
2. The Ethical Issues-In responding to some of the medical and
practical problems associated with the use of covert video surveil-
lance, supporters of the tactic are also confronted with ethical
concerns.39 For example, one of the practical problems with covert
video surveillance is that there are no objective, neutral studies,
which use subjects without regard to case histories to validate the
statistics regarding the effectiveness of the method. 20 Should such
studies be conducted? One might argue that it would be unethical
and unlawful to conduct video surveillance in cases where there is
no suspicion of parental misconduct. While this may be legally ac-
curate, it is inconsistent to assert that it is unethical to perform
covert video surveillance on parents who are not harming their
children, but ethical to perform such surveillance on other parents
who, although suspected of harming their children, may not be
doing so. If covert video surveillance is unethical in one instance, it
is unethical per se-suspicions do not obviate ethics. As a legal
matter, however, suspicions may obviate the need for video surveil-
lance and, when supported by enough circumstantial evidence,
may obviate the right of alleged perpetrators to supervise their
children without restrictions.
One of the unethical elements in the employment of covert
video surveillance is the concept of a doctor deceiving a parent-
presumably an innocent parent-into believing that his or her
child may be experiencing a serious medical condition or life-
threatening event, when the doctor in fact suspects that the child is
either perfectly well or, at most (if the parent is innocent), that the
321child is experiencing an unexplainable condition. In response to
this concern, commentators who favor surveillance argue that in-
nocent parents worry anyway, and that such grave statements about
the child's health are not really misleading or violative of a parent's
rights, since the child may actually be experiencing the serious
problem of Munchausen Syndrome by Proxy. 2 But however much
the doctor's statements wind up being accurate, and however laud-
able the doctors' intentions, the ends simply do not justify the
means. Doctors should not lie to patients, or parents of patients,
319. See Basil J. Zitelli et al., In Reply, 142 AM. J. DISEASES CHILDREN 918, 918 (1988)
(replying to Frost et al., supra note 22, at 917) (arguing that, although covert video surveil-
lance may be legal, it raises ethical concerns).
320. See Morley, supra note 22, at 1604.
321. See id.
322. See Shabde & Craft, supra note 22, at 1605.
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for the sake of diagnosis, particularly when doing so places the
child at substantial risk.
Indeed, the most significant unethical factor inherent in the use
of covert video surveillance is the potential harm to the child. This
factor overshadows even the few scenarios where the use of such
surveillance is not legally invalidated. Advocates of covert video sur-
veillance justify the risk of harm to the child by relying on the
principle of "double effect"-that is, the act of surveillance is
viewed as acceptable because its objective is good and because that
objective may be achieved by the act of surveillance, albeit with in-
cidental and unavoidable harm.25 However, supporters of video
surveillance mistakenly view the harm involved primarily as the in-
vasion of the parents' privacy; they acknowledge the risk of harm to
324the child only as a secondary issue. Perhaps because the sadistic
nature of Munchausen Syndrome by Proxy is so underestimated or
inconceivable, the magnitude of the potential harm to the child in
conducting the surveillance is not fully appreciated. The concept
becomes clearer when applied to sexual abuse or some other form
of "sadistic" abuse, such as burning with cigarettes. Would any doc-
tor not question the ethics of placing a child alone in a private
room with one who is suspected of sexually abusing the child and
then, upon the perpetration of the sexual abuse, simply observing
for fifty, thirty, even ten seconds for the sake of confirming suspi-
cions? If it takes thirty seconds of suffocation or fifteen slaps on the
head to warrant intervention in the surveillance of Munchausen
Syndrome by Proxy cases, how many cigarette burns would have to
be observed before a doctor intervened to protect the child-
regardless of the criminal outcome for the perpetrator? Would any
doctor justify his or her ethics in support of surveillance of these
types of abuse? Why, then, is it justified for suffocation or the injec-
tion of foreign matter? Indeed, the fact that doctors would not
justify the use of surveillance with these other forms of abuse makes
the surveillance inherently unethical.
323. See id. at 1605; see also Shinebourne, supra note 22, at 27 (arguing that surveillance
avoids the harm of separating the child from the parent on inadequate information, but
ignoring the harm to the child inherent in conducting the surveillance).
324. The primary focus on harm to the parent rather than harm to the child during sur-
veillance is evidenced by the argument that covert surveillance is ethical when the video
camera is focused only on the child's bed, but unethical when the camera brings into view
the entire cubicle, so that the parent could be observed while away from the immediate pres-
ence of the child. See, e.g., Frost, supra note 22, at 917. If the primary concern were the harm
to the child, then narrowing the physical scope of the camera to just the child's bed would
not take the surveillance outside the realm of being unethical, *since the risk of harm to the
child is the same, regardless of where the camera is focused.
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In justifying the use of surveillance in the face of the harm of
which the child is at risk, some commentators refer to the potential
harm only in the context of situations in which the surveillance was
of an innocent parent.12 In that scenario, Shinebourne observes
that "[c] overt video surveillance (CVS) did not result in harm to
the child, and most importantly did not result in removal of the
child from an innocent parent."3 2 In these rare situations, however,
that conclusion is obvious because the parent is innocent. Shine-
bourne makes no mention of the more common scenarios,
however, where the parent is not innocent and the child struggles
for life as the parent suffocates the child for thirty seconds at a time
and makes no mention of the fact that, in the former scenario, the
privacy rights of an innocent parent were violated . 7 Illogically,
Shinebourne comments: "I can think of nothing more cruel and
harmful for the child and the mother ... [than] taking the child
away from the parents on inadequate evidence."3 2 Shineboure
simply ignores the harmful effect of covert video surveillance on
the child, stating: "Covert video surveillance (CVS) is a diagnostic
activity that causes no harm to the child... ,,329 Given the statistical
likelihood of confirmed suspicions over false accusations 3 3 0 and the
325. See, e.g., Shinebourne, supra note 22, at 27.
326. IdL
327. See generally Shineboume, supra note 22. One mother accused of perpetrating Mun-
chausen Syndrome by Proxy who was subjected to covert video surveillance in the hospital
writes:
During the three weeks of secret observation my baby was kept in a cubicle for the
whole time and not allowed out even for an hour; was kept connected to a physiologi-
cal monitor for the whole of this time and not allowed out of her cot even for meals;
and was not allowed to sit in a high chair for feeding-I had to feed her through the
bars. I was not allowed to bath her during this time, and, even though she was walking
when she went in the hospital, by the time she came out she could not walk. During
this period of secret observation I was not offered any respite by the staff and was not
offered food. I had to ask a nurse to sit with my daughter so that I could get food. I
had no food at all one day because the nurses were too busy to relieve me.
Being filmed in this way infringed my human rights and my rights as a mother.
Gwyneth Tenney, Covert Surveillance in Munchausen's Syndrome by Proxy: An Infringement of Hu-
man Rights, 308 BRIT. MED.J. 1100, 1100-01 (1994) (letter to the editor). For a commentary
denying the allegations raised by Ms. Tenney, see Samuels & Southall, Covert Surveillance:
Welfare of the Child Must Come First, supra note 22, at 1101-02 (letter to the editor) (asserting
that the logs for the subject case contradict the allegations raised by the mother).
328. Shinebourne, supra note 22, at 27.
329. Id. at 28.
330. For example, in the study by Dr. Southall, suspicion of abuse was confirmed in 33 of
the 39 cases studied. See Southall et al., supra note 19, at 735. Thus, removal of the child with-
out placing the child at further risk by conducting video surveillance would have been
appropriate in those cases.
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more significant risk of harm to the child during covert video sur-
veillance, compared to the effect of temporary separation from the
sole presence of a parent (which, in most situations where a parent
is guilty, has a protective effect), it is simply illogical to use covert
video surveillance before temporary restrictions on supervision.
To other commentators, the ethical debate over the use of covert
video surveillance to detect or confirm Munchausen Syndrome by
Proxy entails two separate moral issues: (1) whether the surveil-
lance should be regarded as research and, therefore, require
assessment by a Research Ethics Committees (REC) before imple-
mentation, and (2) whether the surveillance is morally justified in
certain sorts of extreme cases .3 ' Some argue that the surveillance
tactics described in this Article, like those employed by Dr. David
Southall, should be considered "research" and therefore, should,
be reviewed and approved by an ethics committee.32 Others, in-
cluding Dr. Southall himself, argue that in extreme cases,
surveillance is an established method of clinical practice that is ap-
propriate for some, but not all, cases of Munchausen Syndrome by
Proxy and, therefore is, morally justified .
Regardless of the level of the ethical debate-whether it is simply
a question of research and protocol, or whether it rises to the level
of moral justification-broader considerations are present at both
331. See Gillon, supra note 22, at 131-32 (suggesting that covert surveillance should be
used only when there is no other available alternative that will better protect the child, and
when the surveillance has been considered by an ethics committee and approved on an indi-
vidual basis by ajudge).
332. See, e.g., Evans, supra note 16, at 12 (contending that using covert video surveillance
to detect Munchausen Syndrome by Proxy entails considerable research and that, therefore,
its use should be reviewed by an ethics committee before implementation); see also Evans,
Covert Video Surveillance, supra note 22, at 341-42 (1994) (characterizing surveillance as re-
search rather than as clinical practice because no treatment is provided for the child).
333. See, e.g., David Southall & Martin P. Samuels, Some Ethical Issues Surrounding Covert
Video Surveillance-A Response, 21J. MED. ETHICS 104, 105 (1995) (responding to Dr. Evans'
criticism by arguing that the protocol employed by Dr. Southall was morally justified because
no other protocol would be successful in such extreme cases). Although Dr. Southall's argu-
ment that his protocol is morally justified involves a distinct ethical question from the
question of whether or not the protocol is considered research and warrants review by an
ethics committee, Dr. Southall additionally responds that his protocol was submitted to a
Research Ethics Committee, which agreed that it was not research but suggested that it should
be reviewed by an individual hospital ethics committee. See id. For a counter-response from
Dr. Evans, see Donald Evans, Covert Video Surveillance--A Response to Professor Southall and Dr.
Samuels, 22J. MED. ETHICS 29, 29 (1996) (suggesting that the doctors' response did not ad-
dress the concerns raised in the initial criticism-that there was a research interest in the use
of surveillance). For a second response by Southall and Samuels, see David P. Southall &
Martin P. Samuels, Reply to Dr. Evans Re Covert Video Surveillance, 22 J. MED. ETHICS 32, 32
(1996) (arguing that, despite the harm faced by the child during the surveillance--which
they claim is caused by the parent, not by the surveillance-surveillance is necessary because
of the high standard of proof necessary for the courts).
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levels. For example, it is the "moral tradition of medicine ... to
trust the patient and in any case not to impose treatment or any
other medical intervention in the absence of consent, whether ex-
plicit, implicit or given by an acceptable proxy."334 There is no
consent in covert video surveillance. Instead, medical professionals
are deliberately deceiving parents, deliberately invading their pri-
vacy interests,335 and deliberately producing the environment where
the abuse of a child is likely, or at least, suspected, to occur. Advo-
cates of surveillance assert that "[w]hen there is sound evidence
that the parent is acting against the interests of the child, and en-
dangering the child, the customary right of the parent to make
decisions on behalf of the child may be forfeited., 3 6 There are in-
consistencies in this response, however. First, if the evidence
showing that the parent is acting against the best interest of the
child and endangering the child is so sound, then covert surveil-
lance should be unnecessary. Instead, based on the sound evidence
that the child is being abused, the medical staff should be able to
diagnose abuse by separating the parent and child and assessing
the child's progress. Although this process may be more time con-
suming, it is less deceptive, less dangerous, and certainly less
harmful to the child. However, the practicality of employing this
more cautious protocol will largely depend on the cooperation of
the legal field.
Just as advocates of covert video surveillance acknowledge the
ethical dilemma of the surveillance and the perspective of those
who assert that it is "troublesome" to allow such abuse to occur or
to put a child through such painfully horrific episodes, opponents
of covert video surveillance may also acknowledge the attractiveness
of any means of intervention that so successfully uncovers proof of
the occurrences. After all, Dr. Southall's study suggests that the
abuse perpetrated in the hospital on some children was
"frequent[], if not almost continuous[] .,,3 Dr. Southall justifies the
use of surveillance by asserting that the abuse would have occurred
anyway: "That it was detected in the caring and child-centered envi-
ronment of a hospital raises the possibility that even more severe
abuse may have been inflicted at home."3 Even if this is true, it
cannot justify the infliction of abuse of such a "sadistic nature. 3 3 9
Indeed, Dr. Southall likens Munchausen abuses to abuses resulting
334. Gillon, supra note 22, at 132.
335. See id.
336. Id.
337. Southall et al., supra note 19, at 739.
338. Id.
339. Id. Dr. Southall himself uses this phrase to describe the abuse that occurs. See id.
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in "brutal injuries, such as cigarette burns or multiple fractures. 3 40
Dr. Southall states: "It is difficult ... to accept that placing a burn-
ing cigarette on a child's body could represent a legitimate form of
punishment or an impulsive act of anger."3 4 Is it any less difficult to
accept, or even imagine, that placing a burning cigarette on a
child's body could represent a legitimate form of medical re-
search?
342
Rather, in Munchausen cases doctors should focus on protecting
the child without the risk of harm inherent in the surveillance. Ad-
vocates of surveillance contend, however, that any evidence outside
the scope of covert video surveillance is circumstantial evidence
and is, in most cases, insufficient to assure protection of the child
and prosecution of the perpetrator.343 However, now that Mun-
chausen Syndrome by Proxy is becoming more familiar to the
professions, and now that the common dynamics of the Syndrome
are becoming more determinative in identifying and diagnosing
the disease, both courts and some medical professionals are begin-
ning to view the Syndrome from a different perspective when
balancing the interests involved, especially as the necessity of re-
sorting to video surveillance becomes more questionable.
3
4
340. Id. at 740.
341. Id.
342. In no other type of child abuse-for example, burning with cigarettes-would it be
ethical for a medical staff to arrange for the perpetrator to burn the child with cigarettes in
an effort to prove that the abuse caused the child's condition. Donald and Jureidini state:
"[C] onfirmation [of abuse] is by physical examination [of the victim]...." Donald & Jureid-
ini, supra note 16, at 753-54. Likewise, Colin Morley notes: "'If you suspected a man of
sexually abusing a child you would not put him in a room alone with the girl and see what
happened. Some of these children could have been protected earlier.'" Mark Henderson,
Multiple Cot Deaths May Be Result of Abuse, TIMES (London), Oct. 27, 1997, at 4 (quoting Colin
Morley, consultant pediatrician at Addenbrooke's Hospital in Cambridge, regarding the
study by Dr. Southall).
343. See, e.g., Byard & Burnell, supra note 22, at 356 ("[C]ircumstantial evidence may not
carry as much weight as a videotape of the event in legal proceedings."); Epstein et al., supra
note 22, at 223 (fearing circumstantial evidence is insufficient to obtain solid documentation
of the acts).
344. Even advocates of surveillance acknowledge that the decision to employ covert
video surveillance is made only when the diagnosis is already fairly certain. See Epstein et al.,
supra note 22, at 223. Many others support the argument made in this Article that if there is
enough evidence to use covert video surveillance, then there is enough evidence to use other,
less risky methods to confirm the diagnosis. See, e.g., Morgan, supra note 22, at 1374
(acknowledging that in many cases there is already enough presumptive evidence of abusive
behavior by the parent that using covert video surveillance to justify the child being placed
under supervision "smacks of vindictiveness"); Thomas, supra note 22, at 23 (noting that if
there is sufficiently strong evidence to justify covert video surveillance, it is arguable that the
same evidence would justify taking action without recourse to covert video surveillance). At
least one recent study empirically supports the argument that the child can be adequately
protected by separating the child from the perpetrator, without relying on covert video sur-
veillance. See P. Davis et al., Pwcedures, Placement, and Risks of Further Abuse After Munchausen
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D. Balancing the Interests
Covertly videotaping suspected perpetrators of Munchausen
Syndrome by Proxy clearly affects three interests: (1) the privacy
interest of the alleged perpetrator; (2) the interest of the govern-
ment in obtaining reliable, convincing evidence of abuse for
criminal prosecution and/or an appropriate disposition for the
child; and (3) the interest in protecting the welfare and safety of
the child. This Article has demonstrated that, within the scope of
the Fourth Amendment, the alleged perpetrator generally will have
a reasonable expectation of privacy in the hospital surveillance set-
ting, such that the surveillance constitutes a search that requires a
warrant based on probable cause.14 Arguably, however, the warrant
and the search (the surveillance) are unnecessary because there is
an alternative means of protection available that carries much less
risk of harm to the child and is not completely adverse to the inter-
ests of the parent (assuming the parent is the alleged perpetrator).
Restricting the parent's supervision of the child by requiring tem-
porary supervision of their interactions allows the parent to
continue to "parent" the child, care for the child, make decisions
for the child, and be in the presence of the child. The showing
necessary to place such restrictions on the parent, a showing that
such a restriction is in the best interest of the child, is no lower a
standard for the government than that necessary to procure a war-
rant based on probable cause to conduct the surveillance. Thus, in
cases where a court would otherwise authorize the employment of
potentially harmful covert video surveillance to confirm suspicions
of child abuse, it should instead order temporary removal from the
unsupervised care of the parent to see if the child's condition im-
proves. This should confirm either some perpetration of factitious
or abusive behavior by the parent, or some continuing, undefined
medical complication in the child. By ordering supervision for the
parent, the court assures the best interest of the child and avoids
the potential for further harm to the child by the parent in the
hospital.
This balancing of interests between the State's need to obtain
evidence for criminal prosecution, the parent's interest in privacy,
and the State's need to protect the safety and welfare of the child is
a vital part of deciding whether to allow covert video surveillance to
Syndrome by Proxy, Non-Accidental Poisoning, and Non-Accidental Suffocation, 78 ARCHIVES OF
DISEASE IN CHILDHOOD 217, 221 (1998) ("Without covert video surveillance a high propor-
tion of suffocation victims were protected effectively.").
345. See supra Part II.B.
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confirm suspicions of Munchausen Syndrome by Proxy. The
United States Supreme Court's reasoning in balancing the welfare
of the child against other constitutional interests suggests how
other courts might rule when considering similar interests within
the context of a Munchausen Syndrome by Proxy case. In Maryland
v. Craig,46 the Court balanced the State's interest in protecting
children against a defendant's Sixth Amendment right to confront
the witness against her at trial, and held that the interest in protect-
ing the safety and welfare of children is paramount.3 47 The Court's
analysis in Craig is suited for application to the dilemma of balanc-
ing the interests in cases of covert surveillance of Munchausen
Syndrome by Proxy.
In Craig, the defendant was tried on several charges related to
her alleged sexual abuse of a six-year-old child . The State at-
tempted to produce the child's testimony by a statutorily-permitted
procedure, whereby the child would testify via one-way closed cir-
cuit television. 349 The State had produced medical evidence
demonstrating that if the child were to testify in the courtroom, the
child would suffer severe emotional distress."'0 Craig objected to the
procedure as violative of her Sixth Amendment right to confront
the witnesses against her.35' The trial court held that the process did
not violate the Sixth Amendment because Craig still essentially re-
tained the right to confront the child."' Consequently, the
procedure was employed, and Craig was convicted. 3 The Maryland
Court of Appeals reversed the conviction and remanded for a new
trial, finding that, although the Sixth Amendment is not an abso-
lute guarantee to a face-to-face confrontation in the courtroom, the
State court did not find that the child would suffer harm if the pro-
cedure were not employed. 4 The Supreme Court granted
certiorari to address the effect of the state's interest in protecting
346. 497 U.S. 836 (1990).
347. See id. at 855.
348. See id. at 840.
349. See id. The procedure would allow the judge to receive the testimony of the child
witness, who was alleged to have been the victim of sexual abuse by the defendant. See id.
During the testimony, the child, prosecutor, and defense counsel are in a separate room,
while the judge,jury, and defendant remain in the courtroom. See id. at 841. The child is then
examined and cross-examined in the separate room, while those remaining in the courtroom
observe the child's testimony on a video monitor. See id. The defendant has electronic contact
with the defense counsel, and objections can be made and ruled on by the judge as if the
testimony were being given in the courtroom. See id. at 842.
350. See id. at 842-43.
351. See id. at 842.
352. See id.
353. See id. at 843.
354. See id.
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children on the defendant's Sixth Amendment right to confront
the witnesses against her.1
55
Application of the Court's analysis in Craig to the issue of covert
video surveillance requires balancing the child's best interest
against a competing interest. In Craig, the competing interest is the
defendant's interest in confronting the witnesses against her; in
Munchausen cases, the competing interest is the government's in-
terest in obtaining evidence.3 56 Note, however, that in this analysis,
the harm from which the child is to be protected is the harm in-
herent in the employment of covert video surveillance, not simply
the future protection of the child once he or she is removed from
the hospital. The alternative to surveillance suggested-restriction
of the parent's unsupervised care of the child--directly competes
with both of these interests; i.e., it prohibits the evidence-gathering
interests of the government and interferes with the parent's unfet-
tered right to raise her child without supervision. The special
evidentiary procedure in Craig may be likened to the restriction on
the parent's supervision of the child in suspected Munchausen
cases, where both restrictions are implemented as a means of pro-
tecting the child, but are implemented narrowly in an attempt to
recognize and respect the competing interests to the greatest ex-
tent possible; that is, to restrict visitation rather than to modify
custody altogether. Both procedures restrict the defendants'
rights-to confront a witness in Craig, and to privately parent a
child in Munchausen cases. In Munchausen cases, however, the
court must weigh the interest in protecting the child from harm
(not by conducting the surveillance, but by not conducting the sur-
veillance) against the government's interest in prosecuting the
alleged perpetrator.
355. See id.
356. The parent's right to privately parent her child without supervision is not per se a
competing interest when surveillance is being considered, since it is not specifically balanced
against the risk of harm to the child. Rather, the parent's right to unsupervised care of the
child in the hospital is only an issue when restricting supervision is considered. I have argued
above that, at this level of analysis, the best interest of the child should outweigh that interest.
See supra notes 300-03 and accompanying text. The mother's right to unsupervised care of
her child must, however, play a part in the analysis as an unavoidable consequence of prohib-
iting covert video surveillance in Munchausen cases. In reviewing the evidence presented to
the trial court, the Craig Court of Appeals remanded the case, finding that the judge "did not
explore any alternatives to the use of one-way closed-circuit television." Craig, 497 U.S. at 859.
Although the Supreme Court found that consideration of alternatives could strengthen the
grounds for using other protective measures, it did not require that such evidence be consid-
ered as a prerequisite for the use of closed circuit television. See id. at 860. Similarly, in the
case of Munchausen Syndrome, a lack of alternatives would not be a prerequisite for the use
of surveillance. Since the only other alternative is to allow the child to leave the hospital with
the suspected perpetrator, however, the court may be more inclined to view a restriction on
supervision as the least restrictive viabLe alternative.
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In Craig, the Court details its long held reluctance to restrict the
constitutional protections afforded defendants by the Sixth
Amendment. 57 The Court provides that "any exception to the right
'would surely be allowed only when necessary to further an impor-
tant public policy'-i.e., only upon a showing of something more
than the generalized, 'legislatively imposed presumption of
trauma'.... , The Court added that "in certain narrow circum-
stances, 'competing interests, if "closely examined," may warrant
dispensing with confrontation at trial.' 3 59 Consequently, it equated
the face-to-face scenario with a "preference," which "'must occasion-
ally give way to considerations of public policy and the necessities
of the case.' ,360 The Court further indicated its hesitancy to restrict
the Sixth Amendment protection except "where denial of such
confrontation is necessary to further an important public policy" or
"state interest. 3 6' The Court recognized child protection as a suffi-
ciently compelling state interest to restrict the Sixth Amendment
36protection. 62 Thus, the Court determined that, if the State can
make a threshold showing that the special restriction on the other-
wise affordable competing interest is necessary to protect the
welfare of the child and can show that the child will be harmed if
363the restriction is not employed, it will allow the restriction.
The reasoning in Craig is applicable to the issue of using covert
video surveillance in Munchausen cases. First, the backdrop of
357. See Craig, 497 U.S. at 844 (quoting Coy v. Iowa, 487 U.S. 1012, 1016 (1988); citing
Kentucky v. Stincer, 482 U.S. 730, 748, 749-50 (1987); Pennsylvania v. Ritchie, 480 U.S. 39, 51
(1987); California v. Green, 399 U.S. 149, 157 (1970); Snyder v. Massachusetts, 291 U.S. 97,
106 (1934); Dowdell v. United States, 221 U.S. 325, 330 (1911); Kirby v. United States, 174
U.S. 47, 55 (1899); Mattox v. United States, 156 U.S. 237, 244 (1895)).
358. Craig, 497 U.S. at 845 (quoting Coy, 487 U.S. at 1021).
359. Id. at 848 (quoting Ohio v. Roberts, 448 U.S. 56, 64 (1980) (quoting Chambers v.
Mississippi, 410 U.S. 284, 295 (1973) (citation omitted))).
360. Id. at 849 (quoting Mattox, 156 U.S. at 243).
361. Id. at 850, 852.
362. The Court notes:
We have of course recognized that a State's interest in 'the protection of minor vic-
tims of sex crimes from further trauma and embarrassment' is a 'compelling' one....
'[W] e have sustained legislation aimed at protecting the physical and emotional well-
being of youth even when the laws have operated in the sensitive area of constitution-
ally protected rights.'
Id. at 852 (quoting Globe Newspaper Co. v. Superior Court, 457 U.S. 596, 607 (1982); citing
New York v. Ferber, 458 U.S. 747, 756-57 (1982); FCC v. Pacifica Found., 438 U.S. 726, 749-
50 (1978); Ginsberg v. NewYork, 390 U.S. 629, 640 (1968); Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S.
158, 168 (1944)) (altered capitalization in original); see also Osborne v. Ohio, 495 U.S. 103,
109 (1990) ("[A] State's interest in 'safeguarding the physical and psychological well-being of
a minor' is 'compelling.'" (quoting Ferber, 458 U.S. at 756-57)).
363. See Craig, 497 U.S. at 855-56.
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each analysis is similar: in Craig, the Court recognized that there is
no "absolute right to a face-to-face meeting with witnesses ... at
trial. 3 64 In Munchausen cases, the competing interest-the gov-
ernment's interest in searching for evidence for prosecution-is
also not absolute; in certain situations, it must give way to other in-
terests. 3 65 Likewise, a parent's right to raise her child without
supervision is also not absolute, but may be restricted when it is in
366the best interest of the child to do so.
Second, both in Craig and in Munchausen cases, medical evi-
dence is offered demonstrating that, if a special procedure is not
employed, the child will suffer harm. In Craig, the Court deter-
mined that evidence of severe emotional distress was sufficient to
meet this threshold. 367 The Court supported the "State's traditional
and 'transcendent interest in protecting the welfare of children,'"
especially when "buttressed by the growing body of academic litera-
ture documenting the psychological trauma suffered by child abuse
victims who must testify in court. ... "s Similarly, in Munchausen
cases, courts should consider the growing body of literature regard-
ing Munchausen Syndrome by Proxy, especially studies like that of
Dr. Southall, that document the severe and sadistic harm that may
befall the child when covert video surveillance is employed. 66
Third, in Craig, the Court allowed a restriction on the Sixth
Amendment protection, which it was historically hesitant to allow,
because the special procedure involved other safeguards that as-
sured retention of the essence of the protected right (the right to
confront witnesses) . In Craig, the closed circuit television testi-
mony still allowed the defendant to view the child, cross-examine
the child, object to testimony, and have the jury view the demeanor
311of the child. In Munchausen cases, the special procedure-
364. Id. at 844.
365. Cf id. at 849-50 (explaining that the confrontation clause must sometimes give way
to other interests in the criminal trial process). The government's interest in obtaining evi-
dence in a criminal prosecution is, of course, limited by the protections afforded by the
Fourth Amendment. See U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
366. See, e.g., In re B.B., 500 N.W.2d 9, 12 (Iowa 1993) (stating that although parents have
a legitimate interest in the integrity of the family unit, that interest is not absolute, and condi-
tions may be placed on parents' visitation).
367. See Craig, 497 U.S. at 856.
368. Id. at 855 (quoting Ginsberg v. New York, 390 U.S. 629, 640 (1968) (quoting People
v. Kahan, 206 N.E.2d 333, 334 (N.Y. 1965))).
369. It is imperative that courts considering covert video surveillance in Munchausen
cases recognize the inherently deceptive nature of the disease, the minimal degree to which
medical and legal professionals are aware of, or even believe, the effects of the disease, the
difficulty in diagnosing and confirming the disease, and the significant risk of harm that every
child faces during each incident of surveillance. See discussion supra Part I.A.
370. See Craig, 497 U.S. at 851.
371. See id. at 842.
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temporarily restricting the parent's unsupervised care of the
child-also retains the essence of the protected interest, the right
of the parent to care for her child. The parent may still be with the
child, care for the child, and make decisions for the child. Like-
wise, the government's interest in obtaining evidence is still viable
(the child can still be observed and treated), and the child's medi-
cal condition outside the unsupervised care of the parent may be
compared with the child's previous condition, which itself may con-
firm suspicions of abuse. While both procedures are less than ideal,
both allow the defendant to retain a protected right while assuring
the health and safety of the child, which the Supreme Court has
held to be of paramount concern.3
2
The Craig Court also supported its holding by noting that, within
the context of child testimony, when the child is traumatized by
having to testify face-to-face (i.e., when the restriction is not em-
ployed) the harm caused to the child would "disserve" the goal of
the protected interest.73 In Craig, the protected interest was the
truth-seeking purpose of the Sixth Amendment.374 Similarly, if a
child is at risk of harm from Munchausen Syndrome by Proxy be-
cause of video surveillance, the employment of the surveillance
disserves the government's interest in protecting the child from the
harm of Munchausen Syndrome by Proxy. If the court is to protect
the interests of the child in balancing the interests involved in the
determination to use covert video surveillance, then in accordance
with Craig, the most effective and appropriate means of doing so is
to avoid the use of covert video surveillance and, instead, to employ
the less harmful-but equally effective-method of separating the
child from the alleged perpetrator.
III. OBVIATING THE NEED FOR COVERT VIDEO SURVEILLANCE BY
INTEGRATING MEDICAL AND LEGAL RESOURCES
As the medical profession identifies more cases of Munchausen
Syndrome by Proxy, it develops a greater understanding of the con-
sistencies in the dynamics of each case .3 Experience also teaches
the medical profession that therapy and counseling does little for
372. See id. at 852-53, 855.
373. Id. at 857.
374. See id. ("[Flace-to-face confrontation 'may so overwhelm the child as to prevent the
possibility of effective testimony, thereby undermining the truth-finding function of the trial
itself.'" (quoting Coy v. Iowa, 487 U.S. 1012, 1032 (1988) (BlackmunJ., dissenting))).
375. See Flannery, supra note 9, at 1181-1209.
FALL 1998]
University of Michigan Journal of Law Refom[
the perpetrators of Munchausen Syndrome by Proxy, particularly
376for those who deny the existence of the disease. The medical pro-
fession may have a working definition of the Syndrome, so that
when one doctor tells another doctor, "I suspect Munchausen Syn-
drome by Proxy," the other physician will be able to make an
independent observation and determine whether he or she con-
curs with the opinion. This working definition or diagnosis may not
be equally helpful to a judge or jury, however, who must determine
whether a child was abused, neglected, or remains at risk. In Mun
chausen Syndrome by Proxy cases, there is no one psychological
test or piece of evidence (such as a fingerprint, DNA sample, or eye
witness) that can tell a court that abuse has been perpetrated on a
child and that the abuse was perpetrated by a particular person.
Instead, the Syndrome, by nature, is a circumstantial puzzle that,
when pieced together correctly, only paints a picture that resem-
bles other, similar, circumstantial puzzles. Thus, in drawing the
definitional connection between what the medical field describes
as Munchausen Syndrome by Proxy and what the legal profession
qualifies as child abuse, there are two options: (1) the medical field
may produce that one piece of evidence-that smoking gun-that
video tape-that conclusively evidences that "this mother abused
this child;" or (2) the medical profession may describe the dynam-
ics of what it has generally accepted to be "Munchausen Syndrome
by Proxy" and describe the facts or the circumstances of the case.
The court may then take into account all of the circumstances and
determine that "this case is just like those cases that the medical
profession described as Munchausen Syndrome by Proxy." The dif-
ference between these two options is that the first option entails an
inherent risk of harm to the child. If the court is to avoid the added
risk to the child inherent in the first option by employing the sec-
ond option instead, however, it must be able to reach a legal
conclusion regarding abuse or neglect based solely on medical de-
scriptions of circumstantial evidence. It must be able to conclude
that the circumstantial evidence in any given case equates with
Munchausen Syndrome by Proxy, but it must also make the hard
rule-the litmus test-that the court in In re Bowers refused to
make-that Munchausen Syndrome by Proxy constitutes child
abuse. s7 Some courts have begun the transition from option one to
option two 378 and have thereby obviated the need for covert video
376. See supra notes 143-59 and accompanying text.
377. See In re Bowers, No. 1490, 1992 WL 2870, at *4 (Ohio Ct. App.Jan. 2, 1992).
378. See, e.g., In re Aaron S., 625 N.Y.S.2d 786 (Fano. Ct. 1993); In reJessica Z., 515
N.Y.S.2d 370 (Fam. Ct. 1987).
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surveillance." If courts deciding appropriate dispositions in Mun-
chausen Syndrome by Proxy cases wish to accomplish this, they
must first accept a cumulative diagnosis of the Syndrome and then
apply a res ipsa loquitur standard.
A. A Cumulative Diagnosis
In an effort to facilitate earlier intervention by confirming suspi-
cions and making a diagnosis based on cumulative circumstantial
evidence, some courts in recent Munchausen Syndrome by Proxy
cases have adopted a different perspective in the way they deter-
mine the credibility of the medical diagnosis and the precautions
they take to confirm the diagnosis. 380 That is, some courts have be-
come more flexible in accepting evidence of what the medical
profession has diagnosed as Munchausen Syndrome by Proxy. In
turn, courts are taking added, but less risky, precautions to confirm
the diagnosis.81
In State v. Dejesus, the court respected a doctor's testimony that
"[a] diagnosis of [Munchausen Syndrome by Proxy] is not made on
the basis of psychological testing but, rather, on the match between
known facts and history of the case and known features of
[Munchausen Syndrome by Proxy] .''82 Although the case consid-
ered the effectiveness of therapy and the propriety of a suspended
383
sentence, the acknowledgment by the court regarding the man-
ner in which a court may consider the sufficiency of the diagnosis
384
was a first step toward restricting visitation as a means of confirming
the diagnosis, preventing additional harm, and obviating the need
379. See infra Part III.A.
380. In Florida, for example, Patricia Young is accused of making her two children sick.
See Leiser, supra note 3. The judge separated the children from the mother on a temporary
basis, agreeing to the social worker's request for time "to see if the children's health contin-
ues to improve in their mother's absence." Id. For an example of how courts are becoming
more cautious with regard to the child's safety and more restrictive of parental contact during
the investigation of suspected Munchausen Syndrome by Proxy, see supra note 19 (discussing
the disposition of the case involving Cynthia Lyda). Regarding the court's most recent deci-
sion to reverse its order of unsupervised visits between Lyda and her youngest son, District
Judge David Peeples, in mandating supervised visits, said: "[T] his court is unwilling to decide
such an important child-safety matter without the benefit of all the evidence." See Prentice,
Mother's Visitations Gone, supra note 19; see also State v. Dejesus, No. CR92-73269, 1993 WL
171866, at *1 (Conn. Super. Ct. Apr. 27, 1993); Reid v. State, 964 S.W.2d 723, 732 (Tex. App.
1998); In re Clarissa M.S., No. 94-2017, 1995 WL 27793, at *2 (Wis. Ct. App. Jan. 24, 1995).
381. See supra note 380.
382. DeJesus, 1993 WL 171866, at *1.
383. See id.
384. See i&
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for covert video surveillance. The importance of doing so was
voiced by the Reid opinion, which stated that expert testimony was
part and parcel of the diagnosis, which could not be made without
application to the facts of the case:
Under the peculiar and special circumstances of the psychiat-
ric condition known as [Munchausen Syndrome by Proxy]
and its diagnosis, the experts' use of the facts ... in pursuing
and determining their medical diagnosis, in explaining the
diagnosis to the jury, and giving their opinion as to the cause
of [the child's] death was ... permissible ... testimony as an
aid to the jury in determining the guilt or innocence of appel-
lant.... [B]y its very nature, the [Munchausen Syndrome by
Proxy] diagnosis depends upon expert testimony ... and is
necessary to aid the jury in deciding the ultimate issue of guilt
or innocence in cases such as this.8 5
In In re Clarissa M.S., the court accepted testimony from a doc-
tor, who diagnosed Munchausen Syndrome by Proxy.38 6 The doctor
testified that the diagnosis was based entirely on circumstantial evi-
dence, and could only be made after the symptoms in the child
dissipated during the six-week period when the child was removed
from the perpetrator's care. The doctor testified:
The only real way you ... diagnose the disease is [to] remove
the child from the perpetrator or perpetrator from the child
and if that happens those symptoms should go away because if
there's some underlying disease, whether the [alleged] perpe-
trator is there or not should make no difference. The child
should continue having the symptoms of the disease. So it's
the [separation] that confirms the diagnosis."8
385. Reid, 964 S.W.2d at 732.
386. See In re Clarissa M.S., 1995 WL 27793, at *2-*3.
387. See id. at *3.
388. Id. at *2. This statement is not entirely accurate, although the inaccuracy only fur-
ther supports the need for separation as a circumstantial source of evidence. The statement is
incorrect because it would make a difference if the alleged perpetrator were with the child if
the cause of the symptoms were some underlying disease. If the alleged perpetrator is not the
cause of the child's condition, but is suspected of being so, and the symptoms of some under-
lying illness continue in the presence of the alleged perpetrator, there is no indication that
the alleged perpetrator is not the cause of the symptoms because their presence is continual.
Therefore, it is imperative that the alleged perpetrator not be present during the trial period so
that, if the symptoms do continue, the absence of the alleged perpetrator will indicate that
the source of the symptoms lies elsewhere. This clarification supports the value of temporarily
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Similar testimony was offered in Thomason v. SCAN Volunteer Serv-
ices, Inc., where the court heard evidence that "there was not any
medical reason that had been found for apnea, [and that] the only
way to know for sure whether or not that was happening would be
for the child to be in a neutral setting. 3 89 Likewise, in Reid the doc-
tor testified that the Syndrome is diagnosed by further testing or
removing the child from the alleged perpetrator, at which time the
signs and symptoms will resolve themselves if the alleged perpetra-
tor was the cause.90 Beatrice Crofts Yorker has noted: "Getting
good smoking-gun evidence is very, very hard.... [T]he most im-
portant, definitive way of knowing whether or not the mother is
causing harm to the child is, if upon separation from the mother or
the perpetrator, the child's physical condition improves dramati-
cally and they thrive."3 9'
The testimony in these cases demonstrates that suspicions of the
Syndrome can be confirmed through the temporary separation of
the alleged perpetrator and the child without placing the child at
further risk through covert video surveillance. Of course, the rem-
edy works both ways; it may also dispel suspicions and prove that
the Syndrome is not being perpetrated by the parent. There are
cases where, upon the separation of the child from the alleged
perpetrator, the child's symptoms continued, thereby evidencing
that the alleged perpetrator was not the cause of the child's condi-
tion and that, although Munchausen Syndrome by Proxy was
suspected, it should not have been diagnosed. For example, in Stra-
ton v. Orange County Department of Social Services the child, Ashley,
was ill for her entire life, and the mother was suspected of perpe-
trating Munchausen Syndrome by Proxy.393 Consequently, Ashley
was separated from all contact with her mother.394 After one year,
Ashley's condition did not improve.393 Determining that the parents
were not the source of Ashley's condition, the Family Court re-
turned her to her parents.3 96 Likewise, in Thomason, the child was
separating the suspected perpetrator and the child and allowing the child's condition to
confirm suspicions.
389. Thomason v. SCAN Volunteer Servs., Inc., 85 F.3d 1365, 1372 n.5 (8th Cir. 1996)
(quoting deposition testimony of SCAN worker Andrea Goin).
390. See Reid, 964 S.W.2d at 727.
391. 48 Hours: Jennifer Bush, Allegedly Made all supra note 19 (quoting Beatrice Crofts
Yorker, expert on Munchausen Syndrome).
392. 628 N.Y.S.2d 818 (App. Div. 1995).
393. See id. at 819.
394. See id.
395. See id.
396. See id.
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returned to the parents after being separated for two weeks. 97
When the child's condition did not improve during the separation,
the case was dismissed for insufficient evidence of abuse.39 s
While unfortunate in its premise, in certain respects this sce-
nario can be viewed positively for the following reasons: it helps to
resolve the issue of diagnosing Munchausen Syndrome by Proxy; it
rules out another possible cause of the child's condition; it clears a
grieving parent who was falsely suspected of abuse; it reunites a
sickly child with a parent after a temporary separation; and it allevi-
ates the necessity of potentially harmful covert video surveillance.
This scenario can also be viewed negatively, however, for the follow-
ing reasons: it potentially adds to the list of invasive tests and
procedures already performed on the child; it falsely accuses a
grieving parent of abusing her child; it separates a sickly child from
a loving parent; and it subjects the hospital, doctor, or social service
agency to potential civil liability. For example, in Straton, the par-
ents brought medical malpractice and false imprisonment claims
against the social service agency. 99 Although they had had no con-
tact with their child for an entire year throughout the ordeal, their
claims were dismissed. 400 Likewise, in Thomason, the parents brought
a section 1983 due process claim for interference with their family
integrity.40' The court held that, while the parents had a right to
family integrity under section 1983, they did not have a right to be
free from child abuse investigation. °2 The court qualified the re-
striction on their visitation with the child as an investigation of
potential child abuse and dismissed their claims. °3 Many other law-
suits have been filed against hospitals for allegations of
Munchausen Syndrome by Proxy raised against the parents."
397. See Thomason v. SCAN Volunteer Servs., Inc., 85 F.3d 1365, 1369 (8th Cir. 1996).
398. See id. at 1369-70.
399. See Straton v. Orange County Dep't of Soc. Servs., 628 N.Y.S.2d 818, 819-20 (App.
Div. 1995).
400. See id.
401. See Thomason, 85 F.3d at 1370.
402. See id. at 1371.
403. See id. at 1372-73.
404. Dr. Patricia Siegel, a pediatric psychologist and child abuse authority at Children's
Hospital of Michigan, has stated: "There's lack of institutional support very often.... Nobody
wants to get involved because there's fear of litigation." James Tobin, Diagnosis: Illness Often Is
Hard to Detect; Clever Deceptions, Fear of Lawsuits May Shroud Syndrome, DET. NEWS, Feb. 9, 1998,
at A4 (quoting Dr. Patricia Siegel, concerning the role of litigation in Munchausen Syndrome
by Proxy diagnoses).
In 1996, doctors at the Vanderbilt University Medical Center accused Julie Patrick of per-
petrating Munchausen Syndrome by Proxy on her 11-month-old son, Philip. See Catherine
Trevison, Parents Sue VU Over Mysterious Death of Infant, TENNESSEAN (Nashville), Oct. 8, 1997,
at IB, available in 1997 WL 14650216. A year after the child's death, in a $60 million lawsuit
filed in United States District Court, Patrick accused the hospital staff of providing negligent
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Notwithstanding that restricting parents' right to visitation with
their child has certain negative effects, the court's goal should be
to diagnose the child's condition accurately in a way that most fairly
considers all of the interests involved. To do so, courts should con-
sider all of the cumulative evidence, including expert testimony
about the disease, and accept the credibility of the diagnosis by
matching the circumstantial evidence in the case to the expert
medical testimony about the dynamics of the Syndrome. Part of the
circumstantial evidence that should be considered, which many
experts feel is the most important piece of evidence, should be the
change or consistency in the child's condition after a temporary
restriction on the alleged perpetrator's visitation with the child."5
medical care which led to the child's death. See id. In the lawsuit, Patrick claimed that doctors
worsened the child's mysterious condition by performing invasive procedures that caused the
child's infection to spread, by ignoring symptoms, and by giving him high doses of steroids
that damaged the child's kidneys. See id. As the child's condition worsened, however, doctors
became suspicious, and the Department of Children's Services took custody of the child on
September 6, 1996. See id. The Patricks were seldom able to see their son in the weeks before
he died on October 7, 1996. At a subsequent juvenile court hearing, one doctor testified that
Patrick had injected fecal matter into the child's intravenous feeding tube. See id. When an
autopsy of the child did not reveal any evidence that Patrick had harmed her son, however,
the state dropped the case. See id. Although blood tests revealed that the child may have been
suffering from an undiagnosed tumor, the hospital administration contends that the case was
riddled with complications that pointed to Munchausen Syndrome by Proxy and supported
the hospital staff's actions. See id. For example, the child was presented to the hospital after
several treatment episodes at hospitals in Philadelphia, New Orleans, and Memphis; Patrick
sometimes challenged the decisions of the medical staff; Patrick was extensively involved in
the child's condition and diagnosis, even publishing the child's medical history on the Inter-
net. See id. All of these symptoms fit the "profile" for warranted suspicions of Munchausen
Syndrome by Proxy. See discussion supra Part I. The Patricks now publish a World Wide Web
page for MAMA-Mothers Against Munchausen Syndrome by Proxy Allegations--which
warns parents that they can easily fit the profile by simply advocating for their child. See id.
Ellen Storck, who continues to fight her case of false allegations of Munchausen Syndrome
by Proxy, see generally infra note 425, filed a lawsuit against the New York Department of Social
Services and others, alleging civil rights violations. See Storck v. Suffolk County, No. 97-9110,
1998 WL 398817, at *2 (2d Cir. June 5, 1998).
California physician Dorothy Calabrese, who was found guilty of cruelty to animals and
faces up to one year in prison for starving her horses and llamas, filed a civil rights lawsuit
against numerous officials for the removal of her four children in 1995. See Masciola, supra
note 97. Calabrese is seeking more than $4 million in damages arising from officials' allega-
tions that she was treating her children for nonexistent medical problems and causing them
harm for reasons related to personal aggrandizement. See id. No charges were brought
against her, and the children were returned after two weeks. See id.
405. For example, Donna Rosenberg, M.D., Assistant Professor of Pediatrics at the Uni-
versity of Colorado in Denver, cautions that physicians should always choose protecting the
child over obtaining evidence, even though video surveillance does not always result in harm,
commenting: "Don't send the [child] home to be poisoned again so that you can gather
gastricjuices. The next time you see him, he may present DOA." Janice Rosenberg, Patient by
Proxy, Am. MED. NEWS, Dec. 16, 1996, at 18, available in 1996 WL 11860617; see also In reAaron
S., 625 N.Y.S.2d 786, 792 (Fam. Ct. 1993) (explaining that the strongest support for doctor's
opinion that Munchausen Syndrome by Proxy was being perpetrated was the fact that the
child's condition subsided when he was removed from the mother's care).
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After considering this evidence, the court should be inclined to
find that Munchausen Syndrome by Proxy either has or has not
been perpetrated without having to resort to covert video surveil-
lance in either case. Some courts have taken a further step to
support their inclination by applying a res ipsa loquitur standard to
their consideration of the cumulative evidence." 6 The application
of this standard assures the safety of the child by obviating the need
for covert video surveillance and narrowing the gap between the
medical diagnosis of the Syndrome and a court's hesitancy to ac-
cept the diagnosis and to respond with an appropriate disposition
for the child.
B. A Res Ipsa Loquitur Standard
The Family Court in New York has applied a res ipsa loquitur
standard in two cases of Munchausen Syndrome by Proxy-In re
Jessica z. 40 7 and In re Aaron S.40° In these cases, the court recognized
the difficulty in dealing with the phenomenon of Munchausen
Syndrome by Proxy.& Yet the court demonstrated that the applica-
tion of a res ipsa loquitur standard does not mean that the child will
automatically be removed from the parent.410 Despite the applica-
tion of this strict standard, the court may still implement a
disposition best suited for the child's well-being. The court in In re
Aaron S., following its decision In re Jessica Z., provided that when
video surveillance is not used and the parent is separated from the
child, a res ipsa loquitur standard is applied to judge whether or not
Munchausen Syndrome by Proxy is a factor.4 '
The res ipsa standard was first applied in Jessica Z., where the
court acknowledged the medical profession's urgings to become
more aware of the reality of the Syndrome and of its effect in the
legal and medical fields.12 In Jessica Z., the mother, Lori Z., was ac-
406. See discussion infra Part III.B.
407. 515 N.Y.S.2d 370, 377 (Fam. Ct. 1987).
408. 625 N.Y.S.2d at 789.
409. See Aaron S., 625 N.Y.S.2d at 787-88;Jessica Z., 515 N.Y.S.2d at 372.
410. See Jessica Z., 515 N.Y.S.2d at 378 (holding that, despite the determination that
mother perpetrated Munchausen Syndrome by Proxy and a finding of abuse, the child was
not removed from the parents' home because removal posed additional risks to the child).
411. See Aaron S., 625 N.Y.S.2d at 789.
412. SeeJessica Z., 515 N.Y.S.2d at 372. Acknowledging the admonitions of the medical
profession, the court heeded the urges of medical experts: "It is incumbent on medical per-
sonnel involved with such children and families to educate the legal authorities about this
form of child abuse to insure [sic] [the] proper care for the children." Id. (quoting Orenstein
& Wasserman, supra note 16, at 624).
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cused of repeatedly causing her daughter Jessica to ingest large
quantities of laxatives to cause her to have severe diarrhea, infec-
tion of the blood, dehydration, and extended hospitalizations.413 In
addressing these facts, the court considered that "the [S]yndrome
may be far commoner than previously supposed but.., its true in-
cidence is unknown because detection is so inherently difficult."
414
It further recognized that there are "obstacles to appropriate diag-
nosis and management" of Munchausen Syndrome by Proxy cases,
which include "skepticism of the legal authorities presented with
the paradox of a parent who appears to be seeking the best medical
care for the child, and to love and dote on the child, while at the
same time causing the child's illness, suffering and even death.,
415
In the 14-day trial, the court heard from 21 witnesses, including
12 doctors and one psychologist. All of the evidence was
circumstantial, with the exception of a lab result indicating that the
child had ingested laxatives. 6 A critical piece of circumstantial
evidence was the fact that the child's condition markedly improved
after the child's contact with the mother was restricted with
supervision. 7 Based on that fact, the court was able to draw the
conclusion that the child would not have suffered, were it not for
his mother's abuse.4 s Under the statutorily imposed res ipsa loquitur
standard:
proof of injuries sustained by a child or of the condition of a
child of such a nature as would ordinarily not be sustained or
exist except by reason of the acts or omissions of the parent or
other person responsible for the care of such child shall be
prima facie evidence of child abuse.... 419
413. See id. at 370-71.
414. Id. at 371.
415. Id. (citing David A. Waller, Obstacles to the Treatment of Munchausen by Proxy Syndrome,
22J. AM. ACAD. CHILD PSYCHIATRY 80, 81 (1983) (regarding study where five of 23 children
who were victims of Munchausen Syndrome by Proxy died)). Other obstacles noted by the
court were the following: "(1) failure to appreciate fully the relationships of [Munchausen
Syndrome by Proxy] to non-accidental poisoning of children; (2) the striking symbiotic tie
between mother and child; [and] (3) the highly persuasive denial typical of the par-
ent/perpetrator...." Id. Commenting on how doctors can be duped into overlooking the
possibility of the Syndrome, the court quoted Dr. Newman's testimony that "[e]veryone was
so trusting-so helpful-so satisfied with the efforts of the doctors and staff." Id. at 373.
416. See id. at 372-77.
417. See id. at 374.
418. See id. at 377.
419. N.Y. FAM. CT. ACT § 1046(a) (ii) (McKinney 1983). For application of the res ipsa lo-
quitur standard to other cases of abuse or neglect, see In re Tara H., 494 N.Y.S.2d 953, 956
(Fam. Ct. 1985) (applying res ipsa loquitur theory not only to cases where the child never
leaves the parents' control, but also to cases where the parent has primary custody during the
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The Jessica Z. court held that the res ipsa standard is particularly
applicable when no other explanation for the child's condition is
i-" 420)
offered.
Despite these findings by the court and the application of the res
ipsa loquitur theory, the court still balanced all of the risks inherent
both in leaving the child with the perpetrating parent and in plac-
ing the child in foster care.421 The court recognized that if the child
were to remain at home with the parent, the parent might perpe-
trate the abuse on the child again, simulate the abuse that was
already perpetrated on the child, or avoid treating a legitimate ill-
ness in the child because the parent felt threatened by legal
proceedings if treatment were sought.4 2 2 The court also recognized
the harm caused by removing the child from her parent and plac-
423ing her in foster care, however. The court held that the
appropriate disposition for the child was to remain in the mother's
424
care, with therapeutic intervention.
The New York Family Court again applied the res ipsa loquitur
theory in In re Aaron S.425 Like the court in In rejessica Z., this court
critical period when the child sustains the injury); In re Charmine W., 402 N.Y.S.2d 19, 20
(App. Div. 1978); In reTashyne L., 384 N.Y.S.2d 472, 473 (App. Div. 1976).
420. See In rejessica Z., 515 N.Y.S.2d at 377. The court noted the only other case in New
York that involved Munchausen Syndrome by Proxy. See id. (citing N-943-84 (N.Y. Fam. Ct.
1985) (theory applied against both parents, who allegedly had contaminated the child's IV
lines with corrosive substances)).
421. See id. at 378.
422. See id.
423. See id.
424. See id. The court acknowledged the medical evidence that, historically, therapeutic
intervention had failed to be effective in preventing recidivism, but since none of the parties
challenged the disposition, the court returned the child to the perpetrator. See id. The doctor
testified, notwithstanding medical evidence to the contrary, that, in his experience, confron-
tation resulted in the cessation of behavior and that therefore he felt that, with appropriate
safeguards in place, there was no harm in the child returning to the care of the mother. See
id.
425. 625 N.Y.S.2d at 786. There is a long history of facts in the case, which has been
highly publicized in the media. Aaron Storck was initially removed from his mother's care in
1992, after New York authorities suspected his mother suffered from Munchausen Syndrome
by Proxy. See Storck v. Suffolk County, No. 97-9110, 1998 WL 398817, at *1 (2d Cir. June 5,
1998); see also Douglas C. Lyons, Teen In Custody Fight Flees Cops, Goes Home with Mon, SUN-
SENTINEL (Ft. Lauderdale, Fla.), June 21, 1997, at 6B. He was later placed with relatives in
Ohio, where he was joined by his mother. See id. In violation of a court order restricting the
mother to supervised visits with the boy, the family later moved to Florida, and Ellen Storck
filed a lawsuit against New York state officials, doctors, and social workers, alleging civil rights
violations. See Storck, 1998 WL 398817, at *2; see also Chau Lam, Court: Woman Must Return Son,
NEWSDAY, July 4, 1997, at A20. In June 1997, however, authorities in New York obtained a
court order for Aaron to be returned to New York. See Lyons, supra. When the child saw the
police coming, he fled. See id. Subsequently, a federal court judge ruled that the boy must be
returned to New York. See Lam, supra. Ellen Storck protested the ruling, however. See David
Cazares, Son, Mother Make Plea for Help: Don't Let N.Y. Officials Separate Us, SUN-SENTINEL (Ft.
Lauderdale, Fla.), Aug. 23, 1997, at 2B. In January 1998, all parties agreed for the family to
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again stated its concern for the difficulties involved in even accept-
ing that the Syndrome exists .426 Likewise, the court accepted that
"[Munchausen Syndrome by Proxy] is a diagnosis reached after
examining the total picture presented, not any one specific fac-
tor."'12 7 Noting the progression of the diagnosis, which includes the
separation of the child and the alleged perpetrator as part of the
cumulative diagnosis, the court found that:
suspicion ... is raised when a child presented to a doctor has
one or more medical problems which do not respond to
treatment or which follow an unusual course which is persis-
tent and puzzling, has unexplainable physical or laboratory
findings which are physically or clinically impossible and
where such puzzling and/or bizarre symptoms abate sponta-
neously when the child is separated from his parent.
2
1
With regard to confirming the diagnosis, the court expressly pre-
sented the two available options: "surreptitious videotaping of the
mother inducing symptoms ... [or] an immediate and almost mi-
raculous recovery when contact with the mother was curtailed and
strictly monitored. ' 29 While the court did not specifically condemn
the use of covert video surveillance, it stated that without it, the
court must apply a res ipsa loquitur theory where the circumstantial
evidence is cumulative and the abatement of the illness upon sepa-
ration from the alleged perpetrator speaks for itself.43° Of the two
options offered by the court for confirming the diagnosis, the latter
is legally, medically, and ethically more favorable, because it more
completely protects the child, and it equally confirms or refutes the
suspicions of the diagnosis. Even the court in In re Aaron S. stated,
"The strongest support for [the diagnosis of Munchausen Syn-
drome by Proxy] is that [the child] has had no [symptoms] since
he was removed from his mother's care." 2 Commenting on the
undergo a comprehensive evaluation while Aaron remained in the care of Social Services,
having only supervised visits with his mother. See Douglas C. Lyons, Mother, Son Fight to Reunite,
Tests Planned; Mom Accused of Causing Her Child's Illness, SUN-SENTINEL (Ft. Lauderdale, Fla.),
Jan. 21, 1998, at 8B. On June 5, 1998, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit denied
Storck's appeals of the district court's denial of her injunction to prevent the Department of
Social Services from retaining custody of the child and her request for removal of the case to
federal court. See Storck v. Suffolk County, No. 97-9110, 1998 WL 398817, at *1, *3-*4 (2d Cir.
June 5, 1998).
426. See Aaron S., 625 N.Y.S.2d at 787.
427. Id. at 788.
428. Id.
429. Id. at 789.
430. See id.
431. Id. at 792.
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process for reaching the diagnosis, the court provided: "The find-
ing that he is the victim of [Munchausen Syndrome by Proxy] has,
as its basis, a cumulation of behaviors encompassing the last four
years; no one particular procedure, treatment, or hospitalization
can be the basis of that determination. Rather the entire course of
conduct must be examined."
43
With regard to the diagnosis of Munchausen Syndrome by Proxy,
the holdings in In re Jessica Z. and In re Aaron S. are consistent,
which is unusual, given the varied history of Munchausen Syn-
drome by Proxy cases. A comparison of the dispositions in the two
cases clearly shows the ongoing dependency between the medical
and legal fields in working towards consistent and appropriate dis-
positions for the children. The fact that, in both cases, the court
required the consideration of cumulative evidence and the applica-
tion of the res ipsa loquitur theory did not affect the court's
consideration of the appropriate disposition for the children; that
was entirely dependent on medical interpretation and insight.4 3 In
In rejessica Z., despite a history of medical evidence to the contrary,
the court returned the child to the perpetrating parent based on
the doctor's belief that the harmful behavior would cease upon
confrontation.434 Contrary to the finding in In rejessica Z., however,
the court in In re Aaron S. found that "Once a condition, status,
state of facts or state of mind is found to exist it is presumed to con-
tinue.... [Munchausen Syndrome by Proxy] conduct will not
spontaneously abate with the finding of neglect."435 Thus, the court
in In re Aaron S. extended the application of its findings to the
mother's other children.3 6 The court was concerned that, once the
subject child was removed from the mother's care, she would proj-
ect the same behavior onto her other children. 43 '7 Acting on this
concern, the court held that "a court cannot and should not 'await
broken bone or shattered psyche before extending its protective
cloak around [a] child.' ,
43
1
8
Despite the differing dispositions likely to occur when a court
considers the best interest of each individual child on an ad hoc
basis, the important consistency drawn from In rejessica Z. and In re
Aaron S. is that both apply a standard, comprehensive framework
for dealing with Munchausen Syndrome by Proxy. The application
432. Id. at 794.
433. See id.; see also In rejessica Z., 515 N.Y.S.2d 370, 378 (Fam. Ct. 1987).
434. SeeJessica Z, 515 N.Y.S.2d. at 378.
435. Aaron S., 625 N.Y.S.2d at 794 (citing In re Iris C., 363 N.Y.S.2d 7, 8 (A.D.2d 1974)).
436. See id. at 794.
437. See id.
438. Id. (quoting In reAnthony, 366 N.Y.S.2d 333, 336 (1975)).
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of that framework in these disparate cases suggests that if courts
will admit and consider cumulative circumstantial medical evidence
of Munchausen Syndrome by Proxy and apply a res ipsa loquitur le-
gal theory to it, then courts and medical professionals will be able
to avoid the necessity of relying on covert video surveillance. This
approach will avoid further harm to the child and intrusion against
the parent, and still effectively and conclusively confirm or dispel
suspicions of abuse. Even under the language of the guidelines re-
sulting from Dr. Southall's study, covert video surveillance should
not be necessary. Under the North Staffordshire guidelines,
"[c]overt video surveillance could be used where it is agreed that
evidence sufficient to ensure protection for the child through care
proceedings is not already available from other sources., 439 Thus, if
courts continue to move in the direction of recent precedent in
Munchausen Syndrome by Proxy cases, where cumulative circum-
stantial evidence tips the balance of interests in favor of protecting
the child from the abuse inherent in the surveillance, particularly
in states like New York, where the res ipsa loquitur theory is applied,
then evidence sufficient to confirm suspicions without relying on
covert video surveillance would be available.
CONCLUSION
In cases where a child is likely to be subject to covert abuse by a
parent, one may argue that the interest in protecting the child
from such abuse supersedes the ethical obligation not to deceive
the parent or infringe upon his or her privacy interests. Employing
the very abuse that is sought to be avoided in achieving this end,
however, is medically, legally, and ethically invalid. Medically, this
argument may be justifiable for some; for others, not. Although
reasonable medical minds may differ, this Article concludes that it
is medically contradictory and unsound to inflict harm in the name
of preventing harm.
Legally, the infliction of harm in the name of preventing harm is
unnecessary and unsupportable. It will remain so unless courts de-
termine that Munchausen Syndrome by Proxy is a rare and unique
form of abuse that warrants specialized investigation and interven-
tion techniques, which otherwise would not be legally justified.
More so, it is beyond legal justification for a medical professional to
assume the role of fact-finder, and unilaterally to qualify a parent's
439. Guidelines, supra note 310, 3.3, at 17.
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legal rights and interests based upon those facts. Thus, even if con-
ceptually the use of covert video surveillance to detect or confirm
Munchausen Syndrome by Proxy were legally justified by a court of
law based on the extreme and rare circumstances that accompany
the disease, the employment of such measures should be consid-
ered and approved on an ad hoc basis by a court of law, not by the
subjective whims of a frustrated and suspicious medical staff.
Ethically, this Article concludes that it is contrary to the inherent
tenets of the medical profession, to the best interest of children,
and to logic and reason, to allow a child to struggle through sixty
seconds of suffocation in the interest of either research or confirm-
ing suspicions. Those interests, in any case, should be satisfied
through less cruel and less dangerous means. That is not to say that
the alternative should be taken lightly. It defies logic, however, to
assert that there is sufficient evidence to convince a judge that a
child should be purposely subjected to cruel and possibly fatal
abuse, yet that this same evidence is insufficient to convince ajudge
that, in the interest of a child's safety and well-being, the child
should be temporarily separated from the parent until suspicions
can be confirmed or dispelled.
Fighting fire with fire by employing child abuse to prevent child
abuse is ludicrous and unethical, however satisfying or necessary
the result. The solution to the medical and ethical dilemma of em-
ploying covert video surveillance to detect or confirm Munchausen
Syndrome by Proxy lies in the willingness and ability of judges and
juries to accept the disease as a unique form of child abuse that
warrants unique consideration, such as that given by the Family
Court of New York, which considers cumulative circumstantial evi-
dence of Munchausen Syndrome by Proxy and to it applies the res
ipsa loquitur theory. While judges may find accepting the reality of
the disease unnerving, it should not take the perpetuation of evil to
bring about good, when all that is required to do justice is an open
mind, a willingness to err on the side of caution, and a Hippocratic
resolve to "first, do no harm."
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